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A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law:
Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil Procedure
Charles W. Mooney, Jr. *

Abstract
This paper develops a normative theory oj' bankruptcy law called
''procedure theory." The core ofprocedure theory is that bankruptcy law
exists in order to maxin1ize the recoveries for holders oflegal entitlements
("rightsholders '') in respect ofafinancially distressed debtor. Bankruptcy
law in the United States is a branch ofcivil procedure and the jurisdiction
offederal courts. Procedure theory holds that it generally is wrong in
bankruptcy to redistribute a debtor's wealth awayjrom its rightsholders to
benefit third-party interests, such as at-will employees and the general
community. It also generally is wrong to rearrange priorities in
bankruptcy as among a debtor's rightsholders. Procedure theory explains
what bankruptcy law is supposed to achieve, not how bankruptcy law is to
achieve its proper ends.
Procedure theory draws support from three perspectives. First, it argues
that it is incoherent to provide different substantive rules in bankruptcy
when those substantive rules are equally applicable outside bankruptcy.
This incoherence offends the interest ofjustice. Second, procedure theory
is supported by the Erie doctrine in federal courts and considerations of
federalisn1. Basic substantive law rules should not vary depending on the
forum in which a proceeding is conducted-state court or bankruptcy
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court. Third, a public choice analysis reveals the enormous power ofthe
bankruptcy bar.
The Judiciary Committees in Congress and the
bankruptcy courts are in1proper venues for the developn1ent oflaw that is
not bankruptcy specific.
Ajustificationfor bankruptcy law n1ust be that, as a collective proceeding,
it can maximize or enhance recoveries and benefits for rightsholders when
compared to nonbankruptcy law.. This Article exan1ines a number of
importantfeatures ofUnited States bankruptcy law that conflict with (or at
least appear to conflict with) procedure theory. It generally rationalizes
procedure theory with several of these features. In several other cases,
procedure theory calls for a modification ofcurrent law.
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1. Introduction
During the past two decades, contelnporary bankruptcy scholars have engaged
in extensive academic debates that have played out in many law review articles and
1
several books. This Article engages iInportant aspects ofthose debates. It expands
on a theme that I suggested ahnost a decade ago. 2 It describes and defends a
1. See infra Pati II.C (presenting the debate among bankruptcy scholars).
2. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Hosing Down Senior Clain1s with a Quicker and Dirtier
Chapter 11, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1153, 1158 (1994) (commenting on Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Compensating Unsecured Creditors for Extraordinary Bankruptcy
Reorganization Risks, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1133 (1994). The article states:
When a claimant ... employ[s] the judicial system to recover on a claim, the end
game converts the obligor's property into property of the claimant, such as by levy
of execution, sheriffs sale, and so forth. Bankruptcy is a part of that system. Its
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normative theory of bankruptcy law that views the core role of bankruptcy law as
the maximization of recoveries for those with nonbankruptcy legal entitlements
relating to financially distressed debtors. 3 Stated otherwise, bankruptcy law should
exist, essentially, in order to serve the interests ofthe holders ofnonbankruptcy legal
entitlements. I call these holders "rightsholders. ,,4 For reasons developed fully
below, I refer to this normative theory as "procedure theory."
This Article focuses primarily, butnot exclusively, on business bankruptcy. It
is in business bankruptcies, in particular in Chapter 11, that the greatest telTIptations
may exist to favor extraneous social goals at the expense of a debtor's
rightsholders. 5 It also focuses primarily on bankruptcy law in the United States, but
domain is an orderly procedure that should allow claimants to obtain at least as
much as they would have obtained in the nonbankruptcy enforcement process, and
perhaps more .... Bankruptcy is civil procedure-no less but absolutely no more.

ld.
3. References to bankruptcy are intended to enCOlnpass not only liquidation under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, but also reorganization under Chapter 11. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701
et seq. (2000)~ 11 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. (2000).
4. Much of the ongoing debate about bankruptcy policy centers on the question whether
the core principle of bankruptcy is the maximization of creditor wealth or whether it has more
expansive goals. See infra Part II.C (discussing the role of procedure theory in the normative
debates on bankruptcy philosophy and policy). In his critique of the use of bankruptcy for
expansive goals, Christopher Frost contrasts a debtor's "investors" with its "non-investors," but
that terminology does not seem to capture involuntary creditors (although Frost clearly intends
that they be encompassed as "investors"). Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive
Policies and the Limits ofthe Judicial Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 75, 80 n.l6 (1995). I use the
term "rightsholders" to encompass the holders of all legal entitlements vis-a-vis a debtor,
including but not limited to "creditors," such as shareholders, governmental regulators, and the
beneficiaries of laws and regulations that apply to debtors. Even so, "creditor" is quite broadly
defined in the Bankruptcy Code to include entities that hold "claims." 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)
(2000) (defining "creditor"). "Claim" is defined broadly to lnean:
(A) right to paylnent, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured~ or
(B) right to an equitable relnedy for breach of performance ifsuch breach gives rise
to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced
to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured,
or unsecured.
11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(2000).
5.
See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775,776-77 (1987)
(discussing competing goals of bankruptcy). Professor Warren states:
Professor [Douglas] Baird and I have agreed to debate the basis of bankruptcy
policy in the context of business bankruptcy. While we both believe that the
principles we discuss have significance in a consumer setting as well, we recognize
that additional issues should be a part of a discussion about consumer bankruptcy
policy and that those issues would make the discussion even more complex.
ld.
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, the core insights of procedure theory should be robust in the conSUlner bankruptcy
setting as well as under the laws of any jurisdiction.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the principles elnbraced by
procedure theory, including its ends and basic features. It also situates
procedure theory in the ongoing normative debates about bankruptcy
philosophy and policy and distinguishes procedure theory from much of the
other bankruptcy scholarship that has been featured in these debates. In
particular, it addresses academic critiques of the path-breaking scholarship of
Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson and identifies procedure theory's
sitnilarities to, and differences from, Baird and Jackson's theoretical work. Part
III makes the normative case for procedure theory and identifies sources and
bases of its normative content. It first addresses the application of procedure
theory to the interests of a debtor's rightsholders versus those of
nonrightsholders and then as to the rights of a debtor's rightsholders inter see It
then fashions a norlnative account of procedure theory based on jurisprudential
and philosophical grounds, on theoretical underpinnings of civil procedure law
and federal court jurisdiction, and on a public choice analysis. Part IV
addresses bankruptcy law as a procedural system for Inaxhnizing recoveries and
benefits for a debtor's rightsholders. It considers justifications for bankruptcy
law as a special branch of procedural law. It also identifies several aspects of
bankruptcy law that alter or appear to alter nonbankruptcy entitlements. It
explains how some of these alterations may be coherent under, and entirely
consistent with, procedure theory. Part IV also tests procedure theory against
various controversial elements of bankruptcy law and identifies some aspects of
current bankruptcy doctrine that offend procedure theory. In this way it
explores the explanatory and instructional powers of procedure theory to
suggest doctrinal reforms. Part V then concludes the Article.
A complete account of procedure theory first would address all aspects of
nonbankruptcy law as affected by all aspects of bankruptcy law. Second, it
would identify and call for retention of only those aspects of bankruptcy law
that cOlnport with procedure theory and the elimination of those that do not.
Third, it would compare and contrast procedure theory with all of the
theoretical academic literature on bankruptcy during (at least) the past two-plus
decades. Fully realized, that project would be not only enormously ambitious
but also quite lengthy. Instead, this Article will be satisfied to examine the
intersection of some of the more important aspects of nonbankruptcy law with
some of the more significant aspects of bankruptcy law, and it necessarily will
be selective in the breadth and depth of its consideration ofthe literature. This
initial project provides a platform for subsequent work that will target narrower,
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more discrete areas of nonbankruptcy law and bankruptcy law with
correspondingly greater depth and detail.

II. Basic Elements ofProcedure Theory
A. Normative Theory and Bankruptcy Policy
This Article should pose and answer several questions before outlining the
content and significance of procedure theory. For example: What is a
normative theory of bankruptcy law? What distinguishes a nonnative theory of
bankruptcy law froln other approaches-both nonnative and non-nonnativeto examining and providing content to bankruptcy policy? What is it that a
normative theory of bankruptcy law does and does not do?
In his 1996 article, Professor Donald Korobkin explained how normative
theory could contribute to the ongoing policy debates about bankruptcy law. 6
For the most part, I subscribe to Korobkin's taxonomy of bankruptcy
scholarship, which Inay be non-theoretical or theoretical and non-normative or
normative. 7 A normative theory can provide a cOlnpelling story about what the
means and ends of bankruptcy law should be. 8 Although a normative theory
also may provide explanatory insights concerning current bankruptcy law, it
need not do so (at least not with perfect precision) to be successful. As
Korobkin has observed, "[t]he very object ofa nonnative theory is to establish a
critical perspective on current law. ,,9 Obviously, normative theory is based on

6. See generally Donald R. Korobkin, The Role 0.[ Nornlative Theory in Bankruptcy
Debates, 82 IOWA L. REv. 75 (1996).
7. ld. at 121-22. Actually, I(orobkin also offers even richer taxonomies, but those

mentioned in the text are sufficient for present purposes. Although I find Korobkin's analysis of
bankruptcy scholarship both insightful and useful, as will become clear below, I reject
Korobkin's own normative theory as, inter alia, incoherent. See infra notes 155-65 and
accompanying text (criticizing Donald R. I(orobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of
Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (1991) [hereinafter Rehabilitating Values] and Donald R.
Korobkin, Contractarianisn1 and the Normative Foundations ofBankruptcy Law, 71 TEX. L.
REv. 541 (1993) [hereinafter Contractarianism]).
8. See Korobkin, supra note 6, at 111-12 (discussing the value of normative theory).
9. Id. at 98. Oddly, Korobkin criticizes Baird and Jackson's "common pool account" of
bankruptcy, which Korobkin acknowledges is a "system-based" normative theory, because that
account "fails as an explanation" of current law. ld. at 112-16 (emphasis added); see also
KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 2 (1997)
[hereinafter FAILURE] ("Despite the zeal and stridency of the bankruptcy system's critics, many
of them have not confronted, and some have not even recognized, this prescriptive challenge,
namely, addressing what bankruptcy law ought to be in contemporary American society. ")
(footnote omitted).
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values. As a theory, moreover, normative theory may offer guidance for
resolving competing values. IO To be successful, a normative theory of law must
identify the nature and source of the values and principles on which it is based
and also must offer some meaningful prescriptive force concerning how law
should be altered or preserved. But it need not resolve every detail of a large
and comprehensive statute such as the Bankruptcy Code. 11 Put in context,
procedure theory prescribes what bankruptcy law should achieve, but it does
not dictate precisely how to accomplish its goals lTIOst effectively, except in a
very general fashion. 12 Indeed, there is no reason to suppose that a single
means or structure can reach the ends of bankruptcy law.
The following subpart outlines the essential attributes ofprocedure theory.
Procedure theory identifies the ends that bankruptcy law is supposed to achieve.
Essential goals are the cornerstone of any normative theory of bankruptcy law.
Procedure theory holds that the goal of bankruptcy law as a system is to
maximize the recoveries or other benefits for the debtor's rightsholders. A
corollary of this principle recognizes the procedural character of procedure
theory: Bankruptcy law should take substantive legal entitlements of
rightsholders as it finds them, honoring both powers and limitations under
nonbankruptcy law.

B. The Ends and Principles ofProcedure Theory ofBankruptcy Law
1. Bankruptcy as Civil Procedure
Procedure theory conceptualizes bankruptcy law as a subset of the law of
civil procedure. I3 Thus, before turning in earnest to what it is that bankruptcy
10. See Korobkin, supra note 6, at 111 (" [N]onnative theory attempts to obtain a critical
perspective on the means that we use and the ends that we seek. ").
11. Id. (discussing normative law). Korobkin states:
[U]nlike a predictive theory, a normative theory does not undet1ake to identify the
best or most efficient proposal for achieving a particular end. Certainly, a
normative theory serves to criticize values that underlie such proposals, and
therefore it may have legislative implications. But it is not less successful as a
normative theory if the theorizing results in normative prescriptions rather than
specific legislative advice.
ld. at 98.
12. See infra Part II.D (explaining how bankruptcy law may maximize recoveries for
rightsholders).
13. See infra Part III.D (addressing in some detail below the procedural and federal courts
account of procedure theory). For convenience I intend an expansive meaning for references to
"civil procedure" and "procedure." For example, I realize that "civil procedure" does not
necessarily include the subject matter jurisdiction of courts, but I intend the term to reach that
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law should do (and does), it is helpful to focus on what it is that civil procedure
should do (and does). It is the relationship of procedural law to substantive
doctrinal law that gives content to the nonbankruptcy legal entitlements of
rightsholders. Books on civil procedure normally begin with an identification
of the substance-procedure dichotomy. 14 A standard conceptualization is that
substantive law creates legal rights and duties and procedural law provides a
means to enforce the substantive .rights and duties. I5 Procedural law serves
substantive law, the latter having primacy in this sense. I6 Although a
significant role of procedural law is the actual resolution of disputes between
and alTIOng parties, it also is a "social process." 17 Procedural law must provide
far. Procedure theory also embraces civil procedure as consisting of more than merely
"procedural" rules and as encompassing as well the law of remedies. For now, it is useful to
note one response to the question, "Why procedure?" In developing a theory it is helpful to
base or ground the theory in a familiar field from which direct or analogous wisdom and insight
might be derived. Obviously, bankruptcy is bankruptcy, and it has some distinctive features.
See infra Parts n.D and IV (discussing the distinctive features of bankruptcy). Ultimately,
procedure theory must stand or fall on its own normative bottom and not on whether one agrees
or disagrees that it is a branch of civil procedure.
14. See, e.g., FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.1, at
1-2 (3d ed. 1985) (presenting the substance-procedure difference); RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN ApPROACH 1 (1989) (same). I am aware, of course, that only the
most naive would believe that every legal rule or standard could be labeled definitively as
"procedural" or "substantive'! or that a meaningful understanding of the rule or standard could
be immanent in the label. But that is not to say that the dichotomy is nonexistent or
meaningless.
15. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 14, at 1 (discussing the standard conceptualization of
substantive law). The text states:
Law can be conveniently divided into two categories, substance and procedure.
Substantive law defines legal rights and duties in everyday conduct. Thus, it is a
rule of substantive law that an individual will be liable in damages for injuring
another person through negligence. Procedural law sets out the rules for enforcing
substantive rights in the courts. . . . The line between substance and procedure is
sometimes difficult to draw, but the basic distinction is central to the theory of
procedure.

Jd.
16.

JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 14, §1.1, at 2 (discussing substantive law). The text

states:
It is a means of augmenting other inducements that persons have for conducting
their relations in conformity with the substantive law's prescriptions. As Hepburn
says: "As its name' adjective' imports, it exists for the sake of something else-for
the sake of the 'substantive law' [quoting HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
OF CODE PLEADING 19, 20 (1897)].

Jd.
17. See id. § 6.1, at 279-80 ("Civil litigation is a social process, one of the techniques by
which society adjusts to the conflicts that arise froln sholiages of resources, misunderstandings
and antipathies aInong members of society, and social change over time. ").
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assurances to all parties that the process is fair and that they will have an
opportunity to present a case. 18 Moreover, procedural law should provide
courts that are available to parties at a reasonable cost and that act with
reasonable swiftness. It should also result in final resolutions that provide
repose and security.19
The social significance of civil procedure embraces much more than a
means of judicial enforcement of private rights. It is inextricable from and
20
essential to those rights. For example, the quality of a tort claim or contract
claim necessarily, and obviously, is a function of the enforceability of the
clailn-whether a court would be legally obliged to give a remedy to the holder
of the claim. But it also is a function of whether or not there exists a judicial
system available to the clailnant pursuant to which the claimant infact can both
obtain a legal remedy (such as a money judgment) and exercise effective
judicial enforcelnent (such as execution and sheriffs sale or garnishment). To
the extent that effective procedural relnedies are not available, the substantive
doctrine of tort and contract law provided by lawgivers-legislatures, judges,
and administrators-is undermined. 21
An understanding of the role of procedural law is informed by the
comparative work of Kathryn Hendley. Among other things, Hendley
addresses the relationship between substantive and procedural law in her
insightful book on the role of law in the former Soviet society.22 Her study
focuses on "law in action"-how "law was actually being implemented at the
/d. § 1-1, at 2-3.
Id. ("[P]rocedure should not be too costly in time and money.").
See supra note 16 (discussing substantive law); see also Jerome Michael & Mortimer
J. Adler, The Trial ofan Issue of Fact: 1,34 COLUM. L. REV. 1224, 1230 (1934) (discussing
18.
19.
20.

judicial enforcements of rights). The text states:
The procedural law, like the substantive law, should serve the end of justice.
Whether or not it does is the root of our criticism of it. But the procedural law is
subordinate to the substantive law. Justice cannot be achieved by just laws alone
but only by a just administration of just laws.
/d.
21. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter With the Sweet: Tradition, History, and
Limitations on Federal Judicial Power--Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1291, 1292-93
(2000) ("[P]rocedure is power, whether in the hands of lawyers or judges. . .. Substantive

rights, including constitutional rights, are worth no more than the procedural mechanisms
available for their realization and protection. "). This statement explains why parties in
substantial transactions normally insist on receiving legal opinions, including a "remedies"
opinion intended to provide assurances to the opinion recipient that a judicial remedy will be
available. See, e.g., Committee on Legal Opinions, Third-Party Legal Opinion Report,
Including the Legal Opinion Accord, ofthe Section ofBusiness Law, American Bar Association,
47 Bus. LAW. 167, 198-201 (1991 ) (discussing the remedies section of a legal opinion).
22. KATHRYN HENDLEY, TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATTER (1996).
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grassroots level. ,,23 Hendley argues that law can Inatter either reciprocally or
coercively. Law matters in the reciprocal sense (Hendley's preferred sense)
when it serves "as a means of constraining official power, vindicating citizens'
grievances, and facilitating private transactions. ,,24 On the other hand, law
matters in a coercive sense when its effect and design is to impose social
25
Hendley identifies the "defining elements of law that matters
order.
reciprocally" as "legitimacy, accessibility, and efficacy. ,,26 These elements are
affected by the nature of the enforcement system available to litigants. If the
applicable enforcement systelnis adequate, the system enhances legititnacy,
accessibility, and efficacy. A defective enforcement structure detracts from
these elements. 27
Hendley explains that only by understanding the specific characteristics of
the gap between the written law and the law as implemented can one
realistically evaluate the obstacles to the realization of a legal order in which
law matters reciprocally, not coercively.28 Under the Soviet regitne, the low
level of trust in the basic fairness of law-both substantively and
procedurally-resulted in a great reluctance of Soviet citizens to turn to the
legal system for vindication of their rights. 29 A widely held belief that the
judicial system or judge is inherently biased or corrupt discourages resort to the
30
courts. Substantive doctrine is meaningless in a system in which an aggrieved
party cannot obtain effective relief in the courts. Significantly, the inadequacy
of available remedies and judicial enforcelnent power also contributed to this
reluctance, thereby rendering the Soviet courts ineffective. 31
23.
24.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 3. Hendley identifies a number of necessary characteristics of law that matter

reciprocally. They include a general societal trust in the fairness of law, both substantively and
procedurally, a remedial structure that responds to the needs of citizens, a judiciary that has
sufficient power to resist legislative and executive power, and an understanding of law as "an
interactive process in which both state and society participate on a more or less equal basis." Id.
at 177.
25. Id. at 3.
26. Id. at 4.
27. Id. at 113-14 (discussing the lethargy of the Soviet courts).
28. This point is illustrated in Hendley's article on Arbitrazh courts, which examines a
Russian judicial system that is incapable of providing effective and timely enforcement of
judgments. See generally K.athryn Hendley, Ren1aking an Institution: The Transition in Russia
fron1 State Arbitrazh to Arbitrazh Courts, 46 AM. J. COMPo L. 93, 109-18 (1998).
29. HENDLEY, supra note 22, at 122-37 (discussing the judicial system in the Soviet
Union).
30. Id. at 167-68 (discussing the relationship between the courts and the State in the
Soviet Union).
31. Id. at 167-68, 177-78. Hendley identifies ways in which Soviet law often failed to
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One can easily apply Hendley's analysis ofthe Soviet legal regime to legal
systems in developing third-world countries, many of which may possess
32
similar attributes.
It also offers to infonn the study of bankruptcy law,
improbable as that might seem at first glance. Viewed in this context, Chapter
11 's dilution of the benefits of SOlne rightsholders arguably moves the
aggregate system of civil procedure in the United States toward the third-world
model. 33 The infamous delay and expense imposed by Chapter 11 provides an
obvious example. 34 Another example is the failure to compensate secured
35
creditors for the delay in obtaining and applying the value of their collatera1.
But the object of the present discussion is not a critique of current bankruptcy
law through the lens of procedure theory.36 Instead, the central point here is to
emphasize the connection between the aggregate systeln of civil procedure and

make whole those who were legally wronged. For example:
Within the confines of the economic plan, factories entered into contracts with one
another to supply various goods. When one party to such a contract reneged the
other party was obligated under law to go to a special economic court (arbitrazh)
and seek damages for the breach. Yet the tTIoney damages available were
meaningless in this context. The damaged party could not obtain the needed
materials elsewhere because no market existed. What the damaged party really
needed was an injunction directing the party who had breached to perform. Yet
arbitrazh lacked the power to order specific performance.
ld. at 33 (emphasis in original).
32. These characteristics might include a strong tTIistrust of substantive and procedural
fairness and inadequacy of available remedies, resulting in suboptimal willingness to resort to
the judicial system for relief.
33. By "aggregate system," I refer to the various state, federal, and regulatory systelTIS of
procedure in the United States as supplemented and modified by bankruptcy law, including
Chapter 11.
34. A recently published report by a committee of bankruptcy practitioners and judges
provides evidence of the need to shorten the length and reduce the costs of Chapter 11 cases.
See Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Reporter, Select Advisory Committee on Business Reorganization
(SABRE), First Report ofthe Select Advisory Comn1ittee on Business Reorganization, 57 Bus.
LAW. 163 (2001) [hereinafter First Report]. SABRE, a special committee of the Business
Bankruptcy Committee of the American Bar Association Section of Business Law, was formed
"to consider the perception that Chapter 11 business reorganizations take too long and cost too
much and, if appropriate, to develop legislative solutions to reduce the time and cost." ld. at
166. Apparently SABRE concluded that the length and cost of Chapter 11 cases do present
problems, inasmuch as the report makes three specific legislative reform proposals. ld. at 169.
There is some evidence that in recent years the situation is improving. See Douglas G. Baird &
Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 17 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 356, 364-65 & n.18
(2001) (stating that preliminary empirical evidence indicates that judges exercise well the
decision of whether and when to shut down Chapter 11 debtors).
35. See infra Part IV.J (discussing the protection of undersecured creditors).
36. For that critique, see infra Part IV (addressing in detail the potential for procedure
theory to inform efforts to reform bankruptcy law).
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the underlying rights provided by lawgivers under the substantive doctrine
created for the benefit of rightsholders. 37
Procedure theory's conceptualization ofbankruptcy law as civil procedure
necessarily raises a Inore fundamental question. Why have bankruptcy law? In
other words, what value does bankruptcy law add, if anything, to the generally
applicable structure of civil procedure? Douglas Baird posed this challenge
8
several years ago/ and I confront this challenge below by examining the
means employed by bankruptcy law to achieve its end. 39 But first I consider in
more detail procedure theory's contemplation of the ends to which bankruptcy
law should be directed.

2. Respecting Nonbankruptcy Entitlements ofRightsholders:
Procedure Theory in Context
As explained above, procedure theory takes as its central principle that
bankruptcy law should Inaximize the recoveries and benefits for a debtor's
rightsholders, but within constraints consistent with the rationale for having a
bankruptcy law. Before examining the normative basis for procedure theory, it
is worth considering bankruptcy policies reflected in the Bankruptcy Code
itself. In our recent article, Professor Steven Harris and I undertook this
positive account and noted the enormous respect that the Bankruptcy Code
40
generally affords legal entitlements under nonbankruptcy law. In particular,

37. Of course, one might draw on Hendley's critique of Soviet law to criticize more
generally the operation of civil procedure law in the United States. For example, the so-called
"American rule," under which the prevailing party in litigation normally must bear its own legal
expenses, necessarily means that the prevailing party is not made whole (although that situation
does not alone dictate that the American rule is unwarranted). See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.22 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing cOlnpeting policy debates concerning the
American rule). As a normative theory, however, procedure theory asks primarily what it is that
civil procedure generally and bankruptcy law specifically should achieve. Whether the
aggregate system of civil procedure in the United States in fact is optimal in achieving its goals
is a separate question, albeit an important one.
38. See Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply
to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 824 (1987) [hereinafter Loss Distribution] ("The challenge
facing anyone who wants to write about bankruptcy policy is to explain why a distinct
bankruptcy law exists at all. I').
39. See infra Part lI.D (examining the methods by which bankruptcy law achieves its
goals).
40. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Revised Article 9 Meets the Bankruptcy
Code: Policy and Impact, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 87-89 (2001) [hereinafter Policy]
("The Bankruptcy Code offers a blank check to the makers of non-bankruptcy law to define and
delineate property law principles that will prevail in Bankruptcy. ").
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we argued that Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code is fully
consistent with the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code. 41 As we
acknowledged, our positive account could not answer the question whether and
to what extent bankruptcy law should respect nonbankruptcy entitlements. 42
Procedure theory addresses that question.
Procedure theory draws its authority and normative force froln the moral
foundations of the sources and substance of nonbankruptcy law. It assumes a
legitimate basis for respecting the decisions of our lawgivers. And it assumes
that bankruptcy law, as a part of the law of civil procedure, should not
undermine these rules of law based on conflicting policy views. In short,
nonbankruptcy law determines rightsholder status. Unless special treattnent in
bankruptcy can be justified on a basis or context peculiar to bankruptcy,43
nonbankruptcy policies announced by lawgivers necessarily are undermined if
the interests of persons other than rightsholders are addressed in bankruptcy to
the detriment of rightsholders. The same is true if the interests of rightsholders
are diminished or enhanced at the expense or for the benefit of other
rightsholders in a Inanner inconsistent with nonbankruptcy law. These caveats
are crucial. Clearly, bankruptcy law could improve the lot of persons other than
rightsholders while in no way deviating from procedure theory. But procedure
theory holds that the interests of rightsholders should not be set aside or put at
risk for the benefit of nonrightsholders or for the benefit of other rightsholders.
Procedure theory recognizes that bankruptcy law is not only about
enforcing the rights of rightsholders against a debtor but it also addresses
protection of the interests of the debtor. In the case of a corporate debtor the
distinction in not significant, inaslTIuch as the interests of the corporate debtor
can be identified by the interests of the shareholders, who are themselves
41. Id. passim (discussing Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code). The text
states:
Central to the analysis is the Bankruptcy Code's overarching respect for
nonbankruptcy law's allocation of rights with respect to particular assets in which
the bankruptcy debtor has an interest. Bankruptcy law gives effect to a debtor's
prebankruptcy transfers of property (including security interests) and,
correspondingly, to the rights of the holders of property interests that do not belong
to the debtor.
Id. at 87. Of course, the fact that this attribute of the Bankruptcy Code is positive law and is
generally accepted provides at least SOlne n1eaningful indication of its normative value. Part IV
considers some apparent exceptions to the Bankruptcy Code's respect for nonbankruptcy
entitlements, including the avoiding powers.
42. Id. at n.36.
43. See generally infra Part IV. A further qualification, of course, is that there must be a
justification for having a bankruptcy law at all. See infra Part n.D (discussing thejustifications
for bankruptcy).
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rightsholders. Even in the case of an individual business debtor, the debtor is a
rightsholder. Civil procedure is about a fair system of determining and dealing
with legal entitlelnents of all concerned, and bankruptcy law fits this Inodel.
In recognizing that nonbankruptcy law creates, defines, and shapes the
contours of the legal entitlements of a debtor's rightsholders, procedure theory
acknowledges the essential procedural nature of bankruptcy law. For example,
nonbankruptcy law regulates competing claims to the debtor's property and
orders the priorities to be afforded to those claims. Procedure theory generally
rejects a bankruptcy system that would create a special reordering of
rightsholders' interests in bankruptcy, whether inter se or vis-a-vis
nonrightsholders. Procedural law, including bankruptcy law, should further,
enhance, and vindicate, but not disrupt, policies that nonbankruptcy law creates
and seeks to implement.
This overview of procedure theory Inust acknowledge its limitations as
well. In two important respects, procedure theory presents a less sharp
dichotomy than the foregoing might suggest. First, procedure theory's respect
for nonbankruptcy legal entitlements is not absolute. Bankruptcy law doesand should, even under procedure theory's dictates-alter these entitlements in
significant ways. Pro rata distribution among similarly situated claimants
provides an exalnple. As explained below, however, the concept of pro rata
distributions conflicts with nonbankruptcy law only superficially and is fully
consistent with procedure theory.44
Bankruptcy law Inaterially alters
nonbankruptcy entitlelnents in other respects as well. Some ofthese alterations
are consistent with procedure theory, and some are no1. 45 As explained in Part
IV, procedure theory recognizes that it sometitnes is appropriate-and in fact
feasible-to relax procedure theory's strict respect for nonbankruptcy legal
entitlements and to distinguish the procedures and relnedies in bankruptcy (or
any other collective system for dealing with financial distress) from those
applicable under nonbankruptcy procedural law. But these special bankruptcy
deviations are justified under procedure theory only when the bankruptcy
context is distinctive and when they further procedure theory's ends of
46
generally respecting nonbankruptcy legal entitlements.
44.
45.

See infra Part IV .C (discussing the concept of pro rata distributions).
See generally infi"a Part IV.

46. These bankruptcy-justified deviations from nonbankruptcy law are discussed in Part
IV. In this connection it is important to be precise about what procedure theory does not claim.
It does not argue that bankruptcy law always should defer to nonbankruptcy law or as some
have put it, that nonbankruptcy law should "trump" bankruptcy law. If that argument were to
prevail, bankruptcy law would be vacuous or, at most, interstitial. Instead, procedure theory
addresses the circumstances under which bankruptcy law should or should not override
otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law. It seeks to stake out the proper domain of bankruptcy

A NORMATIVE THEORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW

945

Second, the dichotomy between procedural law and substantive law tends
to blur at the margin. Moreover, the shape and effectiveness of procedural law
necessarily have profound substantive effects. Bankruptcy law's deviations
from nonbankruptcy entitlements, such as pro rata sharing, undoubtedly are
substantive in effect even if also characterized as a part of a generally
47
procedural body of law.
Furthermore, demonstrating that bankruptcy law
essentially is procedural in nature does not of itself support a compelling
normative theory. The procedural label may offer some illumination and a
useful framework for analysis, but the label alone cannot carry the normative
48
argument.
Given these limitations, procedure theory faces three significant
challenges. First, it must provide a convincing normative account of why
bankruptcy law generally should respect, enforce, and give effect to
nonbankruptcy legal entitlements. Second, it lTIUSt offer a coherent account for
its acceptance ofa relaxation of this general principle of respect in bankruptcy
in certain limited but material respects, while not rendering the general
principle superfluous. Third, it must take seriously and confront claims that
bankruptcy law as we know it simply is not susceptible to any overarching
normative theory.49

C. Situating Procedure Theory in the Normative Debates on Bankruptcy
Philosophy and Policy

This subpart fits procedure theory into the ongoing norlTIative debates
about bankruptcy policy. Anyone joining these debates can draw enormous
assistance, as have I, from Douglas Baird's insightful article, Bankruptcy's

law. It argues that bankruptcy law should provide rules that vary nonbankruptcy law only when
there is a coherent, bankruptcy-related basis for having a different rule.
47. See infra Part III.D (providing a normative account of procedure theory from the
perspectives of civil procedure and federal courts). Inasmuch as bankruptcy cases reside in
courts, those courts also should be empowered to adjust nonbankruptcy substantive law (state
law) to the same extent that nonbankruptcy courts (state courts) are so empowered in
interpreting and applying nonbankruptcy substantive law.
48. See infra Part III (making the normative case for procedure theory).
49. See David Gray Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1389
(1987) [hereinafter Philosophy] (liThe whole idea offinding a deep structure in a complicated,
historic artifact such as the Bankruptcy Code was doomed from the start. "); see also
Memorandum from Charles Tabb to Chuck Mooney (June 26,2001) (on file with Washington
and Lee Law Review) ("[M]y own bias ... has evolved to the point where I have become a bit
of a skeptic, or perhaps an agnostic, about normative bankruptcy theory generally. ").
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Uncontested Axioms. 50 In his article, Professor Baird identifies and contrasts
two separate "camps" of bankruptcy experts. 51 The "traditionalists" inhabit one
camp, and the "proceduralists" occupy the other. 52 Traditionalists typically are
bankruptcy lawyers and similarly inclined academics. 53 They generally are
skeptical of economic models and favor more general conceptions ofequity and
54
fairness. Traditionalists are open to redistributional goals of bankruptcy, and
believe that "preservation of firms (and therefore jobs) is an important and
independent goal of bankruptcy.,,55 They seek to protect employment and
general community interests, for example, as well as providing equity among
creditors. 56
Baird describes proceduralists as acadelnics who focus (unsurprisingly) on
procedure. 57 Proceduralists resist redistributive goals for bankruptcy and
interference with nonbankruptcy entitlements, except as may be necessary to
maximize value for the holders of entitlements. 58 In particular, proceduralists
emphasize the instrumental role of law both outside and inside bankruptcy.59
They believe that efficient markets should permit the failure and liquidation of
economically distressed firms-finns whose businesses cannot succeed
because, for example, their products or services are inferior or otherwise are not
desirable. In their view, bankruptcy's goal is to preserve the value of
financially distressed firms (firms with sound businesses but are unable to pay
their obligations).60 They prefer market solutions to financial distress over
61
judicial discretion. Offering essentially an economic account of bankruptcy,
50. See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested AxioJns, 108 YALE LJ. 573,576-79
(1998) [hereinafter Axioms] (discussing the two primary groups of bankruptcy scholars).
51. Jd. at 576.
52. Jd. at 576-80.
53. Jd. at 576 ("This group contains not only scholars firmly ensconced in the academy
but also practitioners and judges who write and are active in legal reform. ").
54. Jd. at 592 (discussing the traditionalist view of economic and game theory).
55. Jd. at 579 (discussing bankruptcy's role in rehabilitation).
56. Jd. at 577. Examples of traditionalist scholars identified by Baird include Samuel L.
Bufford, I(aren Gross, Harvey R. Miller, Elizabeth Warren, Jay Lawrence Westbrook, and
William C. Whitford. Jd. at nn. 9-10.
57. Jd. at 576-77 ("The group's distinctive characteristic is its focus on procedure. ").
58. Jd. at 577-78 (stating that bankruptcy cannot "work any special magic"). Examples of
proceduralist scholars identified by Baird, in addition to himself, include Barry E. Adler, James
W. Bowers, Frank Easterbrook, Thomas H. Jackson, Randal C. Picker, Robert K. Rasmussen,
Robert E. Scott, George G. Triantis, and Michelle 1. White. Jd. at 576 n.ll.
59. Jd. at 578,589-92 (discussing law both "inside and outside bankruptcy").
60. See id. at 580-82 (contrasting "financial distress" with "economic distress").
61. See id. at 582 ("[O]ne cannot justify a bankruptcy law whose goal is to prolong the
life of a bad restaurant. ").
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proceduralists insist that decision-making power in bankruptcy-whether to
liquidate or attempt to reorganize-should be placed in the hands ofthose who
62
stand to gain or lose. In the case of an insolvent debtor, that power should
reside with the unsecured creditors, as shareholders and management have
63
nothing to lose.
Ted Janger has summed up Baird's identification of the important
frontiers of the traditionalist-proceduralist divide:
According to Douglas Baird, three litmus test questions, or axioms,
determine a scholar's affiliation. These questions are (1) whether the
Bankruptcy Code should seek to rehabilitate firms; (2) whether bankruptcy
judges should alter non-bankruptcy entitlements in order to rehabilitate
firms; and (3) whether bankruptcy judges are capable of distinguishing
likely candidates for reorganization from firms that are destined to fail.
The paradigmatic proceduralist answers "no" to each question, while the
paradigmatic traditionalist answers "yes" to all three. 64

Janger dubs Baird's proceduralist answers to the first two questions, that
bankruptcy law "should not favor reorganization and ... engage in post hoc
reallocation of prebankruptcy entitlelnents," as the "proceduralist 'should
not. ,,,65 He explains that Baird and some (but not all) other proceduralists,
elnbrace a "weak version" of the "should not" principle, recognizing that some
nonbankruptcy entitlements may need to be modified in order to, and only in
order to, resolve the collective action probleln that is created upon insolvency.
What they oppose is redistribution for its own sake, not redistribution that
increases the value of the bankruptcy estate. ,,66 Janger calls the proceduralist
answer to the third question the "proceduralist 'cannot.,,,67 Even if judicial
discretion might be justified by the weak version of the "should not,"
proceduralists like Baird believe that judges are incapable of identifying which
68
firms can successfully be reorganized and which cannot.
62. See id. at 583-86 (discussing the appropriateness of deferring to the owner-manager).
63. See id. at 586 (If[T]he new value plan leaves the greater creditor as well offas it would
have been had it been allowed to seize the assets. If).
64. Ted langer, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Con1petence and
Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 559, 566 (2001).
65. Id. at 576.
66. Id. at 576-77.
67. Id. at 577.
68. Id. Accepting arguendo the weak version of the "should not," langer's article
challenges the conclusion that proceduralists draw from the "cannot"-that bankruptcy law
should employ sharp "crystalline" rules instead of fuzzy "lTIuddy" rules. Id. at 564, 581-614.
langer does not attempt to resolve the second "should not"-that bankruptcy law generally
should not be redistributive and should not disturb nonbankruptcy entitlements. Thus, his
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No doubt, Thomas Jackson's path-breaking article, Bankruptcy, NonBankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain,69 marks the inception of
the proceduralist acadetnic school. The creditors' bargain theory, as further
developed by both Jackson 70 and Baird,71 featured a pseudo-Rawlsian
contractarian core based on the idea that bankruptcy law generally reflects the
hypothetical creditors' bargain that creditors would reach if they were to
bargain before their extensions of credit.72 But the theory generally embraced
the principles that Baird has attributed to proceduralists, including respect for
nonbankruptcy entitlements in bankruptcy except as necessary to solve the
collective action probletn facing creditors under the first-in-titne state law
73
collection system.
While the creditors' bargain itself never attracted
widespread acceptance,74 the proceduralist principles that it etnbodied have
75
been durable.
Both the creditors' bargain theory and the proceduralist variations have
drawn considerable criticism frotn scholars in the traditionalist camp,76 scholars

article does not confront the central tenet of procedure theory as presented here.
69. Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors'
Bargain, 91 YALE LJ. 857 (1982). Carlson identifies the pre-beginning, of sorts, ofthe field as
Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities An10ng
Creditors, 88 YALE LJ. 1143 (1979). David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory and the
Creditors' Bargain, 61 U. Cm. L. REV. 453, 454 (1992) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Theory].
70. See generally THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
(1986).
71. See generally Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 173 (1987).
72. JACKSON, supra note 70, at 16-17 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42
(1971)) (discussing the creditor contract theory).
73. See Axioms, supra note 50, passin1. For an overview of the Baird-Jackson theory
contrasting it with a traditionalist approach, see generally Loss Distribution, supra note 38.
74. Indeed, Thomas Jackson himself joined in a substantial recantation of the "simple"
creditors' bargain, although I suspect that he tnay have done so by virtue of the intellectual
tenaciousness of his co-author, Robert Scott. See generally Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E.
Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors'
Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 189-90, 199, 202 (1989). Jackson and Scott suggested that a
risk-sharing analysis derived from the "common disaster" context of admiralty law's general
average contribution rule may provide a normatively justifiable explanation for various
bankruptcy distributional rules under the Bankruptcy Code. ld. at 171-74. In pat1icular, they
invoked the analogy to general average contribution as an illustration that risk-sharing in
bankruptcy may be an effective means to control eve of bankruptcy strategic behavior by a
dominant secured creditor. ld. (discussing the "analogy to general average contribution").
75. See generally Axioms, supra note 50.
76. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 5, at 789-93 (disputing the use of economic analysis to
limit the "distributional scheme" ofbankruptcy)~ Rehabilitating Values, supra note 7, at 735-39
(criticizing the creditors' bargain theory).
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with an economics perspective,77 and scholars whose approaches are not easily
78
Procedure theory seeks to respond to and deflect much of this
classified.
criticism. Procedure theory's partial response is that it is less comprehensive
than other proceduralist accounts. My personal policy intuitions favor most if
not all of Baird's proceduralist positions-el11bracing the weak "should not," to
use Janger's characterization. But procedure theory as presented here stakes
out a more modest scope. In his critique of Jackson's creditors' bargain theory,
David Carlson challenged the very idea that anyone could discover a coherent
79
"deep structure" in the Bankruptcy Code. Procedure theory proposes a much
shallower structure but a normative structure nonetheless.
By proposing a baseline that generally respects nonbankruptcy legal
entitlements in bankruptcy, procedure theory fully embraces the proceduralist
"should not." But this feature of procedure theory is not grounded normatively
on contractarian theory, as Jackson claimed the creditors' bargain to be, or on
opposition to forum shopping. Indeed, its normative base is not primarily
utilitarian at all, instead it draws norl11ative support from the incoherence of any
other baseline, insights drawn frol11 bankruptcy law seen as a branch of civil
procedure and federal court jurisdiction, and public choice perspectives on
bankruptcy law. Procedure theory's "should not" adopts neither the "weak H nor
the "strong" versions. It can coexist with welfare-enhancing redistributive rules
80
under the weak version or with adaptations of the strong version, such as
permitting debtors to contract for bankruptcy terms or to provide for them in
corporate charters. 81 Procedure theory also does not dictate the shape of
77. See, e.g., James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow ofMurphy's Law:
Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Econon1ics ofFailure, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2097 (1990)
[hereinafter Murphy's Law] (applying Murphy's Law analysis to bankruptcy law)~ see also
James W. Bovvers, Security Interests, Creditors' Priorities and Bankruptcy 1500, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 90 (Boudewijn Bouekaert & Gerrit De Geest eds. 2000)
(discussing the law and economics duality), available at http://allserv.rug.ac.bel--,'gdegeest/I500

book.pdf.
78.
79.

See generally Philosophy, supra note 49~ Bankruptcy Theory, supra note 69.
See Philosophy, supra note 49, at 1389 ("The whole idea offinding a deep structure in

a complicated, historic artifact such as the Bankruptcy Code was doomed from the start. ").
More recently, Carlson himself identified an "organizing principle" in bankruptcy law, which is
proceduralist in large part. See David Gray Carlson, Bankruptcy's Organizing Principle, 26
FLA. ST. L. REv. 549 (1999) [hereinafter Organizing Principle] (discussing the strong-arm
theory as demonstrating the organizing principle of bankruptcy). Carlson explains, from both
historical and doctrinal perspectives, that the trustee's "strong-arm" power under 11 U.S.C.
§ 544(a)(I), under which the trustee receives the status ofa hypothetical judicial lien creditor, is
an important "organizing principle" that runs throughout the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 622,-23.
The "strong-arm" power and other avoiding powers of the trustee are addressed in Part IV.E.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 65-68 (discussing Janger's analysis).
81. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories ofAmerican Corporate
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bankruptcy law except to acknowledge that bankruptcy law may be necessary to
maximize the benefits for a debtor's rightsholders. 82 It identifies the
beneficiaries, a debtor's rightsholders under nonbankruptcy law, but does not
specify the details of how value is to be preserved or grown for their benefit.
Procedure theory is about who gets the pie, not about how to preserve or grow
it. Consequently, it does not advocate for or against either market-based
bankruptcy structures,83 generally favored by proceduralists, or those grounded
in judicial discretion, favored by lTIany traditionalists. 84 This is not to say that
neither approach is better than the other (one probably is)85 or that the
preservation and growth of value are not important (they are, obviously), but
86
procedure theory as advanced here does not offer an answer.
In addition to rightsholders, bankruptcy law has other plausible
beneficiaries. For example, no doubt a rehabilitated debtor firm could provide
benefits to a variety of external constituencies, such as governments (ITIOre
taxes), existing and future elTIployees (continued or new employment and
higher wages), and communities (wealth enhancements from increased
economic activity). Procedure theory does not deny the existence or
importance of these constituencies. They are without question direct social
beneficiaries that a system of bankruptcy law can serve by preserving and
growing value. But procedure theory holds that bankruptcy law should serve
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 322-23 (1993) (discussing "investor choice" and the
incorporation of a "pre-established restructuring plan into [an] initial investment contract");
Janger, supra note 64, at nn. 37,43 & 66 (citing Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of
Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 ILL. L. REV. 503) (discussing contract bankruptcy); Robert K.
Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REv. 51,
100-07 (1992) (discussing a corporations' ability to choose "no-bankruptcy" Chapter 7 filing
only or create an individual bankruptcy scheme); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of
Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV. 515, 524-34 (1999) (discussing the current
debate concerning whether debtors may contract for bankruptcy terms); Alan Schwartz,
Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed, 109 YALE L.J. 343, 346-48 (1999) (discussing bankruptcy
contracting); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE
L.J. 1807, 1821-22 (1998)) (same).
82. See inj;"a Part n.D (asking "Why Bankruptcy?").
83. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101
HARV. L. REv. 775, 785-86 (1988) (proposing a new technique for reorganization). For a
survey and critique of various market-based approaches, see generally David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 WIS. L. REv. 465
[hereinafter Markets].
84. See generally, Warren, supra note 5 (discussing abstract economic theory).
85. My strong intuition is that bankruptcy law should be more market based in its
approach toward capturing (indeed, enhancing) value for rightsholders.
86. Procedure theory does, however, accommodate major aspects of bankruptcy law as it
exists in the United States today. See infra Part IV (discussing bankruptcy law under procedure
theory).
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them only collaterally; it objects to serving these interests to the detriment of
the interests of rightsholders. 87

D. Why Bankruptcy?
1. Preserving, Increasing, and Fairly Distributing Value
This discussion meets, at least in part, Baird's important challenge to
explain why we need a bankruptcy law. 88 In the context of procedure theory, if
bankruptcy is civil procedure, why is civil procedure not bankruptcy? Why do
we need a special body of procedural law for debtors in financial distress?
Procedure theory's justification for a bankruptcy law is that specialized
bankruptcy procedure can serve to maximize the recoveries of and benefits for
rightsholders. If the otherwise applicable procedural law were up to the task,
however, much of bankruptcy law would be unnecessary.89 The same could be
said in a perfect market world in which costless contracting could settle the
matters that arise in financial distress and insolvency.9o Happily, there appears
to be a general consensus that a bankruptcy law (in some form) is necessary for
business debtors as well as individual conSUluers.
The need for a bankruptcy law is most obvious in the case of a debtor in
financial distress, which typically involves luultiple defaults on its obligations
and the present or anticipated inability to satisfy its obligations. 91 A debtor in
financial distress mayor luay not be insolvent in the sense of its obligations
exceeding the value of its assets. 92 There is little disagreeluent that one
important justification for a bankruptcy law is that it facilitates the preservation,
87. See infi"a Part IILA (discussing the interests of rightsholders and nonrightsholders).
88. See supra note 38 (stating the need to justify bankruptcy law).
89. At least a pared down bankruptcy law would be required, however, in order to provide
for an individual debtor's discharge under Chapter 7. See infra Part IV.G (discussing procedure
theory's approach to the individual discharge in bankruptcy)~ see also Douglas G. Baird &
Robert K. Rasmussen, The End afBankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751,788-89 (2002) (arguing
that Chapter 11 no longer plays its "traditional" role in reorganizations of large corporations and
that reorganization law no longer provides material benefits).
90. See supra note 83 (discussing contracting over bankruptcy rules).
91. Baird uses the term "financial distress" to mean a firm that is viable but that cannot
satisfy its obligations. Axion1s, supra note 50, at 580-81. Baird contrasts this vision of
financial distress with "economic distress," intending the latter term to encompass a firm that is
not viable-a firm that makes a product or provides a service that few people wish to purchase.
Id. For present purposes, I use the term "financial distress" to encompass both scenarios (for
either a firm or an individual) so long as the circumstances involve multiple defaults and the
inability to timely satisfy obligations.
92. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (2000) (defining "insolvent").
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and sometimes even the increase, of value for the collective benefit of
rightsholders when compared to the nonbankruptcy law's provisions for the
enforcement of legal entitlements-most typically, the collection of debts. 93 A
single collective proceeding provides advantages over the independent efforts
of rightsholders to secure their entitlements under nonbankruptcy law. For
example, by calling offthese uncoordinated efforts, the automatic stay imposed
by Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code allows the trustee-nonnally the debtor
in possession in a Chapter 11 case-to identify and preserve the debtor's
94
assets. Although the automatic stay obviously and materially interferes with
the enforcement of nonbankruptcy entitlelnents of rightsholders, it is a
justifiable procedural device to the extent that the end result Inaximizes (or at
least enhances) the benefits for rightsholders. 95 Even outside bankruptcy, the
civil judicial enforcelnent of legal entitlements takes time-it is not
instantaneous. Viewed in this way, one can see bankruptcy as a class action
enforcelnent proceeding for rightsholders; it provides a single proceeding in a
single court in which the affairs of the debtor and its rightsholders are sorted
96
OUt.
Resulting cost savings and efficiency gains in bankruptcy are analogous
97
to those for which the class action has been created.

93. See Max Radin, The Nature ofBankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1940) (discussing
the essence of bankruptcy). Radin states:
The essence of bankruptcy ... is not that the debtor's property is impounded nor
that the creditors are affected, nor even that all of them are affected. Something
additional is required. Unless we intend to bring the creditors into one large group,
and adjust their common claims to a fund consisting of a single debtor's property,
there is no reason to have recourse to bankruptcy.
Id. ~ see also Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational Device?,
1983 SUP. CT. REV. 459,463 (stating that creditors' bills "were the most obvious instance of a
true and necessary class action" ~ prior to the developlTIent of lTIodern bankruptcy law a creditor
could "sue an insolvent debtor" and, under a creditors' bill, "force a distribution of assets under
supervision of the court of equity"). Those with decidedly different views on many aspects of
bankruptcy law generally agree on this most basic aspect of bankruptcy law. See, e.g., GROSS,
supra note 9, at 14, 137-38 (discussing the collective approach ofbankruptcy)~ JACKSON, supra
note 70, at 5, 12-14 ("Bankruptcy provides a way to make these diverse individuals act as
one.").
94. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000) (establishing the automatic stay).
95. See infra Part IV.G (discussing the automatic stay and procedure theory).
96. Actually, other courts may be involved, but for present purposes the single-court
paradigm is sufficient.
97. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 16.1, at 722 (1 st ed. 1985) ("The
class action permits a lawsuit to be brought by or against large numbers of individuals or
organizations whose interests are sufficiently related so that it is more efficient to adjudicate
their rights or liabilities in a single action than in a series of individual proceedings. ").
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In addition to preserving value for the benefit of rightsholders, bankruptcy
law also provides a necessary procedurallTIeans for determining who is entitled
to the value-for identifying the debtor's legitimate rightsholders under
nonbankruptcy law. Moreover, it provides procedures for distributing the value
98
to rightsholders, either in liquidation or under a plan ofreorganization.
To be sure, enormous disagreelTIent exists on the answers to and the
normative basis for answering questions such as why andfor whose benefit is
bankruptcy law positioned to preserve value~99 For example, Jackson sees
bankruptcy essentially as a response to a "COlTIlTIOn pool" problem. 100 Under the
state law first-in-time "grab" rule, individual creditors' actions would harm the
creditors as a group.lOl Bankruptcy law can ensure a larger pie, on average, for
creditors by preserving a firm's "going concern" value. 102 As a corollary, in
Jackson's view bankruptcy law generally should respect nonbankruptcy
entitlements except as necessary to benefit creditors as a group. 103 Unwarranted
deviations from this principle would provide incentives to file bankruptcy cases
104
in circumstances in which bankruptcy is an inappropriate response.
On the
other hand, Korobkin's Rawlsian-contractarian theory would extend the proper
reach of bankruptcy to address goals of all affected interested persons,
including nonrightsholders. 105
98.

See infra notes 246-99 and accompanying text (outlining the procedures ofChapter 7

and Chapter 11).
99. See generally supra notes 51-86 and accompanying text (discussing "proceduralist"
and "traditionalist" conceptions of bankruptcy law).
100. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 70, at 16-17,45 (discussing bankruptcy's role at
supplementing creditor remedies in the comlnon pool context). For a more nuanced view, see
generally Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters: ClarifjJing the Con1n10n Pool Analogy
as Applied to the Standard for Con1n1encement ofa Bankruptcy Case, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 337
(1993).
101. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 70, at 12 (discussing the "grab" rule of nonbankruptcy
law).
102. Id. at 14. If the debtor suffers econolnic distress (in Baird's sense), of course, there
may be no going concern value and the debtor should be allowed to fail. See Axioms, supra
note 50, at 582 (stating that a "firm's capital structure ought to shape the law of corporate
reorganizations"). Nonetheless, bankruptcy law may serve to preserve wealth by providing a
more efficient liquidation process than is available under nonbankruptcy law.
103. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 70, at 33 ("Changes in non-bankruptcy rights should be
made only if they benefit all those with interests in the firm as a group. ").
104. See, e.g., id. at 20-27,33 (discussing "The Destructive Effect of Changes of Relative
Entitlements in Bankruptcy").
105. Infra notes 156-65 and accompanying text. K.orobkin chides Jackson's contractarian
creditors' bargain both for its failure to equip the bargaining creditors with the Rawlsian veil of
ignorance and for its failure to include bargainers other than consensual creditors. See
Contractarianism, supra note 7, at 554-65 (discussing the "Representation of Persons" and
"Knowledge and Ignorance").
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Procedure theory resolves the Jackson-Korobkin disagreement by
concluding that bankruptcy law should exist to vindicate and enhance benefits
for a debtor's rightsholders generally as their rights exist according to
nonbankruptcy law. To this extent it lines up with Jackson and other
proceduralists, but without embracing Jackson's creditors' bargain or common
pool heuristics. Procedure theory embarks from the cOlnmonly accepted
proposition that there is a need for a collective federal bankruptcy law designed
to preserve value that justifies the existence of bankruptcy as a separate, distinct
body of procedurallaw. 106
Procedure theory does not reject the idea that the shape of bankruptcy law
can, in turn, impact contents and effect of nonbankruptcy law. For example,
the protections afforded an individual debtor under bankruptcy law, such as the
discharge,107 may relieve nonbankruptcy law from concerns that bankruptcy law
adequately addresses. l08 The interactions, however, between bankruptcy law
and nonbankruptcy law in no way undercut procedure theory's normative
ground. Procedure theory addresses the appropriate role of bankruptcy law but
does not deny that bankruptcy law has a proper dOlnain.
In sum, procedure theory accepts the lowest comlnon denominator of the
accepted wisdom as to the need for a separate bankruptcy law. Its point of
departure is the justification for a bankruptcy law on which almost everyone
would agree. It then Inoves on to address whose interests bankruptcy law
should serve and for whose benefit bankruptcy law should preserve value.

2. Procedure Theory and the Effectiveness ofBankruptcy Lavv
Procedure theory addresses the ends of bankruptcy law, enhanced benefits
for rightsholders, not the specific means. As already discussed, procedure
theory addresses the question whether the goals of bankruptcy should extend
beyond benefiting rightsholders. l09 But procedure theory Inakes no specific

106. If it were the case, however, that the interests of rightsholders could be served better
by an approach other than a collective bankruptcy proceeding, or that bankruptcy law (or a parts
of it) is unnecessary or unhelpful, procedure theory would not be offended by the elimination or
modification of bankruptcy law.
107. See infra Part IV.G (discussing the individual debtor's discharge and the fresh start
principle).
108. Conversely, were an individual's discharge radically limited, for example, state
legislatures might feel lTIOre pressure to enact additional debtor-protective measures.
109. See supra Part LB (discussing the focus of procedure theory). Of course, incidental
benefits for nonrightsholders are fully consistent with procedure theory so long as the benefits
are not at the risk or expense of rightsholders. See generally infra Part lILA.

A NORMATIVE THEORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW

955

claims about the overall effectiveness or ineffectiveness ofthe provisions ofthe
Bankruptcy Code in preserving wealth.
The particular outlines of bankruptcy law are as important as they are
controversial. To the extent that current law fails to serve optimally the
interests of rightsholders, procedure theory we)cotnes, but generally does not
propose, useful reforms. For exatnple, procedure theory does not address all
aspects of the ongoing critiques and. defenses of Chapter 11 reorganization.
The delay and cost of Chapter 11 reorganization is a recurrent theme. IIO Some
scholars have questioned the very need for a regime such as Chapter 11. 111
Others have stepped up with a vigorous defense. 112 Still others have argued for
retention of a system for reorganization with more or less radical market-based
adjustments. 113 Some have argued for a firtn-by-finn contractually based
system for reorganization of financially distressed debtors. II4 The Chapter 11
debates are important and ongoing and reflect analogous debates about
corporate governance. II5 Baird and Rasmussen, understanding bankruptcy
reorganization as a probletn of corporate governance, recently explained the
overriding importance of "control rights" in Chapter 11. 116 Ultitnately,
however, debates over bankruptcy law will be resolved, if at all, in Congress.

110. See, e.g., First Report, supra note 34, at 167-68 (outlining SABRE committee's
legislative proposals to reduce the length and cost of Chapter 11 cases). Baird and Rasmussen
argue that the excessive delays and costs in Chapter 11 cases have been substantially reduced
during the past decade, in part because "both small and large firms can be sold as going
concerns, inside of bankruptcy and out." Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 89, at 756,786-88.
111. See, e.g., Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter
11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043,1088-89 (1992) (arguing for the repeal of Chapter 11).
112. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to
Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REV. 79, 106-10 (1992) (refuting arguments
applying "perfect markets and zero transaction costs" to the bankruptcy structure).
113. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 83, at 804 (explaining that a proposed type of
reorganization plan fits within existing legal rules).
114. See generally supra note 81.
115. See, e.g., Markets, supra note 83 (critiquing various proposals for reforming Chapter
11); David A. Skeel, Jf., An Evolutionary Theory ofCorporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy,
51 VAND. L. REv. 1325,1331-50 (1998) (developing a theory of corporate law taking into
account both corporate governance and corporate bankruptcy).
116. Douglas G. Baird and Robert !(. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the
Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921, 924 (2001)
("When the managers and shareholders cannot be easily separated, control rights should lie in
the hands of someone whose loyalties are aligned with the creditors, but the reorganization itself
should not affect the value of the managers' equity interest. "). The argument that creditor
control can lead to more efficient decisions about the firm suggests a supplemental instrumental
impact of procedure theory. To the extent that rightsholders, as opposed to nonrightsholders,
are calling the shots in bankruptcy, better decisions are likely to be made.
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But proceduralists and traditionalists are unlikely to develop consensus views
on either the basics or the specifics. 117
While procedure theory may have little to advise about the effectiveness of
bankruptcy law generally in preserving wealth, it must weigh in on whether
bankruptcy law is faithful to the theory's tenets. 118 To this end, Part IV
addresses several of the principal attributes of bankruptcy law and tests them
against procedure theory. Next, Part III sets up the normative case for
procedure theory.

III. The Normative Case for Procedure Theory
This Part makes the normative case for procedure theory. The first two
subparts address the two contexts in which bankruptcy law is most likely to
offend procedure theory. Subpart A considers interests of rightsholders vis-avis the extraneous interests of nonrightsholders-in particular, employees and
other direct and indirect beneficiaries of debtor rehabilitation, including the
larger community. Subpart B takes up the interests of rightsholders inter se.
Subparts C, D, and E then exalnine the normative bases for procedure theory,
focusing on procedure theory from the perspectives of legal philosophy, civil
procedure and federal court jurisdiction, and public choice analysis.

A. Interests ofRightsholders Versus Interests ofNonrightsholders:
Employees, Rehabilitation, and Community
Three sets of related interests or goals have COffilTIOnly been lTIentioned in
the literature as deserving of consideration in bankruptcy, whether or not
nonbankruptcy law would take account ofthese interests. First, proponents ofa
broad scope for bankruptcy law's goals point to the interests of employees. 119
117. See Axioms, supra note 50, at 599 (liThe fundmTIental difference between
traditionalists and proceduralists lies in the questions they think are worth asking and the
problems they think are worth studying. Bridging the gap between them has little to do with
empirical research. Neither is it a task for which either traditionalists or proceduralists are wellequipped. ").
118. For exmTIple, it does object to costs and delays to the extent that the effect is
redistributive from rightsholders to nonrightsholders or to other rightsholders not otherwise
entitled to priority. See, e.g., infra Part IV.J (discussing impact on secured creditors of delay
and the inadequacy of adequate protection); Frost, supra note 4, at 123-29 (discussing
redistributive impact of Chapter 11 costs and delays due to systemic pro-rehabilitation bias).
119. See, e.g., Donald R. Korobkin, Elnployee Interests in Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 5,26-34 (1996) (discussing bankruptcy lavv's response to employee concerns).

A NORMATIVE THEORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW

957

Of course, to the extent that an elnployee has an emploYlnent contract with or is
owed wages by the debtor, the employee is a rightsholder. 120 Of interest here
are employees who care about future employment, to which the employees
presumably hold no legal entitlement. A second interest is that of the
reorganization or rehabilitation of debtors. Rehabilitation, the argument goes,
sometimes can be a beneficial alternative to liquidation. I21 To the extent that
rehabilitation would preserve, or increase, value for the benefit ofrightsholders,
this rehabilitation interest does not run afoul of procedure theory. 122 But to the
extent that the interests to be protected by the rehabilitation goal are those of
nonrightsholders and liquidation-as opposed to attelnpting rehabilitationwould be in the interests of rightsholders, the rehabilitation goal squarely
offends procedure theory. Competing interests of nonrightsholders might
include those of future employment for the debtor's existing or future
elnployees, future business opportunities for persons that wish to engage in
business with the debtor or with the debtor's future elnployees, or governmental
interests in future tax revenues from the debtor's future operations. A third
interest sometimes singled out as deserving of special consideration in
bankruptcy is that of "the community.,,123 The interests of the community are
essentially the same as those served by the employee-protection and
rehabilitation goals. Preserving the going business can benefit the community
at large. But it is taking into account these interests at the expense of
rightsholders (because, for example, rightsholders would benefit from
liquidation) that contravenes procedure theory. 124
Consider an exalnple. A Chapter 11 debtor in possession wishes to close
one of its three plants, sell the related assets,125 and discharge Inany of the
elnployees who work at the plant. The unsecured creditors' committee supports
120. See id. at 6-11 (discussing situations in which employees would be generally
unsecured creditors). An employee or fonner employee also Inight be a rights holder of a firm
that owes unfunded pension obligations, for example.
121. See, e.g., GROSS, supra note 9, at 98-103 (discussing the importance of
rehabil itation).
122. See supra Part Il.D (discussing justifications for bankruptcy law).
123. See, e.g., GROSS, supra note 9, at 193-214, 228-29 (discussing "The Interests of
Community").
124. This discussion assumes that it would be possible to take into account these
extraneous interests in bankruptcy in an effective manner, an assumption that is questionable at
best. See infra notes 333-39 and accompanying text (discussing Frost's critique of judicial
redistributive policies in bankruptcy).
125. A trustee in bankruptcy may sell assets outside the ordinary course of business "after
notice and a hearing." 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(I) (2000). See 11 U.S.C. § 102(1) (2000) (defining
"after notice and a hearing"); § 11 07(a) (debtor in possession has rights, powers, and duties ofa
trustee, with certain exceptions).
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the closure and sale. However, some unsecured creditors, whose businesses are
located near the plant, a representative ofthe plant's employees, and the city in
which the plant is located all strongly oppose this step. Not surprisingly, the
employees' objections are based not on concerns about their legal entitlements
such as payment of wages but on concerns about losing their jobs were the
plant to close. The objecting creditors, likewise, are objecting not out of
concern for satisfaction of their prebankruptcy claitns, but concern for the loss
of future business with the debtor were the plant closed as proposed. And the
city lodges its objection based on the potential loss of future tax revenues and
the negative impact on the local economy that would arise out of the proposed
closure and tennination of elnployees. 126 Asslune further that applicable
federal and state nonbankruptcy law either (1) places no restrictions on the
debtor's closing of the plant 127 and termination of the "at will" employees 128 or
126. Assuming that the city is not a creditor because the debtor is current on its local taxes,
the city nonetheless may be a "party in interest," a term left undefined in the Bankruptcy Code.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 11 09(b), a party in interest "may raise and may appear and be heard on any
issue in a case under this chapter." 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (2000).
127. This assumption contemplates that the debtor in possession would not be required to
give a notification under the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
[hereinafter WARN Act], codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (2000). The WARN Act
prohibits an "employer" from ordering a "plant closing" or "mass layoff' until after a sixty-day
period following written notice to affected employees and certain government officials. 29
U.S.C. § 21 02(a) (2000). There are several reasons why the debtor in possession may be
relieved from the notification requirement. For example, it may not meet the definition of
"employer," or the proposed actions may not lneet the definition of "plant closing" or "mass
layoff." See 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(I) (2000) (defining "employer"); 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(2)
(2000) (defining "plant closing"); 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (a)(3) (2000) (defining "mass layoff').
Alternatively, the WARN Act also contains some exceptions to compliance with the notification
requirement. See 29 U.S.C. § 21 02(b) (2000) (providing some circumstances for "reduction of
notification period. "). Although the assumption in the text simplifies the example, it is not
essential to the analysis inasmuch as the debtor in possession could propose to comply with the
WARN Act, were it applicable. See generally Laura B. Bartell, Why Warn? The Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act in Bankruptcy, 18 BANKR. DEY. J. 243 (2002)
(arguing that the WARN Act should be applied in all bankruptcy cases, including, contrary to
Department of Labor commentary, those in which the trustee's sole function is the liquidation of
a debtor's assets).
128. See 31 AM. JUR. TRIALS 317, 345 (1984, Supp. 2002) (discussing the "at will"
employment doctrine). The text states:
At common-law, in the absence of an employment contract for a definite term,
employees and employers have been free to terminate their relationship with or
without cause at any time. The parties were engaged in an employment relationship
said to be terminable "at will" by either party. This notion became known
popularly as the "at will" doctrine. . .. Thus, the common law employer could
discharge an employee for good cause, no cause, or even for a cause morally
wrong, without thereby being guilty of a legal wrong.
Id. The doctrine has been eroded somewhat in cases of "wrongful discharge." For example, a
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(2) that the debtor complies with any applicable restrictions. Should the court
consider these consequences of closure and sale, even though they have no
bearing on the objectors' legal entitlelnents? Clearly the answer is no, subject
to one caveat. Procedure theory instructs that taking into account the interests
of nonrightsholders generally is not within the proper domain of bankruptcy
law. 129
The caveat: If Inaintaining the operation of the plant would be in the
interests ofthe debtor's rightsholders generally and not to their detriment, then
the judge's taking into account the extraneous interests (future employment,
future business, or community) might not contravene procedure theory. 130 At
worst, the court's consideration of those factors would be harmless error. But
this caveat is probably insignificant in practice. For example, if the debtor in
possession and creditors' comlnittee supported the continued operations at a
plant, why would the judge need to consider the extraneous interests beyond
those of rightsholders?131
civil remedy (usually tort or contract) has been fashioned by the courts in several states for
discharges that are determined to be "retaliatory," "abusive," "lnalicious," "in bad faith," or "in
contravention of public policy." Id. at 345-48. But termination of employees by virtue of a
decision to close a plant based on economic considerations, as contemplated by the example,
has never been considered wrongful.
129. It is worth reemphasizing, here, that the employees and creditors are rightsholders, but
the interests for which they advocate in this context-that the status quo be maintained for the
plant and employees-do not arise out of their legal entitlements. They have no legal
entitlements to future employment or business relationships. Obviously, the same can be said of
the local government's interest in future tax revenue and the local community's interest in
economic prosperity. For a recent case in which the court may have overridden the interests of
rightsholders for the benefit, at least in part, of nonrightsholders, see In re LTV Steel Company,
Inc., 274 B.R. 278 (2002). In LTV, the bankruptcy court permitted the debtor to use cash
collateral that purportedly had been sold (or that was proceeds of purportedly sold collateral)
under two securitization arrangements because the use "was· necessary to permit Debtor to
continue business operations." I d. at 281.
130. To be clear about this caveat, it contemplates that the debtor's creditors, for example,
would be made no worse off by the court's taking into account the extraneous interests. For
example, if the plant sought to be closed were not protltable, the continued operation quite
clearly imposes additional risks on the firm's unsecured creditors by draining value that
otherwise could be used to increase their recoveries. Even if the plant were profitable, its
continued use in lieu of transferring work to a more profitable plant would disadvantage
unsecured creditors.
131. Alternatively, taking into account the interests of nonrightsholders arguably could be
consistent with procedure theory in situations in which the effects on rightsholders of one
approach or the other are identical. But, in reality, if "taking into account" the extraneous
interests has any impact and if rightsholders object to relief sought by the affected
nonrightsholders, then the impact presumptively must work to the detriment of rightsholders. In
practice, this approach would frequently substitute a judge's decision for that of the affected
rightsholders and could permit or induce judges to make difficult to overturn factual findings.
See Peter A. Alces, "!fYou Don't Have Anything Good to Say . ... ", 15 BANKR. DEY. J. 383,
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A closer examination of the basis for rejecting consideration of these
extraneous interests that are not embodied in legal entitlements reveals a strong
intuition as to the moral source of procedure theory. Consider the debtor in
possession's right to close the plant and terminate the elnployees under
applicable nonbankruptcy law. I32 Properly seen, the lawgivers have not only
failed to restrict the debtor's actions but have, itnplicitly but clearly, determined
that society is improved when enterprises such as the debtor in possession
retain this flexibility. If nonbankruptcy law has determined that restricting an
employer's right to close a plant and discharge its elnployees is a bad idea for a
presumably solvent firm outside bankruptcy, it lnust be an equally bad (or
worse) idea for a presulnably insolvent finn in bankruptcy. That is to say, the
harm that itnposing or not imposing such a restrictive policy would address is
wholly agnostic concerning the financial resources and viability of
employers. 133 Nonbankruptcy law reflects the considered social policy as
whether and to what extent firms in a market econolny should or should not be
forced, or induced by threat of sanctions, to do business in a particular location
when they deem it undesirable. 134

390 (1999), reviewing GROSS, supra note 9 ("[W]hy would we want (largely affluent and
insulated) bankruptcy judges to tnake normative judgments they have no particular training or
expertise to make, even if there were enough time and resources?"); James J. White, Failure and
Forgiveness: A Review, 73 AM. BANKR LJ. 435, 441 (1999), reviewing GROSS, supra note 9
("One can foresee lawless decisions that are bound only by the judge's whim. In her proposal,
Professor Gross gives the judge no principled way to decide the weight to be given to a
particular community's claim.") (footnote omitted).
132. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing the WARN Act).
133. Douglas Baird persuasively made a similar point several years ago:
[I]t seems odd to argue, as matter of policy, that existing management should be
able to close a plant and throw workers out, but that those who lent money to the
management and who come into control of the firm only because the firm failed to
meet its obligations to them should not. From the perspective of the workers who
are tossed out, the loss is the same in both cases.
Loss Distribution, supra note 38, at 817. If anything, one might argue (although 1 do not) that
the insolvent firm should be cut some slack by reducing the threshold burdens of closure-just
the opposite of the result that the employees' representative and the local creditors are urging on
the judge in the example.
134. One might argue that a different rule in bankruptcy \Nould have a de minimis effect on
overall social policy. But that is not a principled argument to favor disparate treatment. It only
holds that imposing restrictions in bankruptcy, while bad policy, would not have a significantly
bad result but would have only an insignificantly bad result.
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Quite plausibly neither Congress nor the bankruptcy court 135 even has the
constitutional power to take into account these employee and community
interests to the detriment of the debtor or the debtor's rightsholders. Thomas
Plank has developed a coherent and comprehensive doctrinal theory of the
limited powers of Congress and the courts under the Bankruptcy Clause of the
136
He advances four principles that seek to identify and explain
Constitution.
the dimensions of the "subject of Bankruptcies" as used in the Bankruptcy
Clause. Under one of the four principles comprising Plank's Bankruptcy
Clause construct, the "Non-Expropriation Principle," it is impermissible for
Congress or a bankruptcy court to expropriate the rights of a debtor or its
creditors for the benefit of a "Third Party." 137 Rights other than those held as a
debtor or a creditor are rights held by a "Third Party" under Plank's
taxonomy. 138 Heeding the wishes of Third Parties such as nonrightsholder
employees and the city over the objections ofthe debtor or creditors appears to
fit squarely within the proscriptions of Plank's Non-Expropriation Principle
because the Third Parties in the exalnples seek to enhance their wealth at the
expense of the debtor and the creditors. 139
135. Unless noted or the context otherwise implies, references to "bankruptcy court" in this
article generally encompass the federal court that happens to be exercisingjurisdiction, whether
that court is a bankruptcy court, a federal district court, a federal court of appeals, or the United
States Supreme Court.
136. Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalisn1, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 1063 (2002)
[hereinafter Federalism]; U.S. CaNST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4 (empowering Congress to establish
"uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies") [hereinafter Bankruptcy Clause]. See generally
CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY §§ 1.6, 1.9, at 32,44-51 (1997).
137. Federalism, supra note 136, at 1091-92 n.113. The other three principles that Plank
identifies are the "Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle," the "Non-Interference Principle," and
the "Debtor-Insolvency Principle." Id. at 1089-95; see infra notes 173-74 and accompanying
text (discussing the Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle). The Non-Interference Principle is a
narrow limitation of the Non-Expropriation Principle. Federalism, supra note 136, at 1092-93.
It provides that Third Parties may not use their nonbankruptcy rights, which would otherwise
remain enforceable under the Non-Expropriation Principle, to prevent a debtor or creditor from
initiating a bankruptcy case or otherwise obtaining the benefits of bankruptcy law, such as a
termination-upon-bankruptcy clause in a contract (a so-called ipso facto clause) or a contractual
waiver of the debtor's right to file a bankruptcy petition. ld. at 1092-93.
138. Id. at 1091. For example, a lessor or party to an executory contract normally wears
two hats. /d. at 1113-15. If the debtor owes payment or performance under the lease or
contract, the lessor or other party is a creditor. ld. But, as to the performance owed by the
lessor or other party and the right to withhold performance under the lease or contract, the lessor
or other party is a Third Party. Id. at 1113-15 (discussing situations where a cash seller of
goods under a contract of sale is a Third Party in respect to its contingent obligation to deliver
and may not be required to deliver goods to the debtor-buyer except upon tender or paylnent of
the price).
139. As a normative theory, procedure theory does not depend on consistency with
prevailing legal doctrine. But, procedure theory advises that the Bankruptcy Clause, as a part of
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It does not follow from the foregoing that procedure theory is hostile to the
interests of employees or any other constituency of a debtor. Vary the example
to assume that nonbankruptcy law provides substantial restrictions and
consequences on a firIn that wishes to close a plant, 140 Now, assume that the
debtor in possession and the unsecured creditors' committee argue that closure
should be permitted without compliance with the nonbankruptcy restrictions
and without suffering any other interference or liability under nonbankruptcy
law. They argue that the compliance and consequences would hinder the
prospects for reorganization and the ultimate recoveries for the debtor's
rightsholders. Procedure theory dictates nonetheless that the debtor in
possession is obliged to observe and suffer these restrictions and consequences.
For example, the employees now are rightsholders not only to the extent of
earned and unpaid wages but also as direct or indirect beneficiaries of the
..
cIosure restrIctIons
an d consequences-even 1'f not as cre d'Itors. 141 Of course,
the judge should take into account the interests of the debtor in possession and
all rightsholders in determining whether to pennit the plant to be closed, the
assets to be sold, and the employees to be tenninated. But the debtor should be
142
required to observe the closure restrictions under nonbankruptcy law.
Once again, it is plausible that neither Congress nor the bankruptcy court
is constitutionally empowered to excuse the debtor from compliance with these
restrictions to the detriment of the affected eInployees or other contemplated
beneficiaries. Under this application ofPlank's "Non-Expropriation Principle,"
bankruptcy law must not impair the rights of a "Third Party." 143 Depriving the
bankruptcy law, should be interpreted and applied consistently with procedure theory. See infra
notes 173-74 and accompanying text (discussing Plank's Debtor-Creditor Adjustment
Principle).
140. See, e.g., WARN Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (2000) (discussed supra note 127);
N.J. STAT ANN. § lIA:8-1 (West 2002) (requiring 45-day notice of layoff of permanent
employee); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 109.07 (West 2002) (requiring 60-day notice of mass layoffs to
affected employees, collective bargaining representatives, and municipalities).
141. If, for example, a debtor would be required to make additional payments to its
employees arising out of a prebankruptcy noncompliance with the WARN Act, those claims
should be treated as claims in the bankruptcy case under procedure theory. See Bartell, supra
note 127, at 257-63 (discussing employee claims arising out of prebankruptcy noncompliance
with the WARN Act).
142. It should not matter whether the employees' benefits could be enforced by private suit
or only by the government. The point is that the employees should be entitled to insist that the
debtor comply with the applicable nonbankruptcy law.
143. Federalism, supra note 136, at 1091-92. Note that as beneficiaries of the posited
restrictions on plant closure the at-will employees are rightsholders in my taxonomy although
they are Third Parties, not creditors, under Plank's terminology. Under current nonbankruptcy
law and consistent with procedure theory, the debtor would be required to comply with a statute
such as the WARN Act or analogous state laws. 20 C.F.R. § 639 (1989) (stating that a fiduciary
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direct and indirect beneficiaries of the value of the legal restrictions on plant
closure clearly would violate this principle.
Assume next that the WARN Act provides its direct and indirect
beneficiaries with rights that they do not enjoy under any other law. Does
delivering these benefits in any way offend procedure theory? Of course not.
The WARN Act is fully consistent with procedure theory because it is generally
applicable within its scope; it is not a bankruptcy-specific law. One might
argue that there are bankruptcy-specific considerations that warrant excusing a
firm in bankruptcy from cOlnpliance with the WARN Act. The existence of a
bankruptcy-related justification for special treatment could square that
treatment with procedure theory.144 For example, if the debtor is liquidating
and is no longer operating a business, relief from the WARN Act might be
appropriate. 145 But finns liquidate outside bankruptcy as well as inside
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is not a plausible, Inuch less appropriate, proxy for
liquidation. One also Inight argue that finns that genuinely cannot afford to
comply with the WARN Act should be excused. Perhaps bankruptcy is a
somewhat better proxy for the inability to pay. But the inability to pay is not
the exclusive property of firms in bankruptcy. Indeed, the WARN Act itself
recognizes as much in providing for exceptions based on various types of
hardship.146 For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that procedure theory
recognizes circumstances in which bankruptcy-only rules are appropriate, but
plant closings and Inass layoffs do not appear to qualify.
Consider another example-a lawsuit on a contract in a court of general
jurisdiction. Assume that the court has concluded that an enforceable contract
exists, that the defendant is in breach, and that the plaintiff is entitled to a
money judgment. The defendant, however, argues that enforcement of the
judgment will severely damage the defendant's business prospects and force it
to terminate many employees-all with disastrous effects on the local economy
and the community generally. Should the court take these arguments into
whose sole function is to liquidate a failed business is not required to comply with WARN Act,
implying that other fiduciaries-a debtor in possession under Chapter 11-operating a business
in bankruptcy must comply); see Bartell, supra note 127, at 278-95 (arguing that WARN Act
should apply in bankruptcy with no exception for liquidations); see also 28 U.S.C. § 959(b)
(2000) (providing that the trustee or receiver must manage property in its possession according
to law of the state in which the property is located).
144. See supra Part II.D.1 (discussing "Preserving, Increasing, and Fairly Distributing
Value").
145. See supra note 143 (providing an excuse from compliance with the WARN Act for a
fiduciary that is liquidating a failed business).
146. See Bartell, supra note 127, at 250-53 (discussing exceptions from compliance with
the WARN Act for faltering companies, unforeseeable circun1stances, and natural disasters).
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account in exercising its discretion under equitable principles? Of course not,
and the arguments are no less morally offensive when Inade in a bankruptcy
court.
Advocates of expansive goals for bankruptcy law generally have not
articulated in detail how bankruptcy law could and should take into account
extraneous (nonrightsholders') interests that they favor. 147 Presumably, these
extraneous interests could be served by featuring into the exercise of judicial
discretion, as in the plant closing example. 148 They also Inight figure in a
judge's construction and application of provisions of the Bankruptcy Code,149
or the Bankruptcy Code itself could be revised to address explicitly the role of
these extraneous interests in a bankruptcy proceeding. 150 But however the
approach may be disguised in noble rhetoric,151 service to these extraneous
152
interests at the expense of or risk to rightsholders is prima facie theft.
A
judicial proceeding that transfers wealth froln those who are legally entitled to
benefit from that value to those who hold no legal entitlement is wrong.
Sympathetic as an extraneous cause-"emploYlnent," "rehabilitation," or
"community"-may appear, redistribution of wealth in bankruptcy away from
those who hold legal entitlelnents to those who do not, whether to further a

147. See, e.g., Rehabilitating Values, supra note 7, at 772 ("Bankruptcy law creates
conditions for an ongoing debate in which, by expressing these conflicting and
incommensurable values, participants work towards defining and redefining the fundamental
aims of the enterprise. Through the medium of bankruptcy discourse, the enterprise realizes its
potential as a fully dimensional personality. "). Karen Gross is an exception. See GROSS, supra
note 9, at 248-50 (calling for amendments to 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, 105, 1113, 1129, 1225, and
1325 to take into account the interests of "communities").
148. See Frost, supra note 4, at 123 ("[B]ankruptcy decisions are not expressly
redistributive. The fact-driven nature of the process is such that most of its redistributive
character derives from the judges' attitudes in making close factual calls regarding asset
deployment decisions. ").
149.
150.

Code).
151.

[d.
See supra note 147 (noting proposals made by Gross for amending the Bankruptcy

For example, who could be against "employment" in the abstract?

152. Cf David Gray Carlson, Rationality, Accident, and Priority Under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 71 MINN. L. REV. 207, 209, 245-46 (1986) (drawing analogy

between theft and the first-to-file-or-perfect priority rule under DCC Article 9 that can enable a
secured party acting in bad faith to achieve priority under former UCC § 9-312(5)); James J.
White, supra note 131, at 447 ("[Gross's] proposal to take from rich creditors and give to poor
creditors, despite the fact that each holds identical claims, is fundamentally an immoral attempt
to take the wealth of one and give it to another simply because the former is wealthy and the
latter is poor. "). I consider Professor Gross's proposal in connection with the discussion ofpro
rata sharing in bankruptcy. See infra Part IV.C (discussing pro rata sharing).
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political agenda or a cOInlnunitarian philosophy or otherwise, is a corruption of
civil justice. I53 Robin Hood was, after all, a crook. I54
To be sure, advocates of expansive redistributive goals do not openly
claitn to be Robin Hood supporters. More typically, they argue that bankruptcy
law should provide SOlne redress for those whose interests are adversely
affected by financial distress-with employees, rehabilitation, and community
being the usual proxies-even if those affected interests do not amount to legal
I55
For exalnple, consider the normative arguments advanced by
entitlements.
Korobkin. Korobkin's move is to apply Rawlsian contractarianism to
bankruptcy law in an attempt to discover its "deep structure. ,,156 Unlike
Jackson but faithful to Rawls, however, I(orobkin places the thick "Rawlsian
veil" over the hypothetical bargainers ilnagined to be devising the principal
patterns of a bankruptcy law, and he includes in the group of hypothetical
bargainers representatives of all interests that might be affected by a debtor's
financial distress. I57 The bargainers all know they may be affected by
insolvency, but no one knows if he or she will be a debtor, an unsecured
creditor (contractual or involuntary), a secured creditor, an at-will eInployee, a
member of the community otherwise unconnected to a debtor, or the occupant
153. Could the advocates for extraneous interests be understood to be arguing that
currently extraneous interests should be given legal entitlement status? That would be a stretch,
inasmuch as they advocate for protecting those interests only in bankruptcy, not generally. See
infra note 390 and accompanying text (discussing employment law concerns in bankruptcy).
Some redistribution in bankruptcy may be justified and principled. See, e.g., infra Part IV.E
(discussing trustee's avoiding powers).
154. Actually, the understanding that Robin Hood "robbed the rich and gave to the poor"
was a somewhat late development in the legend's history. lC. HOLT, ROBIN HOOD 183-86 (rev.
ed. 1989).
155. See, e.g., Rehabilitating Values, supra note 7, at 721, 761-77 (discussing the
transformation of competing interests in bankruptcy)~ Contractarianisn1, supra note 7, at 546,
550-58, 574 (discussing the various concerns for preservation under bankruptcy law and the
creditors bargain theory). Obviously, the mere fact that someone's interest is affected by some
event or circumstance cannot plausibly support an argument that there must be some legal
redress. For example, I may be enormously inconvenienced, even damaged, by traffic delays
caused by a driver who carelessly failed to maintain a broken-down automobile, but no one
would suggest that the driver owes a legal duty to me or the possibly thousands of other
inconvenienced or damaged drivers.
156. Contractarianisn1, supra note 7, at 550 (stating that "bankruptcy law's deep structure"
provides principles to evaluate the fairness of bankruptcy law).
157. Id. at 550, 572-89 (discussing the veil of ignorance over all affected parties, not just
legal rightsholders). Korobkin ignores the fact that these affected interests could be affected in
precisely the same manner by a firm's decision to close a plant absent financial distress (indeed,
possibly in order to avoid financial distress) or by closing the plant based on financial distress
outside bankruptcy. Stated otherwise, he does not confront procedure theory's corollary that
bankruptcy law should deal only with bankruptcy-related matters.
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of any other particular relationship. 158 Having consecrated and (dis)armed his
inclusive hypothetical group, Korobkin argues that they would come up with
something like the major features of current bankruptcy law and would seek to
protect those with something to lose and who occupy the "most vulnerable
position" in connection with a bankruptcy. 159 But Korobkin's move seems little
more than an argulnent that thoughtful, interested, objective, and neutral
lawmakers would come to his conclusions about bankruptcy, which he claims
fit "our strongly held considered judglnents." 160 His "theory" turns out to be
vacuous. Moreover, his conclusions generally Inatch those of some other
traditionalist scholars, consisting generally of populist ideals. 161
A possible partial rescue of Korobkin's thesis Inight be to construe it as
consistent with procedure theory as advanced here. For example, one might
understand hiln to argue that bankruptcy law should take into account the
interests of nonrightsholders only if it can do so without risk or imposition on
162
rightsholders.
This understanding would invoke the caveat explained
158. fd. at 574-75 ("The parties in a bankruptcy choice situation know that, once the veil
of ignorance is lifted, they will occupy one or more of the positions, although they have no idea
where they will end up. ").
159. As K.orobkin explains:
The principle of rational planning follows a similar intuition in regulating the
pursuit of mutually exclusive aims of persons affected by financial distress. When
it is iInpossible to promote one aim without frustrating the other, the principle of
rational planning mandates that persons in the worst-off positions in the context of
financial distress should be protected over those occupying the better-offpositions.
I shall refer to those positions that are worst off in financial distress as the "most
vulnerable." A most vulnerable position, as I mean the term, refers to a position
occupied by persons who have the worst prospects for avoiding harms in the
context offinancial distress. Essentially, the persons who have the worst prospects
for avoiding harms in financial distress are those who, while being relatively
powerless in promoting their respective aims, also have the most to lose if their
aims are frustrated.
fd. at 584.
160. fd. at 609. I(orobkin fails to note the identity of those who join him to form the "our."
Most likely it refers to other traditionalists.
161. I must dissent, at least to SOlne extent, from Baird's view that the divisions between
traditionalist and proceduralist conceptions of bankruptcy do not stem from "different political
beliefs." Axioms, supra note 50, at 575. The divisions may not follow the popular liberalconservative dichotomy, and to that extent I agree with Baird. But arguments about the
redistribution of wealth and the advocacy of populist ideals do have political content.
162. I(orobkin states:
Jackson, Baird, and others have questioned the justification for having
reorganization law, based on the contention that the process is economically costly
and does not inure to the financial benefit of creditors. Of course, this contention is
an important one. Even if it were empirically established that reorganization does
not ultimately benefit creditors, however, such a showing would not by itself
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163
earlier.
Alternatively, perhaps Korobkin's conception of those in the "most
vulnerable position" could conform his theory to procedure theory. 164 Rescue
attempts notwithstanding, Korobkin's theory lTIOst likely lies in the tradition of
Robin Hood, which procedure theory rejects. 165 Otherwise, it would
scrupulously and consistently favor those with legal entitlements over those
without, and his critique· of the exclusion of these extraneous interests in
bankruptcy would be rendered meaningless.

B. Interests ofRightsholders Inter Se, Including Priorities

Procedure theory generally insists that nonbankruptcy priorities be
honored and respected in bankruptcy.166 Consistent with the foregoing
discussion of allocating to nonrightsholders value that otherwise would benefit
require the normative conclusion that corporate reorganization must be abolished.
Such a showing does not speak to the aims of many persons affected by financial
distress-including employees, slnall business owners, and interested members of
the community.
Contractarianism, supra note 7, at 597-98 (citations omitted). The understanding ofKorobkin
posited in the text assumes that even ifreorganization law does not benefit creditors it also does
not harm them. That argument is consistent with procedure theory, although superfluous.
163. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing extraneous rightsholders).
164. For example, he argues that a corporation with no real chance of recovery places its
employees in the worst position. /d. at 587 (discussing the A.H. Robins case). However, by
analogy to "medical triage," because the employees no longer have anything to lose, Korobkin
would disregard their interests and consider the unsecured creditors to occupy the "most
vulnerable position." /d. (Presumably, he also would ignore the interests of the shareholders,
inasmuch as by focusing on the unsecureds as the "most vulnerable" he must implicitly be
assuming the firm to be insolvent.) On the other hand, if the firm were insolvent but viable,
presumably the employees' long-term employment interest would render them the "most
vulnerable." /d. What K.orobkin leaves less clear, however, is whether he would favor the
employees' interests in that situation to the detriment of those with legal entitlements, such as
the creditors.
165. This makes sense for Korobkin's Rawlsian theory, inasmuch as Robin Hoodism has
much in common with Rawls' "difference principle." See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
65-73 (rev. ed. 1999) (discussing the difference principle). Under the difference principle, an
initial inequality (in a two-person example) is justified only if "the difference in expectation is to
the advantage of the representative man who is worse off." /d. at 68. Rawls wishes away rights
and entitlements and bids the representative person behind the veil to imagine that he or she is
the poorest beggar of all. If Robin Hoodism is introduced into the original position, then it can
prevail.
166. This section addresses the treatment in bankruptcy of competing claims to property of
a debtor's estate. Claims to priority in payment under Bankruptcy Code Section 507(a) are
addressed in Part IV.I. Part IV.I also considers the "tort-first" proposals that would award
priority in payment to a debtor's involuntary creditors, such as tort claimants, over other
unsecured claims.
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a debtor's rightsholders, procedure theory also teaches that it is wrong for
Congress to allocate assets first to rightsholders who have no legal entitlements
under nonbankruptcy law, to be satisfied first from a particulat iteln of a
debtor's property, or to allocate assets first to those with junior interests in the
assets to the detriment of those who have senior interests. 167
Secured claims against a debtor's assets are ubiquitous and their treatment
in bankruptcy has provided fodder for a substantial volume of commentary. 168
Subject to relatively narrow avoidance powers and costs of delay, 169 however,
security interests in a debtor's personal and real property that are effective
under nonbankruptcy law generally are respected as well under the Bankruptcy
Code. 170 This treatlnent corresponds to procedure theory's tenets.
Respect for nonbankruptcy priorities in bankruptcy is particularly
significant in cases in which nonbankruptcy lawmakers selected priority rules
because of the primarily instrtllnental roles of the rules, particularly in
facilitating extensions of credit. 171 As discussed above,172 traditionalist
bankruptcy scholars, tnore than proceduralists, tend to "assume a bankruptcy"
and then to consider what happens, or should happen, to the assets and the
players involved. This approach offers the freedoln to allocate value to the
interests that one deems most deserving (however that might be determined).
But this approach obviously ignores the instrulnental role of law in shaping
behavior. Presumably, the treatlnent that bankruptcy law affords legal

167. In general, it would be equally wrong for a bankruptcy court to exercise its discretion
to adjust priorities in bankruptcy. However, given that priority rules usually emanate from
statutes that generally do not welcome variance through judicial discretion, the principal locus
of bankruptcy priority adjustment would be the Bankruptcy Code as enacted and amended by
Congress. Of course, courts could and do effect de facto adjustments by means of the
interpretation and application of statutory priority rules.
168. For collections of the commentary, see generally Steven L. Harris & Charles W.
Mooney, Jr., Measuring the Social Costs and Benefits and IdentifYing the Victin1s of
Subordinating Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1349, 1351-55 (1997)
[hereinafter Social Costs]; Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based
Theory ofSecurity Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 202537 (1994) [hereinafter Property-Based Theory].
169. See infra Parts IV.E and IV.J (discussing avoiding powers and protection of
creditors).
170. TABS, supra note 136, §§ 7.25-7.28, at 538-55 ( 1997) (discussing secured claims).
171. See, e.g., Social Costs, supra note 168, at 1356-72 (examining the "social costs" of
the subordinating proposals); Property-Based Theory, supra note 168, at 2028-37 (discussing
whether secured credit acts to transfer wealth).
172. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text (comparing the views of traditionalists
and proceduralists).
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entitlements in bankruptcy affects behavior of many lTIOre market participants
outside bankruptcy. 173
Procedure theory instructs that it is not for bankruptcy law to dull the
effects of nonbankruptcy law, instrumental or otherwise. When bankruptcy
law gives effect to nonbankruptcy entitlements, it enhances the
instrumental effects that nonbankruptcy law lTIay afford. 174 But procedure
theory is not grounded on the principle that nonbankruptcy priority rules
necessarily are socially optimal. Consider another example. Assume that a
nonbankruptcy law priority rule awards priority to a statutory lien in favor
of an artisan over a security interest created and perfected under Article 9
175
of the UCC.
ASSUlTIe further a proposal to amend the Bankruptcy Code
to provide that a secured clailTI created under Article 9 would have priority
over a statutory artisan's lien, reversing the nonbankruptcy priority rule.
The proposal is supported by a credible, even convincing, argulTIent that the
proposed bankruptcy priority rule would be preferable as a matter of policy
to the nonbankruptcy rule. Procedure theory holds nonetheless that
Congress should reject the proposed amendlTIent.
As explained and defended in the following subpart, procedure theory
generally demands respect in bankruptcy for nonbankruptcy priorities even
when the nonbankruptcy rule does not reflect an optimal social policy.
Whether or not bankruptcy law should adjust nonbankruptcy priorities is a
question distinct frOlTI the question whether bankruptcy law should confer
bankruptcy-only rightsholder status to those who do not possess
nonbankruptcy legal entitlelTIents. The case for generally not adjusting
priorities in bankruptcy may be harder than the case for not allocating

173. Professor Harris and I have pointed out the flaws of a static analysis of bankruptcy
distributional effects under alternative nonbankruptcy legal rules when the analysis assumes that
the only differences in result would be the differences in the nonbankruptcy rules applied. See
Policy, supra note 40, at 100 (discussing Revised Article 9 and reduction of perfection errors).
For example, a less expansive legal regime for secured credit would not necessarily result in
larger distributions to unsecured claimants than would be the case under a more expansive
regime. In many situations, for example, the secured credit Inight not have been extended at all
under the less expansive regilne or a slnaller aInount of credit might have been extended. Id.
174. See, e.g., Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Insolvency Law as Credit Enhancement:
Insolvency-Related Provisions of the Cape Town Convention and the Aircraft Equipment
Protocol, 13 INT'L INSOLVENCY REv. 27, 39-42 (2004) (explaining that the Convention and
Protocol could induce extensions of credit by enhancing the effectiveness in insolvency
proceedings of security interests covered by those instruments, along the lines of Section 1110
of the Bankruptcy Code).
175. See, e.g., DCC § 9-333(b) (2000) ( f1 A [statutory or common-law] possessory lien on
goods has priority over a security interest in the goods unless the lien is created by a statute that
expressly provides otherwise. f1).
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rightsholders' wealth to nonrightsholders inasmuch as the latter case seems
more intuitive. But on close examination procedure theory generally
disapproves of both forms of bankruptcy-specific adjustments~
The previous subpart noted the general consistency with procedure
theory of Plank's constitutional principles on the "subject of Bankruptcies"
in respect of Third Party constituencies such as at-will employees and
community interests. In the present context, however, of adjusting
priorities in bankruptcy among rightsholders Plank's constitutional
structure fails to observe procedure theory's admonitions. Under his
"Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle," bankruptcy law generally has
carte blanche to adjust the rights between a debtor and creditor, and among
176
Indeed, Plank's construction of the Bankruptcy Clause would
creditors.
"empower Congress to abolish security interests granted by the debtor to
secure the creditor's debts. ,,177 If Plank's construction is correct as a matter
of existing doctrine-if the existence of the additional constraints
procedure theory would impose cannot be supported based on the history
and application of the Bankruptcy Clause-this theory provides an
important illustration of the value of normative theory. A powerful
normative claitn contrary to accepted doctrine can serve as an instrument
for reforming that doctrine. 178

176. Federalism, supra note 136, at 1089-91.
177. ld. at 1091. Plank does argue, however, that such a statutory move would bean
unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Id. at n.l 06;
see U.S. Const. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation. "). Note that Plank does not advocate such a change in bankruptcy law. Id. Of
course, it is not likely that Congress would enact a complete abolition of respect for security
interests in bankruptcy. But in the real world both the applicable doctrine and its normative
underpinnings provide important insight to lawmakers. Moreover, legislation introduced in
2002 would have made a huge range of routine secured transactions avoidable in bankruptcy
(although the bill's sponsors probably did not intend such a broad scope). Employee Abuse
Prevention Act of2002, S. 2798, 107th Congo (2002); Employee Abuse Prevention Act of2002,
H. R. 5221, 107th Congo (2002). For a discussion of this legislation, see generally William M.
Burke et al., Report on Avoidance, Subordination, Super Priority, and Recharacterization
Provisions of the Proposed Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002 (Sept. 3,2002) (on file
with Washington and Lee Law Review); Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, 1r., The
Unfortunate Life and Merciful Death of the Avoidance Powers under Section 103 of the
Durbin-Delahunt Bill: What Were They Thinking?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1829 (2004).

178. I argue below that the (nearly) unfettered deference of Plank's Debtor-Creditor
Adjustment principle should be reined in by an interpretation of the Bankruptcy Clause more
consistent with procedure theory. See infi"a notes 219--20 and accompanying text (discussing
consistency in procedure theory).
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C. The Philosophical and Jurisprudential Account ofProcedure Theory

The foregoing discussion explained that procedure theory calls on
bankruptcy law to respect, observe, and enforce legal entitlements arising in
179
nonbankruptcy law.
The first two subparts of this Part identified the settings
in which prima facie and intuitive wrongs would arise from a bankruptcy
regime that would redistribute the wealth of rightsholders to nonrightsholders
or reorder nonbankruptcy priorities. 180 But procedure theory does not insist or
assume that nonbankruptcy law necessarily is in all respects just and optimal,
however those attributes Inight be measured or evaluated. So why is drawing
an overarching nonnative baseline to respect nonbankruptcy legal entitletnents
a morally superior move? Why should the makers of bankruptcy law not
correct and override perceived deficiencies in nonbankruptcy law? Procedure
theory must confront these questions directly. This subpart and the following
two subparts address these questions.
A conventional jurisprudential approach might first confront the source of
law's validity, its relationship to accepted social customs and morals, and the
basis for recognizing legal obligations. A plethora of theories have addressed
these questions, including interpretive theories 181 and theories such as
positivism,182 natural law, 183 and legal realism. 184 Procedure theory generally is
agnostic as to the application ofthese theories to nonbankruptcy law. However,
procedure theory does assume the legitin1acy ofthe body of nonbankruptcy law
for which it dictates respect. 185 Stated otherwise, if legitimate nonbankruptcy
law should be observed and enforced outside bankruptcy, procedure theory
insists that it should be observed and enforced inside bankruptcy, absent some
179.

See supra Part II.B (discussing the ends and principles of procedure theory of

bankruptcy law).
See supra Part III.A-B (discussing the interest of rightsholders and nonrightsholders).
See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); JOSEPH RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW (1979).
183. See generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
184. See generally MICHAEL MARTIN, LEGAL REALISM: AMERICAN AND SCANDANAVIAN
(1997).
185. Here I share the majority view in contemporary jurisprudence of law's intrinsic claim
of legitimacy. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Hart on Moral Rights and Legal Duties, 4 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 123, 131 (1984) ("No system is a system of law unless it includes a claim of
legitimacy."). But there is a minority that questions law's intrinsic claim for respect. See
generally Kenneth Einar Hilnma, Law's Claim a/Legitimate Authority, in HART'S POSTSCRIPT
271, 309 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001). To be precise, procedure theory does not claim that
180.
181.
182.

nonbankruptcy law has greater legitimacy than bankruptcy law or that any deviation from
procedure theory by bankruptcy law renders bankruptcy law illegitimate.
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bankruptcy-specific justification. 186 It follows that procedure theory accepts
that nonbankruptcy law reflects a wide range of nonnative justifications as well
as inconsistencies and flaws. While procedure theory does not shy from
beneficial reforms of nonbankruptcy law, it denies the coherence and rationality
of implementing these reforms through bankruptcy law alone.
Consider again the exalnple of a nonbankruptcy legal rule that awards
priority to a statutory or common-law. possessory lien over an Article 9 security
interest, discussed in Part III.B. Assume that this nonbankruptcy law priority
rule is demonstrably suboptimal because a different rule would increase
economic efficiency, would further distributive justice, or would increase social
welfare based on any other rationale. I8 ? Under this assulnption it follows that
altering (reforming) the priority rule in bankruptcy would provide a net benefit
in social welfare, albeit to a lesser extent than an across-the-board refonn ofthe
priority rule, a reform applicable both inside and outside bankruptcy. Yet
procedure theory's normative position would not condone this admittedly
welfare-enhancing utilitarian Inove through changes in the bankruptcy laws.
Procedure theory rejects the bankruptcy-grounded utilitarian reform as
incoherent, even if welfare-enhancing in the specific case. Consider, for
exalnple, Ronald Dworkin's fralnework. The bankruptcy-only priority reform
would offend Dworkin's independent virtue of law's "integrity." 188 In
particular, the reform would succumb to Dworkin's integrity-based
condemnation of "checkerboard" laws. I89 Dworkin posits an example of a
society sharply divided on the morality of abortion. This division gives rise to a
"Solomonic" law that would criminalize abortion "for pregnant women who

186. Consistent with the assumption that non bankruptcy law is legitimate, were an aspect
of nonbankruptcy law shown to be illegitimate, procedure theory would not be offended by that
showing inasmuch as that aspect would not be "law" as contemplated by procedure theory.
Critics of the proposition that bankruptcy law should respect nonbankruptcy entitlements
generally have not based their criticisms on the illegitimacy of the nonbankruptcy
entitlements-the entitlements should not be honored even outside bankruptcy. See infra Part
IV (discussing the circumstances in which procedure theory does support some deviations from
nonbankruptcy law in bankruptcy, based on bankruptcy-specific justifications).
187. For present analytical purposes, there is nothing special about the posited priority rule.
The example just as well could be a suboptimal nonbankruptcy legal rule that failed to
acknowledge the interests of at-will employees or the community more generally, as discussed
in Part lILA. Of course, the proposition that one rule or the other enhances social welfare is
impossible to prove or know with certainty.
188. See DWORKIN, supra note 181, at 176-217 (discussing the legislative principle of
political integrity which requires legislators to adopt a set of laws that are morally coherent).
189. Jd. at 182 C'[M]any of us, to different degrees in different situations, would reject the
checkerboard solution not only in general and in advance, but even in particular cases if it were
available as a possibility. ").
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were born in even years but not for those born in odd ones." 190 As a
compromise, this statutory technique would please opponents ofabortion rights
more than no ban at all while pleasing proponents of reproductive freedom
more than a complete ban. Arguing that neither concerns for justice nor
fairness would condemn this checkerboard law, Dworkin nonetheless concludes
that a state would violate the principle of integrity by enacting this
"unprincipled" rule of law. 191
Denise Reaume has advanced a trenchant critique of Dworkin's integrity
192
theory and analysis.
She argues convincingly that integrity is not a standalone, independent value. 193
She agreed, however, that Dworkin's
checkerboard examples should be condemned, but on grounds offairness and
justice instead of integrity, noting that "Dworkin has deliberately chosen
examples involving irrational criteria." 194 Whether based on Dworkin's

190. /d. at 178. Dworkin also mentions other possible checkerboard laws that he claims
violate the integrity principle. One example imposes strict liability on automobile
manufacturers but not on washing machine manufacturers, and another forbids racial
discrimination on buses but allows it in restaurants. Id.
191. Id. at 183-84 (stating that accepting a checkerboard solution demonstrates the
inconsistent principles which offend integrity). Dworkin states:
The most natural explanation of why we oppose checkerboard statutes appeals to
that ideal [of integrity]: we say that a state that adopts these internal compromises
is acting in an unprincipled way, even though no single official who voted for or
enforces the compromise has done anything which, judging his individual actions
by the ordinary standards of personal morality, he ought not to have done. The
state lacks integrity because it must endorse principles to justify part of what it has
done that it must reject to justify the rest.
/d. Dworkin's example could be adjusted to contemplate the federal system of government
that exists in the United States. A federal law might criminalize abortion in half ofthe states
and provide that abortion is available with no constraints in the other half. To ensure that the
adjusted example strikes a parallel comparison with Dworkin's, the law would prohibit travel
from one state to another in order to obtain an abortion, and the prohibition would be strictly
and effectively enforced. As with Dworkin's original example, the checkerboard state of
affairs under the posited law would be incoherent and would fail Dworkin's integrity test.
192. See Denise Reaume, Is Integrity a Virtue? Dworkin's Theory ofLegal Obligation, 39 U.
TORONTO L.J. 380 (1989) (critiquing Dworkin's integrity theory).
193. /d. at 400 ("These arguments lead to the. conclusion that integrity is not a value
independent ofjustice or fairness. ").
194. Id. at 398. Reaume states:
[T]he chequer-board outcome denies some-either fetuses or women-what they are
entitled to, and is therefore wrong. Again, this is the logical result of the fact that
principles are general standards. . .. Chequer-board solutions are never proposed,
and therefore are not commonly debated, because to do so would be to demonstrate
bad faith. One's commitlnent to one's proclaimed principle would be called into
doubt. Integrity, conceived ofas independent ofjustice, is not needed to explain this.
It takes us no further to argue that it is integrity which requires the adoption of
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integrity heuristic or Reaume's fairness-justice critique, irrational and
unprincipled checkerboard laws should be eschewed.
The bankruptcy-only priority rule posited in the example would be just
such an irrational, unprincipled checkerboard statute. The example posits that
nonbankruptcy law has awarded priority to certain possessory liens over those
of Article 9 security interests in the context of competing claims to a debtor's
property. The factors that rationally Inight be considered for the posited rule
are the saIne whether applied in a priority contest that takes place inside or
outside of bankruptcy. The debtor's assets are scarce. 195 Whether the priority
rule is applied inside or outside bankruptcy, there is no coherent basis for
different outcomes. If Congress wishes to impielnent the desirable, welfareenhancing reform embodied in a revised priority rule, it should do so generally
without regard for whether bankruptcy is involved. 196 To apply the revised rule
only in bankruptcy is no more rational than applying it only in odd years. A
bankruptcy-only fix would be incoherent. 197
Procedure theory's call for respecting nonbankruptcy entitlements in
bankruptcy and its corresponding recognition of the incoherence ofentitlement
adjustments in bankruptcy (but not outside bankruptcy) is not new. For
example, these principles are a central feature of the Baird and Jackson
creditors' bargain theory. 198 But unlike the creditors' bargain thesis, procedure

principles. This is already achieved by a requirement to pursue justice.
Jd. at 397.
195. Otherwise, the priority rule would be of no particular mOlnent. But I do not assume
for this purpose that a priority rule is valuable only if the debtor is insolvent. See infra note 207
and accompanying text (discussing priority rules).
196. That Congress Inight not have the power to adopt an across-the-board priority rule,
however, does not weaken this argument. See infi"a notes 210-13 and accompanying text
(discussing the Commerce Clause and the Bankruptcy Clause).
197. Procedure theory draws on Dworkin's integrity/coherence critique and Reaume's
fairness/justice critique of checkerboard laws as independent normative support for the results
that procedure theory demands. As Dworkin's abortion law example indicates, however, the
normative purchase of these critiques is not limited to the context of the
bankruptcy/nonbankruptcy dichotomy. It also would be incoherent for a nonbankruptcy law to
provide special priority rules that would apply only in the case of priority contests involving
insolvent debtors. See infra note 207 and accompanying text (discussing priority rules).
198. Supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. Baird states that:
A coherent approach to the question of how losses from failed firms should be
distributed cannot ignore the distributional effects tnany legal rules have on firms
that are not in bankruptcy. Legal rights should turn as little as possible on the
forum in which one person or another seeks to vindicate them. Whenever we must
have a legal rule to distribute losses in bankruptcy, we must also have a legal rule
that distributes the same loss outside of bankruptcy. All Jackson and I advocate is
that these two rules be the same.
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theory makes no utilitarian claim that its respect for nonbankruptcy entitlements
199
It is not subject to
in bankruptcy necessarily enhances social welfare.
Carlson's critique of Baird and Jackson's "bankruptcy neutrality" forum20o
shopping thesis.
Unlike the creditors' bargain analysis, procedure theory is
not grounded on the reduction of inefficient forum shopping through
eliminating perverse incentives created by inconsistencies in bankruptcy and
201
nonbankruptcy law.
Procedure theory does not claim that "bad" results
necessarily result from its violation or that nonbankruptcy law is optima1. 202
Could the posited bankruptcy-only priority rule be rationalized if it were
instead an "insolvency-only" rule-one that would apply both outside and
inside bankruptcy but only when the debtor is insolvent?203 I believe not,
because there is no rational basis for a priority rule that applies only in the case
of insolvency. In some situations nonbankruptcy law does take account of a

Loss Distribution, supra note 38, at 822 (footnote omitted).
199. Procedure theory's tenets ntay be welfare-enhancing when its application in the
aggregate is considered, just as civil procedure generally enhances welfare to the extent that it
provides an efficient and fair system of vindicating legal entitlements. See, e.g., supra notes 2237 and accompanying text (discussing Hendley's study of substantive and procedural law in the
former Soviet Union). Moreover, putting the interests of rightsholders first and giving
particular weight to the views of the residual owners of a firm, generally the unsecured creditors
when the debtor is insolvent, may encourage wealth-enhancing decisions. But these
possibilities-probabilities I would argue-differ froln a claim that the vindication of legal
entitlements called for by procedure theory necessarily enhances welfare.
200. See, e.g., Philosophy, supra note 49, at 1377-82 (critiquing Jackson's bankruptcy
neutrality argument)~ Bankruptcy Theory, supra note 69, at 466-69 (discussing bankruptcy
neutrality).
201. See Bankruptcy Theory, supra note 69, at 466-69 (criticizing the creditors' bargain
inefficient forum shopping thesis). Jackson's forum-shopping argument is grounded on the
notion that disparities between treatment inside and outside bankruptcy will lead to the use of
bankruptcy law in inappropriate circumstances, when it's not necessary to solve the collective
action, common-pool problem. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 70, at 21-27,57-62,153,193
(discussing the problem of relative entitlements). Carlson asserts other complaints against
bankruptcy neutrality as well. Philosophy, supra note 49, at 1342 n.4 ("Bankruptcy neutrality"
is Carlson's term for Jackson's position). Given Jackson's utilitarianism, Carlson's critique of
Jackson's bankruptcy neutrality adopts a utilitarian perspective. For example, Carlson argued
that neutrality "freezes" a bankruptcy judge from otherwise needed action to "overrule state
law's bad influence by molding a federal rule in a bankruptcy proceeding." ld. at 1381. Carlson
also asserts that state legislatures sometimes lack the power to Inake meaningful reforms. ld.
This critique suggests that if utilitarianism is the goal, the bankruptcy judge should not need to
wait on the state legislatures to act. Because procedure theory is not a utilitarian theory, its
bankruptcy neutrality (subject, of course, to exceptions) does not succulnb to Carlson's
utilitarian critique of Jackson's utilitarian theory.
202. Thus, it does not derive the "ought" from the "is."
203. If so, then one might justify a bankruptcy-only priority rule by arguing that
bankruptcy serves as a rough proxy for insolvency.
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debtor's insolvency. For example, certain transfers can be set aside under state
fraudulent transfer law when made by an insolvent transferor. 204 But that is
because the other creditors would be disadvantaged for the benefit of the
transferee should the transfer stand. 205 There is no analogous basis for applying
the posited priority rule only in the case of insolvent debtors. Priority rules can
206
have meaning and add value whether or not a debtor is insolvent.
For
example, the claimant that is advantaged by a priority rule applicable to
particular property of a debtor need not look to the debtor's other assets that
would be reachable only through judicial process, even ifthe debtor is solvent.
Another possible justification of a bankruptcy-only priority rule would
recognize that, underthe appropriate circumstances, Congress Inight achieve a
de facto generally applicable priority rule by enacting a bankruptcy-only rule.
For example, a priority rule that Inaterially weakened secured claims in
bankruptcy would have an instrumental effect on the availability and price of
secured credit generally, inasmuch as extenders of credit would take into
207
account the effect ofthe rule at the time credit is extended or refused.
Could
such a bankruptcy-specific priority rule be defended from procedure theory's
condemnation? Clearly not, for several reasons. First, even the adoption of
such a secured-claim-weakening bankruptcy rule would not mean priority
contests outside bankruptcy would no longer occur. Consequently, the rule
actually would not work the same as a generally applicable rule, even though
some effects would be silnilar. Second, in general most bankruptcy-only
priority rules are not likely to have such an enormous impact outside
bankruptcy. Consider the proposed bankruptcy-only priority rule posited in the
example-awarding priority to perfected consensual security interests over
statutory artisan's liens. Reported decisions relating to priority contests
204. See, e.g., UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5(a), 7A U.L.A. 330 (1999) [hereinafter
U.F.T.A.] (stating that a transfer made while transferor is insolvent is avoidable if transferor
does not receive reasonably equivalent value).
205. The avoidance of fraudulent transfers and procedure theory are· discussed in Part
IV.E.3.
206. Moreover, determining whether a debtor is insolvent at any particular point in time
can be difficult. See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, Why Creditors File So Few Involuntary Petitions
and Why the Number is Not Too Small, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 803, 803-04 (1991) (stating that
Congress adopted the standard of general failure to pay debts as they come due for involuntary
bankruptcy petitions because the former Bankruptcy Act's standard was too burdensome on
petitioning creditors).
207. Social Costs, supra note 168, at 1356-64 ("One major benefit is the facilitation of
credit that creditors otherwise would not extend. "). In addition, bargaining among creditors and
a debtor would take into account the bankruptcy-only priority rule and could impact a debtor's
decision to file or not to file. This possibility, of course, is the Baird and Jackson forumshopping paradigm. See supra note 199 (discussing forum-shopping).
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between statutory or common-law liens and consensual security interests
strongly support both the first and second points. These priority contests have
occurred (at least, according to the reported decisions) overwhelmingly outside
bankruptcy.208
Third, if legislating a generally applicable priority rule were the goal of
Congress, why would it codify the rule as part of the Bankruptcy Code? One
obvious reason is that Congress might not have the power to enact a generally
applicable rule, leaving the Bankruptcy Clause as its avenue of last resort. But
justifying a (purported) de facto generally applicable rule in this way would
209
pervert the Bankruptcy Clause.
Finally, enacting a bankruptcy-only rule also
probably would reflect a second-best strategy supported by those who might
favor a generally applicable rule but whose influence and power is limited to
the field of bankruptcy law. 2IO
Consider further the posited priority rule, assulned to be a desirable refonn
that rationally should be Inade across-the-board. If Congress otherwise lacks
the constitutional power to enact across-the-board refonn,211 the Bankruptcy
Clause should not be interpreted to confer that power on Congress. Inasmuch
as the reform is assumed not to be rationally limited to bankruptcy cases, it
212
would be incoherent to elnpower its enactment under the Bankruptcy Clause.

208. The July 2003 UCCSEARCH CD included 176 digested decisions indexed under
Former Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) Section 9-310. Former Section 9-310 contained a
priority rule relating to liens arising by operation of law in favor of suppliers of services or
materials. Of these decisions, 142 (more than 75%) were decided outside bankruptcy. There
were 33 cases that were decided in bankruptcy. Two others were decided outside bankruptcy,
but the relevant debtors had filed for bankruptcy. One case was impossible to classify.
209. See infra notes 211-18 and accompanying text (discussing the priority rule).
210. I develop this theIne in Part III.E, which addresses the public choice account of
procedure theory.
211. The power of Congress in this respect is beyond the scope of this article. I, however,
note that the Supreme Court has sometimes taken a narrower view of the powers of Congress
and the courts in recent years. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,567-68 (1995)
(stating that Congress may not have the authority under the commerce clause to ban weapons
from school zones).
212. The Supreme Court has expansively interpreted what lies within "the subject of
bankruptcies" under the Bankruptcy Clause. See, e.g., Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304
U.S. 502, 513 (1938) (stating that a bankruptcy law extending the period for redemption by
debtor of property subject to a mortgage is valid and not unconstitutional under the Bankruptcy
Clause). The relevant nonnative claim, here, is that procedure theory dictates that the
Bankruptcy Clause, as an element of bankruptcy law, should be interpreted so as to confine the
power of Congress and the courts to serving the goals of bankruptcy that procedure theory
identifies. There is no plausible or coherent basis for the Bankruptcy Clause to extend the
power of Congress and the federal courts beyond those necessary to implement the goals of
bankruptcy.
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The incoherence of bankruptcy-only rules in neutral settings also reflects
the incoherence of some traditionalist accounts of bankruptcy policy. If
nonbankruptcy legal entitlelnents do not provide the baseline in bankruptcy
(subject to coherent relaxation, as contemplated by procedure theory),213 what
baseline would be preferable? Presulnably, bankruptcy-only distributional rules
could be justified on any conceivable normative grounds ranging from
economic efficiency to communitarian values to any other theory of welfare or
justice. Limited only by the stricture of legislating for bankruptcy cases alone,
bankruptcy policy would alnount to no Inore than "do good" as Congress might
view "good" from time to time in a given context. That unbounded approach
does not offer any theory of bankruptcy whatsoever.
Plank's theory of the Bankruptcy Clause and its proper lilnits rejects such
an open-ended approach to the treatment of Third Parties under the NonExpropriation Principle (as Inoderated by the Non-Interference Principle).214
But Plank's Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle in large part would embrace
this unbounded scope of the Bankruptcy Clause. That principle would allow
Congress and bankruptcy courts a free rein, constitutionally, to adjust the
2ls
relationships between and among a debtor and its creditors.
As a
constitutional matter, it would easily welcome the proposed priority rule
discussed in the example. Presumably, bankruptcy law could adopt Robin
Hood's credo for these relationships, subject only to constitutional restrictions
216
·
on tak lngs.
Procedure theory's normative claim offers a narrower, more purposive
framework for interpreting the Bankruptcy Clause. It recognizes that the core
principle of bankruptcy law is the enhancelnent and vindication of legal
entitlements in a collective proceeding. Deviations from the strict respect for
nonbankruptcy entitlements are acceptable only if reasonably calculated to
serve this core principle. 217

213.
214.

See infra Part IV (discussing bankruptcy law under procedure theory).
See supra notes 136-39 and accolnpanying text (discussing Plank's theory of the

Bankruptcy Clause).
215. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text (discussing bankruptcy law's ability
to adjust creditor rights). As already noted, Plank does recognize that the Bankruptcy Clause is
limited by the Fifth Amendlnent in this context. See supra note 177 and accompanying text
(discussing bankruptcy law's ability to adjust creditor rights).
216. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing bankruptcy law's ability to
adjust creditor rights).
217. Part II.D developed this core principle.
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D. The Procedural and Federal Court Jurisdiction Account of
Procedure Theory
As the caption ofthis subpart Inay appear circular, it is worth a few words
to identify itsgoals and strategy. I continue to use the term "procedure theory"
to mean the normative theory of bankruptcy presented in this Article, not to a
more general theory of civil procedure. This subpart first considers the
structure, vocabulary, and function of bankruptcy law and argues that it mirrors
much of more generally applicable, or "trans-substantive," civil procedure law.
I then explain that the history of both bankruptcy law and federal court
jurisdiction supports the characterization of bankruptcy law as a branch ofcivil
procedure law. Finally, I move on froln the positive account of bankruptcy law
to draw on the goals of procedural law to support the normative cOInponent of
the procedure theory of bankruptcy. From that perspective I argue that
bankruptcy law should serve nonbankruptcy legal entitlements and generally
should reject redistributive ends that contravene those entitlements. In
particular, procedure theory draws support from the normative underpinnings
of Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins?18 An analysis ofthe similar origins of
the Bankruptcy Clause and federal diversity jurisdiction, supported by the
lessons of Erie, teach that the applicable rules of substantive law should not be
varied based on the identity of the foruln of application.
Bankruptcy law in the United States consists of Title 11 of the United
States Code (the Bankruptcy Code), several provisions of Title 18 (Crimes and
Criminal Procedure)219 and Title 28 (the Judicial Code),220 the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure,221 the Official Bankruptcy FOrITIS,222 and local rules of
federal district courts and bankruptcy courts 223-supplemented, of course, with
224
judicial decisions.
Consistent with its procedural focus, the Bankruptcy
Code is structured around ajudicial proceeding called a bankruptcy "case" filed
218. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
219. 18 U.S.C. §§ 151-57 (2000) (providing criminal code associated with bankruptcy).
220. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000) (establishingjurisdiction of bankruptcy cases and
proceedings); 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2000) (establishing venue of bankruptcy cases); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1409 (2000) (establishing venue of proceedings under, arising in, or related to bankruptcy
cases).
221. FED. R. BANKR. P.
222. OFF. BANKR. FORMS.
223. See TABB, supra note 136, § 1.13, at 57 (stating that local court rules are an important
part of bankruptcy practice).
224. Substantive state law also plays a crucial role in bankruptcy cases and proceedings.
See id. § 1.14, at 57-60 (liThe substantive law applied in bankruptcy cases ... is in the greater
part governed by state law. ").
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in a "bankruptcy court. ,,225 Many other aspects of bankruptcy law and its
terminology also hark of its procedural features. A bankruptcy case is
commenced by the filing of a "petition" with the bankruptcy60urt. 226 A
bankruptcy petition may be either "voluntary," filed by a "debtor," "joint," filed
by a "debtor" and the debtor's "spouse," or "involuntary," filed by one or more
holders of "claims" against the debtor. 227 The filing of a voluntary or joint
petition "constitutes an order for relief' under the "chapter" under which the
228
petition was filed.
If an involuntary petition is filed, the debtor is entitled to
file an "answer. ,,229 Ifthe involuntary "petition is not titnely controverted," the
court "shall order relief against the debtor. ,,230 If the debtor's answer does
controvert the involuntary petition, then the court lnust order relief only "after
trial" and if at the trial one oftwo statutory grounds for relief are shown, one of
which is that "the debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such
debts become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute. ,,231
There is a bankruptcy court consisting of "bankruptcy judges" in each
232
federal district.
The United States Court of Appeal in the circuit in which the
relevant bankruptcy court is located appoints the bankruptcy judges to fourteen233
year terms.
The powers of the bankruptcy courts and bankruptcy judges
derive from Article I and the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution, as
provided by Congress. 234 The district courts have "original" jurisdiction of
cases under the Bankruptcy Code, but the jurisdiction is not exclusive as to
"civil proceedings arising under" the Bankruptcy Code "or arising in or related
to cases" thereunder. 235 Each district court detennines the bankruptcy cases and
"proceedings" under the Bankruptcy Code to be heard by the bankruptcy courts
225. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2000) (defining voluntary cases); 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000)
(defining joint cases); 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2000) (defining involuntary cases). In addition, the
Bankruptcy Code also makes provision for cases ancillary to foreign proceedings, which also
are commenced by the filing of a petition. 11 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2000).
226. ld.
227. ld.
228. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302(a) (2000).
229. ld. § 303(d).
230. ld. § 303(h).
231. ld. § 303(h)( 1). The other ground is that a "custodian" has been appointed for the
debtor's property outside of the Bankruptcy Code. "Custodian" is defined to include
nonbankruptcy receivers and trustees over property of the debtor and assignees for the benefit of
the debtor's creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (2000).
232. See 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (designating bankruptcy courts).
233. See 28 U.S.C. § 152 (2000) (governing "appointment of bankruptcy judges").
234. See 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2000) (outlining bankruptcy procedures).
235. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a-b) (2000).
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236
in that district.
When a bankruptcy court hears a proceeding under the
Bankruptcy Code other than a "core proceeding," absent consent of the parties
the bankruptcy court lnust submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law to the district court, which reviews de novo any Inatters to which a party
237
has objected.
The district courts must order "personal injury tort and
wrongful death claims" against a debtor to be "tried in the district court in
which the bankruptcy case is pending" or "in the district court in the district in
which the claim arose, as determined by the district court in which the
bankruptcy case is pending. ,,238 The district court in which a bankruptcy court
239
A
sits has jurisdiction to hear appeals froln the bankruptcy court's orders.
bankruptcy petition may be filed only in a bankruptcy court that possesses the
proper "venue" over the case, although the venue rules are somewhat
240
flexible.
This structural and stylistic procedural setting of bankruptcy law extends
not only to "proceedings" relating to a bankruptcy case, such as an "adversary
proceeding,,241 to determine a priority dispute or a hearing on relief from the
automatic stay,242 but also to the core elements of the bankruptcy case itself.
Proceedings relating to a bankruptcy case, of course, are similar to most other
civil disputes subject to litigation. But the case itself relates to the most
fundamental functions of bankruptcy law-what it is that bankruptcy law in
fact accomplishes. At the functional heart of the bankruptcy case the legal
236. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), (b) (2000) (specifying lnatters heard and determined by
bankruptcy judges).
237. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) (2000).
238. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) (2000).
239. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2000) (establishing appeal jurisdiction). In some circuits,
however, bankruptcy appellate panels are appointed to hear these appeals. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (2000) (providing circumstances under which a bankruptcy appellate panel is
appointed).
240. In general, venue is conferred on the district court "in which the [debtor's] domicile,
residence, principal place of business in the United States, or principal assets in the United
States ... have been located for the one hundred and eighty days immediately preceding" the
filing. 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1) (2000). Venue for a debtor's case also lies in a district court "in
which there is pending a case under" the Bankruptcy Code for an "affiliate, general partner, or
partnership" of the debtor. Id. § 1408(2). Additional venue rules apply to a proceeding "arising
under" the Bankruptcy Code "or arising in or related to cases under" the Bankruptcy Code. ld.
§ 1409.
241. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 700 1-87 (establishing bankruptcy procedure concerning
adversary proceeding[s]).
242. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000) (providing that the filing of bankruptcy petition
automatically stay acts to, inter alia, collect claims against a debtor or to enforce claims or liens
against property ofthe debtor' s estate); 11 U. S. C. § 362(d) (2000) (providing grounds on which
relief from automatic stay is to be granted).

982

61 WASH. & LEE L. REV 931 (2004)

entitlements relating to a debtor-pritnarily "claims,,243 against a debtor and in
some cases the "interests" of a debtor's equity security holders 244-are
determined and vindicated. In this way bankruptcy serves the interests of a
debtor's rightsholders as civil procedure Inore generally vindicates the interests
of those with legal entitlements who seek judicial relief or satisfaction.
In a Chapter 7 case, the debtor's assets generally are liquidated by the
trustee in bankruptcy while the net. proceeds, if any, are distributed to the
holders of claims and then, in the highly unusual case, the balance of
distributable assets are paid to the debtor. 245 Secured claims are satisfied either
fully or to the extent of a relevant collateral value. 246 In a Chapter 11 case in
which a reorganized debtor emerges under a plan of reorganization,247
distributions of property are Inade to the holders of clailns in satisfaction ofthe
claims and, sometilnes, to holders of interests of equity security holders. 248 An
essential tenet of both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 is that nonbankruptcy (usually,
state) law defines the metes and bounds of what constitutes a claim or an
249
interest: the beneficiaries of the system and those entitled to participate.
243. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2000) (defining "claim"); see also supra note 4 (quoting
Chapter 11 's definition of "claim").
244. Although "interest" is not a defined tenn in the Bankruptcy Code, it is used in the
definition of "equity security" and in identifying the rights held by an "equity security holder."
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(16) (2000) (defining "equity security")~ 11 U.S.C. § 101 (17) (2000)
(defining "equity security holder"); 11 U. S. C. § 501 (a) (2000) (providing for filing of proof of
claim by creditor or proof of interest by equity security holder); 11 U.S.C. § 1111 (2000)
(outlining classification of claims and interests).
245. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (2000) (specifying order in which claims are to be paid). See
generally TABB, supra note 136, § 7.23, at 531-34.
246. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000) (providing the status of secured claims). Secured
claims may be dealt with in several ways. For example, the court could order relief from the
automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) or abandonment under 11 U.S.C. § 554, thereby
permitting the secured party to enforce its security interest under nonbankruptcy law. Or, the
trustee could sell the collateral under 11 U.S.C. § 363 and pay over the net proceeds to the
secured party. A debtor may redeem collateral under 11 U.S.C. 722. A debtor also may agree
to reaffirm its debt owed to a secured party, under 11 U.S.C. § 524(c), in exchange for the right
to retain the collateral while making payments to the secured party. See generally TABB, supra
note 136, § 7.26, at 544-49.
247. See generally TABB, supra note 136, §§ 11.14-11.34, at 806-80. In some cases a
"liquidating plan" provides for the sale of all of the debtor estate's assets. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1123(a)(5)(D) (2000) (stating that the plan may provide for "sale of all or any part of the
property of the estate").
248. A claimant or interest holder may receive under a plan paylnents or property in
satisfaction of its claim or interest under a plan of reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)
(2000) (outlining the best interests test)~ 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (b) (2000) (explaining when a court
"shall confirm the plan").
249. See T ABB, supra note 136, § 7.5, at 488 ("At its core, bankruptcy remains a
procedural mechanism for sorting out claitns that are established under nonbankruptcy law. ").
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Similarly, nonbankruptcy law delineates what constitutes property and the
identity of the holders of property interests that may be involved in
bankruptcy.250 And it is the allocation of a debtor's property, or its'value, to the
holders of claims and interests that represents bankruptcy law's core mission.
Any contemporary observer of United States bankruptcy law will ask the
inevitable questions. What about debtor relief? What about rehabilitation?
What about the individual's debtor-initiated discharge in bankruptcy? Part
IV.G deals with procedure theory and the individual debtor's discharge. For
present purposes of examining procedure theory from the perspective of civil
procedure law and the law of federal court jurisdiction, however, it is sufficient
to note that a broad discharge provision is a relatively new phenomenon and the
Bankruptcy Code's treatment is far more liberal than laws in most other
jurisdictions.
The earliest English bankruptcy legislation contained no provision for
251
discharge.
It was directed toward overcolning the inadequacy of individual
creditor remedies through a collective proceeding and, in particular, protecting
creditors against fraudulent debtors. 252 Like conventional creditor judicial
253
enforcement, however, it was strictly involuntary-it was creditor-initiated.
254
The first English discharge provisions came later in the Statute of 4 Anne ,
and were short lived. 255 Even so, it seelns clear that the principal role
envisioned for the debtor's discharge was to enhance the recoveries of
256
creditors.
The first bankruptcy act in the United States, the Bankruptcy Act of
1800,257 followed closely the creditor-oriented approach of then existing
258
English bankruptcy law, although it was repealed in 1803. The on-again-off250. See infra Part IV.A (discussing "property of the estate" under 11 U.S.C. § 541). See
generally Policy, supra note 40, at 87-89.
251. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1542-43); 13 Eliz., c. 7 (1570). For an overview of these
statutes, see generally Charles Jordan Tabb, The History ofthe Bankruptcy Laws in the Llnited
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5,7-11 (1995) [hereinafter Tabb, History].
252. See Tabb, History, supra note 251, at 8-9 (stating that the 1520 law was added to
address fraudulent conveyances).
253. Id.
254. 4 Ann., c. 17 (1705). See generally Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of
the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 333-39 (1991) [hereinafter Discharge].
255. See id. at 339 (noting that in 1706 the English Parliament enacted a provision that
required creditor consent as a condition of discharge).
256. Id. at 337 ("Certainly the primary purpose of the act was to facilitate creditors'
recoveries; the title of and preamble to the statute make that abundantly clear. ").
257. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6,2 Stat.
248.
258. See Tabb, History, supra note 251, at 14-15 (discussing the repeal of the Bankruptcy
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again history ofUnited States bankruptcy laws in the nineteenth century and the
Bankruptcy Code in effect today consistently maintained as an essential
component of bankruptcy law the goal of enhancing recoveries oftl1ose holding
legal entitlements, primarily creditors. 259
The goal of enhancing recoveries of rightsholders provides a raison d 'etre
for the efficiencies of collective bankruptcy proceedings as distinct from the
260
enforcement of legal entitlements in general civil litigation.
But over the
period from the earliest English bankruptcy law to the end of the nineteenth
century other, distinct sets of normative considerations had become accepted:
dissatisfaction with the imprisonlnent of debtors and more general concerns for
the welfare of debtors and their need for a "fresh start. ,,261 Although the idea of
a bankruptcy discharge was originally seen as a means to enhance creditor
recoveries, and it generally may serve that function even today, concern for the
plight of an insolvent debtor undoubtedly has achieved normative
independence. 262
The simplest account of procedure theory understands the structural and
functional essence of bankruptcy law as a method of enhancing the
nonbankruptcy legal entitlements of rightsholders-a goal it shares with civil
procedure generally. Along the way procedure theory lnust explain the
rationale for bankruptcy law as a separate branch of procedure as well as role of
the discharge. But the nonnative account of procedure theory of bankruptcy
advanced in this subpart is richer than the simple account that states procedural
law serves substantive entitlements. It situates bankruptcy law as a part of the
structure and law underlying the system offederal courts, federal judiciary, and
federal jurisdiction. Bankruptcy scholars have generally overlooked or
seriously underemphasized this perspective in the norlnative debates over
bankruptcy theory, philosophy, and policy.263 This account recognizes that the

Act of 1800).

259.

/d. at 14-22, 23-38 (discussing the evolution of bankruptcy law).
260. See supra Part n.D (answering "Why Bankruptcy?").
261. See generally infra Part IV. G.
262. See infra Part IV.G (discussing the evolution of bankruptcy law).
263. There are important exceptions, including Ralph Brubaker, Christopher Frost, and
Thomas Plank. See Frost, supra note 4, at 126 ("Bankruptcy is, in the main, ajudicial process
much like any other.")~ infra notes 336-42 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of
Frost's analysis to procedure theory). I draw on Plank's work above and in my discussion of
Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See infra notes 287-332 and
accompanying text (discussing Erie)~ see also Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of Federal
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A General, Statutory and Constitutional Theory, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 743, 941 (2000) ("We must alter the prevailing conception of Bankruptcy in order to
assimilate the wisdom of accepted principles of federal jurisdiction. ").
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normative underpinnings of bankruptcy law must be viewed as a part of the
federal system ofjustice, the relationship between federal law and state law, the
relationship between bankruptcy law, state, and other nonbankruptcy law, and,
more generally, federalism and the separation of federal legislative andjudicial
powers.
Both the Bankruptcy Clause and the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 were
influenced by concerns that nonresident cOlnmercial interests (read, creditors)
were at a disadvantage in seeking to enforce obligations in jurisdictions in
which their debtors were located. 264 This concern was cOlnpounded by the
nonuniform bankruptcy laws that prevailed in the colonies and thereafter in the
states before passage of that act in 1800. 265 The issues of federalism and

264. See Tabb, History, supra note 251, at 13 ("A bankruptcy law was apparently believed
to be a necessary subject of federal legislation because of the problems that varying and
discriminatory state laws caused for nonresident creditors and interstate commerce in general. ").
But see John T. Cross, State Choice of Law Rules in Bankruptcy, 42 OKLA. L. REV. 531, 572
(1989) (asserting that the justifications for bankruptcy courts are "altogether different" from
those for federal diversity jurisdiction). See infi"a notes 272-78 and accompanying text
(discussing federal diversity jurisdiction). While I certainly acknowledge that the concerns
mentioned in the text are not the only justifications for bankruptcy law, the following discussion
demonstrates that Cross's claim is inaccurate.
Here and in the discussion that follows I draw on the origins of United States bankruptcy
law and federal court jurisdiction as additional support for procedure theory. But I eschew any
attempt to draw a complete or deep picture from an historical perspective. See generally BRUCE
H. MANN, REpUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE
(2002); DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA
3, 23-47 (2001) [hereinafter DEBT'S DOMINION].
265. F. Regis Noel states:
It has been demonstrated that the English code had, in colonial times, been carried
across the Atlantic and set up on the shores of America, and the Articles [of
Confederation] continued the operation of the principles of that code in each State
according to the established and traditional laws. The nature and extent of these
laws has been amply illustrated, and it would be nlisleading to suggest that they
ceased to operate or \vere changed immediately by the [Bankruptcy Clause of the ]
Constitution. For, owing to the failure of the Federal government to legislate on
the subject, and the obstinacy of the common-wealths, whose congressmen were
then more frequently laboring for the local than the general welfare, in yielding to
the central and sovereign power anything considered a State right, the regulation of
debt remained for many years under the control and administration of the States.

Under the ... Articles ofConfederation, the creditor classes resisted all schemes for
the relief ofthese private and insurmountable debts, and they suffered considerable
losses from the application of State insolvency laws. . .. The absence of laws
protecting manufacturers in interstate and foreign dealings, lack of security in the
Western Lands, [and other disruptions] at length turned the inhabitants to the relief
of forming a new national government. . .. [S]ome claimed that the rapacity of
creditors, others the depravity of debtors, was responsible for the conditions which
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interstate commerce were at center stage. Joseph Story's commentary on the
Bankruptcy Clause is instructive:
The brevity, with which ... [the Bankruptcy Clause] is treated by the
Federalist, is quite remarkable. The only passage in that elaborate
commentary, in which the subject is treated, is as follows: "The power of
establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the
regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds, where the parties
or their property may lie, or be removed into different states, that the
expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn in question." [quoting The
Federalist, No. 42, at 56 (McLean ed., 1788)].

[T]here are peculiar reasons ... why the government of the United States
should be entrusted with this power [to establish uniform bankruptcy laws].
They result from the importance of preserving harmony, promotingjustice,
and securing equality of rights and remedies among the citizens of all the
states. It is obvious, that if the power is exclusively vested in the states,
each one will be at liberty to fralne such a system of ... bankruptcy and
insolvency [law], as best suits its own local interests, and pursuits ....
There will always be found in every state a large mass of politicians, who
will deem it more safe to consult their own temporary interests and
popularity, by a narrow system of preferences, than to enlarge the
boundaries, so as to give to distant creditors a fair share of the fortune of a
ruined debtor?66

[resulted] ... in the bankruptcy article of the Ainerican Constitution.
In order to realize the confusion arising froin the multiplex and discrepant State
laws for the release of the debtor and the distribution of his effects, prior to the
enactment of [the Bankruptcy Act of 1800] ..., it is necessary only to consider the
inconvenience and injustice which result from lack of uniformity in our day in the
various State laws on divorce, shipping, and insurance. . .. The misery, the
wretchedness, the suffering, the despair, the criine and the injustice of those years
are now scarcely comprehensible.
F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW 68-69,74, III (1919) (internal quotations
omitted) [hereinafter NOEL, HISTORY]. For an overview of bankruptcy and insolvency laws
during the colonial period, see MANN, supra note 264, at 47-67 (outlining colonial bankruptcy
law·s).
266. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1100,
1105-07 (2d ed. 1857).
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Story's concerns relate to inefficiencies arising out ofnonuniformity/67
but he also explicitly notes in the quoted passage the inequitable treatment of
citizens of different states. Inasmuch as every bankruptcy law ever passed in
the United States has placed substantial responsibility for bankruptcy cases in
the hands of the United States district courts, it is plausible to surmise that
Story's concerns Inust have extended as well to the potential for unfair and
discriminatory judicial adlninistration of separate bankruptcy laws in the
268
states.
Consider also Bruce Mann's lucid description of attitudes of the framers
that gave rise to the Bankruptcy Clause:
[T]he idea that bankruptcy raised issues that were better addressed on a
national level rather than through the mechanisms of interstate comity
seems to have taken at least tentative root during the [constitutional]
69
convention. The lawyers and judges in the two Pennsylvania cases/ and
through them some of the key delegates to the convention, clearly
recognized the problems inherent in applying state insolvency and
bankruptcy rules to debtors and creditors who lived in different states.
Credit, like commerce, could not be contained within state boundaries. Full
faith and credit helped somewhat, but it could harm out-of-state creditors
by imposing on them state bankruptcy discharges that stripped them oftheir
claims without their participation in the process. As [James] Wilson
remarked at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, "Merchants ofeminence
will tell you that they can trust their correspondents without law; but they
cannot trust the laws of the state in which their correspondents live."

267. Noel also offers examples:
The State [bankruptcy] laws were not uniform~ and in the same degree were
inadequate and subject to great limitations. . .. A method was required which
would render the discharge of a citizen of any State binding in all others; which
would establish the same acts and defaults of the debtor as occasions for
bankruptcy proceedings in every section; which would abolish the iniquitous
privilege of preferences and which would enable the merchant ofNew York selling
to the trader of Boston or New Orleans to feel confident that if unforseen calamity
should occur the debtor would not be able to place his assets beyond reach.
NOEL, HISTORY, supra note 265, at 120.
268. Story himself is reputed to be the author of the Bankruptcy Act of 1841. Tabb,
History, supra note 251, at 16. For a description of the jurisdiction of the district courts under
the pre-1898 United States bankruptcy laws, see Brubaker, supra note 263, at 757-65 (detailing
the history of bankruptcy courts). See also David Gray Carlson, Security Interests in the
Crucible of Voidable Preference Law, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 211,217-18 (1995) [hereinafter
Crucible] (noting that voidable preference law served the "nation-building" and nationalism
interests by ensuring that secret, local liens would not prevail over national creditors who could
not discover the liens).
269. Mann is referring to two cases involving the effect in one state of a bankruptcy
discharge under the law of another state. MANN, supra note 264, at 183-85.
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Judges ... were more concerned with punishing fraud, while merchants,
whose business was business and who necessarily included debtors as well
as creditors, were more interested in Madison's "regulation of commerce. "
The limited evidence of the Constitutional Convention suggests that the
framers had in mind the latter. 270

In addition to providing support for the Bankruptcy Clause, the same
concerns for fair and equal justice in a federal republic have substantially
influenced the civil jurisdiction of federal courts·more generally. Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution extends federal judicial power to, inter alia
"Controversies ... between Citizens ofdifferent States,,,271 so-called "diversity"
jurisdiction. While the Constitution pennitted but did not require Congress
"[t]o establish Tribunals inferior to the [S]upreme Court,,,272 the first Congress
273
did establish a system of lower federal courts
and provided for diversity
74
jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789.2 The norInative basis of diversity
jurisdiction generally is accepted to be the avoidance of hostility that might be
expected froln state courts based on the identities of the litigants. One view is
275
that a state court might be hostile to the interests of a citizen of another state.
A cOInpeting view is that concerns of the Constitutional framers and members
of the first Congress were addressed to "class hostility. ,,276 But both views
277
agree that diversity of citizenship warrants federal jurisdiction.
270.

ld. at 185-87.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 9.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73.
274. ld. at 78. The act provided that United States circuit courts had jurisdiction if "the
suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought and a citizen of another state."
The current version provides, in part, that federal "district courts have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions where the Inater in controversy exceeds the sum or value of$75,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and is between ... citizens of different states." 28 U.S.C. § 332(a)(1) (2000).
275. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 97, at 25 (citing United States v. Deveaux., 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 61 (1809)).
276. ld. at 25 ("The federal courts offered a means for protecting commercial groups from
class bias on the part of democratically inclined state legislatures, which otherwise might
pressure state courts into decisions hostile to commercial, manufacturing, and speculative land
interests. "); see Burbank, supra note 21, at 1323 ("An important reason for the existence of
Article III federal judicial power in diversity (including alienage diversity) cases and for the
First Congress's decision to create lower federal courts had to do with concerns that state courts
were hostile to creditors. ").
277. There now is considerable disagreement on whether continuation offederal diversity
jurisdiction is wise. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 97, at 25-29 (discussing the
disagreement). But, as discussed below, the normative implications of the applicable law in
diversity cases for the applicable law in bankruptcy cases is not diminished whether or not
271.
272.
273.
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The principal normative implications of these parallel rationales for
federal systems of bankruptcy law and diversity jurisdiction support procedure
theory's core principle that bankruptcy law, like trans-substantive civil
procedure law, generally should serve the interests ofand respect rightsholders'
nonbankruptcy legal entitlements. In this respect bankruptcy theorists can draw
on lessons learned from experience with federal diversity jurisdiction.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 also contained a provision known as the "Rules
of Decision Act. ,,278 Under that Act, "the laws of the several states" were to
apply in "trials at common law" in federal courts. In 1842 the Supreme Court
definitively interpreted the Act in Swift v. Tyson. 279 In an opinion written by
Joseph Story, the Court held that the reference to "the laws ofthe several states"
did not include decisional law of the courts of the states but referred only to
state statutes and constitutions. Aside froln purely "local" law matters/ 80 the
federal courts would apply the "general" law to matters 0 f generaI concern. 281
The legal question addressed in Swift provides an example of "general" lawwhether the transfer and endorselnent of a negotiable instrument (a "bill of
exchange") to a transferee on account of a pre-existing obligation provide the
appropriate consideration for the transfer so that the transferee took free of the
obligor's defense. The defendant argued that under New York's "local"
decisional law the defense against the original payees was also good as against
the transferee?82 Under the "general" law as interpreted by the federal courts,

diversity jurisdiction continues to be warranted. See infra notes 319-32 and accompanying text
(discussing the Rules of Decision Act and the Erie doctrine).
278. 1 Stat. 92 (1789). The currently applicable version is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(2000) and is entitled "State laws as rules of decision."
279. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
280. As Justice Story's opinion in Swift explained:
The laws of a state are more usually understood to mean the rules and enactlnents
promulgated by the legislative authority thereot: or long-established local customs
having the force of laws. In all the various cases, which have hitherto come before
us for decision, this court have uniformly supposed, that the true interpretation of
the 34th section [the Rules of Decision Act] limited its application to state laws,
strictly local, that is to say, to the positive statutes of the state, and the construction
thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to things having a
permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate, and other matters
immovable and intra-territorial in their nature and character.
Id. at 18. "[M]arriage, inheritance, and real property" are examples of "local" law. GEOFFREY
C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 484 (7th ed. 1994).
281. Swift, 41 U.S. at 18-19.
282. Id. at 17-18.
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the defense was not good against the transferee. The Court unanimously held
283
that a federal court should follow the rule under the "general" law.
With hindsight, the incoherence of the rule announced in Swift-applying
one body of substantive, federal "general" common law in a diversity case in
federal court and another body of substantive, state "local" law in a state court
case-was immanent. But Story and the Swift Court appear to have had their
hearts in the right place. If the "general" law would be followed by the state
courts as well, the system would enhance unifonnity of laws among the
states. 284 If both sets of courts were applying the same rules, even though the
state courts were not bound to follow them, the incoherence would be minimal.
In general, this vision of uniformity held true to form in practice until after the
Civil War, when many state courts increasingly parted ways with the "general"
law as laid down by the federal courtS. 285
In 1938, the Suprelne Court decided Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkins,286 squarely overruling Swift. Tompkins had sued Erie in a diversity
action in federal district court for injuries sustained while Tompkins was
walking along a railroad right-of-way.287 Under then-existing federal "general"
288
law, Erie owed TOlnpkins a duty of care and could be liable for negligence.
On this theory, TOlnpkins recovered judgment on ajury verdict against Erie in
the district court. Erie had argued that Pennsylvania law applied, under which
Erie contended that it owed Tompkins only the duty that it owed to a

283. Id. at 18-19. Justice Catron's dissent was based on his different view of the
applicable rule under the "general" law. Jd. at 23.
284. The text states:
The awkwardness that would result from such a disagreement [between a state
decision and a conflicting federal court decision] provided further incentive to the
state courts to follow the decisions of the federal courts.
For the entire pre-Civil War period, the state and federal courts lived in relative
harmony, with the state courts deferring-usually gratefully-to the United States
Supreme Court on questions of general law.
Id. at 486.
285. Jd. at 486-87 (discussing the shift in judicial interpretation after the Civil War).
Following the Civil War, the decisions of some state courts began to diverge from those of the
federal courts as the economic interests of the states also further diverged. Jd. In particular, the
federal courts "constructed a general law that increasingly favored the creditors and employers."
Id. at 486~ see also infra notes 307-18 and accon1panying text (discussing Brandeis'
motivations in writing the Erie opinion).
286. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (overruling Swift).
287. Id. at 69.
288. Id. at 70.
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289

trespasser.
The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment, relying on the
applicability of "general" law. 290 The Supreme Court reversed.
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. And
whether the law of the state shall be dec lared by its Legislature in a statute
or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern.
There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare
substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local
in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of
torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power
upon the federal courtS. 291

Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, gave three bases for the decision. First,
new scholarship demonstrated that Justice Story had Iuisinterpreted the Rules
of Decision Act in Swift.292 Second, experience under Sw{ft had deluonstrated
its "defects, political and social; and the benefits expected to flow from the rule
did not accrue. ,,293 The Court explained that the "Iuischievous ... doctrine"
had led to widespread forum-based "discriluination," a result that diversity
jurisdiction had been created to prevent. 294 The Court, however, further
explained that although the Swift doctrine's "injustice and confusion" had been
argued as reasons to change the rule, these first two bases of its decision would
295
not be sufficient alone to convince the Court to abandon the rule.
But the
third basis of its decision was indeed sufficient; the Swift doctrine was
unconstitutiona1. 296 The pervasive application of federal "general" law to so
many areas of substantive law had "invaded rights which in our opinion are
reserved by the Constitution to the several states. ,,297
289. Id. at 70-71.
290. Id. at 70.
291. Id. at 78.
292. Id. at 72-73 n.5. The opinion cited Charles Warren, New Light on the History ofthe
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,37 HARV. L. REV. 49,51-52,81-88,108 (1923), as the "more
recent research of a competent scholar." 1d. But see HAZARD ET AL., supra note 280, at 494
(stating that Warren's conclusion was "almost certainly incorrect").
293. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,74 (1938). But see EDWARD A. PURCELL,
JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE
POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 141-91 (2000)
(challenging the accuracy of the charges of "defects, political and social" as well as Brandeis's
candor in leveling them). I discuss Purcell's analysis of Brandeis's motivations and conclusions
below. See infra notes 307-16 and accompanying text (discussing the overruling of Swift).
294. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938).
295. Id. at 77.
296. Id. at 77-78.
297. Id. at 80. Justice Reed concurred in part on the basis of the proper interpretation of
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The Supreme Court as well as lower courts have struggled to find the
appropriate line between substantive state law to be respected by federal courts
and procedural federal law that will apply in federal courts even,in diversity
cases. The rules implicated in Swift-the effect of a good faith purchase of a
negotiable instrument for pre-existing value-and Erie-the nature of a
railroad's duty to a person walking along a right-of-way-were straightforward
and obviously substantive. But as the Erie doctrine has continued to evolve the
Court has dealt with a variety of matters in diversity cases, including state-law
statutes of limitations,298 whether the determination of a plaintiffs status as a
statutory employee should be made by ajudge as under applicable state law or
by ajury,299 and the applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 30o It
is not necessary to dissect fully the whole of Erie jurisprudence for the present
purpose of examining the Erie doctrine's support for the normative
the reference to "the laws" in the Rules of Decision Act, but he refused to join in the majority's
conclusion that the Swift doctrine was unconstitutional. Id. at 90-92. Justices Butler and
McReynolds concurred in the result on the basis of the plaintiff s contributory negligence while
noting that no constitutional question had been raised. Id. at 80-90. Some have questioned the
soundness of the constitutional basis for the decision.
Justice Brandeis appears also to argue that the federal judiciary, as distinct from the federal
government as a whole, is not constitutionally empowered to create rules in these areas,
especially when those rules are available only to litigants who can invoke the diversity
jurisdiction. This is an important argument, based partly on separation of powers and partly on
fairness. It is not clear, however, that the argument sustains a conclusion of unconstitutionality
of judicial action. Further, the argument in no way disables the federal government from
enacting generally applicable federal statutory law in these areas. HAZARD ET AL., supra note
280, at 496.
But many believe that Erie's constitutional basis remains relevant and real. See, e.g.,
PURCELL, supra note 293, at 302 ("By the [twentieth-]century's last decade there was relatively
widespread consensus that Erie was a decision of fundamental importance and considerable
agreement that it reached constitutional stature. "); Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and
Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 633,644 (2004) [hereinafter Erie Doctrine] ("[I]n the case
of Congress's Bankruptcy Power, the primary meaning of Erie retains significant force.").
298. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109-10 (1945) (providing New York statute
of limitations applied in case seeking equitable relief because its application was outcome
determinative).
299. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop.,Inc., 356 U.S. 525,533-40 (1958) (applying
balancing test based on extent to which a state rule is bound up in definition of rights and
obligations, strong federal policy of maintaining appropriate judge-jury relationship, and
likelihood outcome would be affected, held question of status as statutory employee was for
jury).
300. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463 (1965) (providing that substituted service of
process under F.R.C.P. 4(d)( 1) is applicable notwithstanding state law's "in-hand" delivery
requirement; stating that "outcome-determinative" test should be applied in light ofdual goals of
Erie doctrine to discourage forum-shopping and to prevent the inequitable administration of
justice; concluding that a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rule must be applied unless the rule
is not within scope of the Rules Enabling Act).
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underpinnings of the procedure theory of bankruptcy. But it is important to
examine Erie's principal normative components. Justice Harlan may have
captured that element best in his concurring opinion in Hanna v. Plun1er: 301
Erie was something more than an opinion which worried about "forumshopping and avoidance of inequitable adlninistration of the laws, ...
although to be sure these were important elements in the decision .... Erie
recognized that there should not be two conflicting systems of law
controlling the primary activity of citizens, for such alternative governing
authority must necessarily give rise to a debilitating uncertainty in the
planning of everyday affairs. 302

Harlan appreciated the unfairness of a forum-based systeln (quoting the Court's
reference in its Erie opinion to "inequitable adlninistration,,)/03 but he also
makes an instrumental claim that such a systeln creates a "debilitating
uncertainty. ,,304 Note however that Harlan is not suggesting, nor does anything
in the Erie jurisprudence suggest, that deference is lnade to state decisional law
because the substance of that law is normatively superior-however lneasured,
on instrumental standards or otherwise-to the "general" law that federal courts
created and sustained under Swift. The inequity as well as the uncertainty, then,
derives from the essential incoherence of having different bodies of law apply
to "primary activity" based on the fortuity of the foruln involved.
What, exactly, was the nature of the concern over forum-shopping under
Swift? Given Swift's incoherent doctrine ofapplying substantive rules based on
whether the forum was a federal or state court, forum-shopping was simply the
manner in which this incoherence was manifested. Parties will always "forumshop" if the opportunity is present. Forum-shopping thereby gave effect to
injustice in the Swift era, but it was the incoherent application of different
substantive rules in different fora (not foruln-shopping) which was the source
305
of the injustice.
Indeed, the very rationale of diversity jurisdiction-the
avoidance of discrimination against noncitizens in the state courts 306-is based
on a type of foruln-shopping. If this rationale is sound, then diversity
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id.
Id. at 474 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.

305. The critique of forum-shopping in the Erie context should be distinguished from the
forum-shopping critique of Baird and Jackson. Their critique is based on the idea that adjusting
nonbankruptcy entitlements in bankruptcy will provide perverse incentives to resort to
bankruptcy or to eschew bankruptcy in inappropriate circumstances. See supra note 199
(discussing Baird and Jackson's creditors' bargain theory).
306. See supra notes 276-78 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons for diversity
jurisdiction).
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jurisdiction appropriately encourages foruln-shopping-eommencing an action
in or removing an action to a federal court-for a better quality ofjustice.
Edward Purcell's account of Justice Brandeis's role in influencing the
result in Erie and writing the opinion of the Court further illuminates its
normative basis. Brandeis saw in Erie an irresistible opportunity to overrule
Swift (and perhaps the last opportunity during his tenure on the Court),307 a
result that Brandeis had long advocated. 308 A Inajority of the Court favored the
overturning of Swift at the first conference of the Justices following oral
309
argument ofthe case.
But it was Brandeis who was the primary advocate for
doing so on constitutional grounds. 310 His determination to ground Erie's
overruling of Swift on the Constitution accounts for the artful nature of his
opinion, which was carefully designed to hold the support of a majority.311
307. See PURCELL, supra note 293, at 137 (discussing Brandeis's motivations). The text
states:
Although Brandeis had no intention of leaving [the Court], especially in the face of
pressure, the political battles and personal wounds of 1937 forced him to recognize
that only a short time remained to him and that the end of his tenure could come
quickly and unexpectedly. It was most unlikely that he would have another chance
at Swift.
Id.
308. /d. at 101 (discussing Brandeis's reasoning).
309. Only eight Justices sat when Erie was argued, Justice Cardozo being absent due to
illness. /d. at 102. At the first conference Brandeis, Justice Stone, and Chief Justice Hughes
supported overruling Swift from the outset. Id. Justices Butler and McReynolds supported
Swift and were opposed to abolishing its doctrine. ld. Justices Black, Reed, and Roberts then
voted in favor, resulting in a Inajority of six for overruling Swift. ld. Reed, however, later
refused to embrace the constitutional basis of the majority opinion, choosing instead to base his
concurrence on an interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 90-92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring). Interestingly, the majority emerged even though
the counsel for the Erie Railroad (whose client stood to gain in the case by overruling Swift)
refused, during oral argument, to take a position in favor of abolishing Swift. PURCELL, supra
note 293, at 97-101. Purcell explained that the railroad in most situations was a beneficiary of
the Swift doctrine and wished to preserve it. Id. at 100.
310. /d. at 101 ("Sometime in late 1937 or early 1938 Brandeis decided to make the Erie
Railroad's appeal the instrument of Swift's demise. The Court's decision to overrule Swift, and
especially its decision to do so on constitutional grounds, was largely due to him. ")~ see also id.
at 109-12 (rebutting "inaccurate" claims that Justice Stone or Justice Black played a major role
in the Erie decision).
311. Id. at 163-64. Purcell explains several of Brandeis's reasons for writing "a flawed,
abstract, oblique, and misleading opinion." /d. at 163. But Purcell primarily emphasizes that
Brandeis's more typical Progressive social critique ofa "particular social discrimination" would
have been "politically divisive" and that the "neutral analysis" adopted by Brandeis in the
opinion ensured that Brandeis could maintain the bare majority of justices supporting the
constitutional basis for overruling Swift. ld. Nonetheless, Purcell reserves some of his most
trenchant criticism for Henry Hart who, in the 1950s "elided [Erie's] ... Progressive political
and social values and transformed [Erie] ... into an abstract symbol of federalism and the rule
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Unlike earlier dissenting opinions in which Brandeis sharply and explicitly
advocated for Progressive values and against the entrenched power of large
corporate wealth, the Erie opinion is abstract and neutral. 312
Significantly, the opinion in Erie also is abstract-even crypticconcerning the precise nature of the unconstitutionality of the Swift doctrine.
Some language evokes concerns about constraints on federal power that might
be read to implicate the Tenth Alnendment. 313 But that was not any part of
Brandeis's analysis. 314 Certainly, the opinion evokes a concern for federalism
and the respect that the federal governlnent owes to the states. 315 But Purcell
identifies the core of Brandeis's objection to Swift as the separation ofjudicial
and legislative powers and the respect that the federal judiciary should observe
toward Congress:
Erie's declaration that Swift was unconstitutional, then, was a conclusion
drawn from two premises: first, that the Constitution inscribed the
principles of coextensive powers and legislative primacy; and, second, that
Swift stood for the proposition that the federal courts could make law in
areas where "Congress was confessedly without power" to act ....
[Brandeis] was only affirming two points. One was that Swift permitted the
federal courts to act beyond the constitutional reach of the federal judicial
power because it allowed them to make rules presumptively beyond the
scope of congressional authority. The other point was that the federal
of law." Id. at 229; see also id. at 246-55 (critique of Hart's Erie analysis).
312. Id. at 163-64.
313. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938) (discussing the authority ofthe
state). In the majority, Brandeis states:
Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of the states is in no
case permissible except as to Inatters by the constitution specifically authorized or
delegated to the United States. Any interference with either, except as thus
permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the state, and, to that extent, a denial of
its independence.
We merely declare that in applying the doctrine this Court and the lower courts
have invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the
several states.
Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."). The opinion also quotes the dissent of Justice Field, which cited the Tenth
Amendment, in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368,401 (1893). Erie, 304 U.S.
at 78. Although the Erie opinion did not mention the Tenth Amendment by name, the
extensiveness of the quotation of Justice Field's dissent was a concession by Brandeis to Chief
Justice Hughes. PURCELL, supra note 293, at 179.
314. Brandeis was strongly opposed to a "substantive interpretation" of the Tenth
Amendment that could be used to restrict Progressive New Deal legislation. Id. at 178.
315. See supra note 300 and accompanying text (discussing Hanna).
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courts should not, without compelling reason, displace state rules with
those of their own makin because Congress had not passed legislation to
cover the facts of Erie. 31 f

Thus, Brandeis believed that it was a constitutional wrong for the federal
judiciary to make law in areas that were beyond even the power of Congress to
317
legislate.
And Brandeis's views, expressed through Erie, extended even
further to condemn federal judiciallawlnaking on matters on which Congress
318
could legislate but on which Congress had not acted.
When the Rules of Decision Act or the Erie doctrine dictates that
bankruptcy courts apply state law the result is fully consistent with procedure
theory.319 John Cross has explained how the Rules of Decision Act applies in
bankruptcy.32o Plank details how the Erie doctrine applies in bankruptcy courts
and the constraints that the doctrine itnposes by virtue of the limitations

316. PURCELL, supra note 293, at 177 (quoting Erie, 304 U. S. at 72)~ see also id. at 173
("Brandeis. .. wanted to established the principle that the mere possibility of valid
congressional legislation was by itself insufficient to authorize the national courts to make law
in an area. Congress, not the courts, should determine when and where national lawmaking
authority was exercised. ").
317. Plank considers this to be the "core" Erie doctrine. Erie Doctrine, supra note 297, at
642-44.
318. This strand of the Erie doctrine rests not only on federalism considerations but on the
constitutional separation of judicial and legislative powers. See PETER W. Low & JOHN C.
JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 279-80 (2d ed.
1989); Erie Doctrine, supra note 297, at 649 (discussing the separation of powers and the
Constitution).
319. That the Rules of Decision Act and Erie apply to bankruptcy courts is implicit in this
point. Cross, supra note 264, at 545-56 (discussing the Rules of Decision Act and its
application to bankruptcy courts)~ Erie Doctrine, supra note 297, at 652-60 (discussing the Erie
doctrine's application in bankruptcy courts)~ Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66
HARV. L. REv. 1013, 1031-36 (1~53) (explaining that Erie doctrine applies in bankruptcy
courts). Vern Countryman took the position that the Erie doctrine does not apply in bankruptcy.
See generally Vern Countryman, The Use ofState Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part 1),47 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 407 (1972); Vern Countryman, The Use ofState Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part 11),47
N.Y.U. L. REv. 631 (1972). Plank provides a trenchant and convincing critique of
Countryman's position. Erie Doctrine, supra note 297, at 19-24. For an excellent discussion
of the interrelationships among the Rules of Decision Act, the Erie doctrine, and federal
common law in the context of interjurisdictional (state-federal) preclusion, see generally
Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full f~aith and Credit and Federal
Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (1986).
320. Cross, supra note 264, at 545-'-56. As in other cases in a federal court, the
applicability of state law in a bankruptcy case is subject to exceptions. Id. at 546-52. Cross
argues for a choice-of-Iaw rule in bankruptcy that relaxes the rule of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941). Klaxton holds that, under the Erie doctrine
in adversity case, the court must look to the choice-of-Iaw rule of the forum. Klaxton, 313 U.S.
at 557-74.
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imposed on courts by the Bankruptcy Clause. 321 Plank argues that under the
"core" Erie principle bankruptcy courts tTIust apply state law when dealing with
an issue outside the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause. 322 Under the separation of
powers strand of Erie, the bankruptcy courts also should follow nonbankruptcy
law even when addressing an issue that is within the scope of the Bankruptcy
Clause but as to which Congress has not acted. 323 In Plank's view, the Court
"applied this [latter] understanding of Erie" in Butner v. United States,324
although the Butner Court did not cite Erie. 325 But Plank criticizes Butner's
exception to the application of state law in determining the existence and nature
of property rights in bankruptcy.326 Under Butner, state law applies "[u]nless
some federal interest requires a different result." Plank argues that even if a
bankruptcy court believes that a federal bankruptcy policy does require a result
different from the applicable state property law, a bankruptcy court is
constitutionally required to apply state law if impletTIenting the federal policy is
outside the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause. 327
Procedure theory of bankruptcy is not doctrinally grounded on the Rules
of Procedure Act or the Erie doctrine. That act and Erie address only the
source of law applicable in federal courts; procedure theory is broader.
Procedure theory instructs Congress as well as the courts. But procedure theory
is normatively based on the same grounds of coherence and justice as the Erie
doctrine. That is, the fortuity of the forum should not control the applicable
substantive law. For example, consider the possibility that Congress might
enact a law codifying the rule ofSwift-that the federal courts can develop and
apply a "general" cotTItTIon law unburdened by state-law doctrine-that would

321.
322.
323.

Erie Doctrine, supra note 297, passin1.
Jd. at 645-48.
Jd. at 649--52.

324. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979) (stating Congress has the authority to
create federal bankruptcy law but has left it to the states). Butner is addressed in more detail in
Part IV.A.
325. Erie Doctrine, supra note 297, at 649-52.
326. Jd. at 651-52.
327. ld.; see supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text (discussing Plank's views on the
scope of the Bankruptcy Clause); see also Burbank, supra note 319, at 789-90 (discussing
federal courts obligation to apply state law) (footnotes omitted). The text provides:
Federal courts are not free to conjure up "interests"; rather, they must tie them to
policies already articulated in, or at least articulable frotTI, valid legal prescriptions.
The natural tendency of institutions to seize the moment to expand their power is
thus bounded by a requirement of resort for authority to policy choices made on
other occasions through different, more detTIocratic, processes.
Jd.
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be applicable only in federal courts. Although it lnight run afoul of Erie's
constitutional mandate, that act of Congress would remove the resulting statute
from the applicability of the Rules of Decision Act. 328 But this codification of
the Swift doctrine would be no more coherent and no lnore just than was the
judge-made Swift doctrine itself. And the same normative and legal objections
would obtain if the statute provided for the application ofthe Swift rule only in
329
bankruptcy cases.
Under this analysis procedure theory also would condelnn judge-made,
discretionary decisions applying principles in a bankruptcy-only context that
have no necessary connection with bankruptcy powers or purposes. The plant
330
closing example discussed in Part lILA is an exalnple.
The relevant
considerations of community interest and continued employment are present
both in and out of bankruptcy and do not differ depending on the context or
forum.
A last word on Erie and procedure theory is necessary. One might see a
conflict, or at least some irony, in the need for the Bankruptcy Clause and a
federal bankruptcy law creating a national system for bankruptcy331 and
procedure theory's normative claim that bankruptcy law generally exists to
vindicate nonbankruptcy (mostly state law) legal entitlements. Any conflict, or
irony, is superficial, however. Bankruptcy law is a part of a procedural system
for the administration ofjustice, just as are diversity jurisdiction and the Rules
of Decision Act. Under Erie, the Rules of Decision Act, and procedure theory
alike, the federal courts-and Congress, under procedure theory-must look
outside the federal judicial system for the substance of the relevant legal
entitlelnents. Stated silnply, a federal system for bankruptcy law makes sense;
varying the legal entitlelnents based solely on the foruln, however, does not. 332
328. See Burbank, supra note 319, at 756 n.l 02 (suggesting that the constitutional aspect
of Erie might extend to Congressional powers).
329. Now if there were some rational bankruptcy-related justification for the statutory
override of nonbankruptcy law (state law, in the exmnple at hand) in bankruptcy, such a statute
could be squared with both the Constitution as well as procedure theory on the basis of the
Bankruptcy Clause. See infra Part IV (explaining consistency of many "special" bankruptcyonly rules with procedure theory). And, presumably, the forum would not be "fortuitous." But
lacking any such justification, the statute would contravene directly the normative ground on
which the Erie doctrine was based and has evolved.
330. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text (discussing employees as
rightsholders). The same could be said of ajudge-made bankruptcy-only priority rule.
331. See supra Part n.D (discussing the justification for bankruptcy law).
332. To the extent that the Bankruptcy Code unjustifiably varies nonbankruptcy law, as
opposed to variance pursuant to the exercise of judicial discretion, the variation may produce
less uncertainty than was experienced under Swift. But that observation goes to the degree of
injustice, not the character of the injustice.
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Finally, Christopher Frost's thoughtful analysis of the bankruptcy process
provides additional support for the procedural account of procedure theory.333
Frost argues that the bankruptcy process in particular and the judicial process
more generally are incapable of rationally redistributing losses from
rightsholders to nonrightsholders. 334
His argulnent assumes, without
conceding, "the social costs accolnpanying business failure should be spread
over a broad base. ,,335 Frost accepts and elucidates the COlnlnon critique that
under current law indirect redistributions are ubiquitous in Chapter 11 cases by
336
virtue of delay and the institutional biases that favor rehabilitation.
He
concludes that this "lnethod of indirect protection [of noninvestor interests] is
incoherent at best. ,,337 But his most trenchant argulnent is that any judicial
process, including the bankruptcy process, is ill-suited for addressing social
338
In
problems such as the appropriate allocation of costs of business failure.
particular, Frost persuasively explains that a judicial process is incapable of
339
taking into account the interests not directly involved in the case at hand.
Frost has convincingly taken on the proponents of redistribution in
bankruptcy head on. But his analysis differs somewhat from procedure theory
as presented here. Implicit in Frost's argument is that assuming the costs of
business failure should (however the "should" might be determined) be spread,

333. See generally Frost, supra note 4.
334. Id. at 77, 138-39. Frost uses the terms "investors" (rightsholders) and "non-investors"
(nonrightsholders).
335. Id. at 77.
336. Id. at 91-103.
337. Id. at 102.
338. Id. at 112-40. Janger apparently believes that Frost's critique of the judicial process
is irrelevant. Janger, supra note 64, at 614 ("[T]o the extent that the debate between
proceduralists and traditionalists turns on differing assessments of the ability of judges to
identify opportunistic or abusive behavior, or to identify businesses that are worth saving, it
would appear to be a red herring. "). Janger argues that "muddy" rules, even when applied by
incompetent (but unbiased) judges, lead to more efficient outcomes. Janger, supra note 64, at
582. But he fails to appreciate, perhaps, that the redistributive propensities in bankruptcy
probably do reflect a judicial bias in favor of reorganization as an end in itself.
339. Frost points to the imperfect information available to a court and the difficulty of
defining the group that will bear the costs. Frost, supra note 4, at 112-13. He also explains that
a coherent implementation of a redistributive policy must take into account its impact on the
cost of capital in the economy, on demand, on the relevant industry affected. Id. at 116-23.
And he demonstrates the judicial system is poorly equipped to deal with "highly polycentric
problems" when compared with "other institutions." Id. at 124~ see also Barry S. Schermer,
Response to Professor Gross: Taking the Interests of the Community Into Account in
Bankruptcy A Modern-Day Tale of Belling the Cat, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1049, 1053 (1994)
(stating that Professor Gross's proposal that bankruptcy courts take into account community
interests is not feasible, but does provide "good fiction").
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it would be norlnatively acceptable to do so in bankruptcy so long as it were
possible to do so rationally. Procedure theory, consistent with the Erie
doctrine, teaches that it would be irrational and incoherent to do so based on the
identity ofthe forum (bankruptcy) even if a court could be confident that it was
providing a normatively superior and rational result. But this difference does
not diminish the persuasiveness of Frost's principal conclusions.
To summarize, bankruptcy law generally bears the unlnistakable hallmarks
of civil procedure law. Its history, purpose, and demonstrable function
demonstrate that its primary role is the determination, resolution, enforcement,
and vindication of legal entitlements relating to a debtor. The historical origin
ofthe Bankruptcy Clause has common roots with the constitutional permission
given Congress to establish diversity jurisdiction. The normative purchase of,
and in some cases, applicable legal doctrine under, the Rules of Decision Act
and the Erie doctrine support procedure theory's claim that bankruptcy law
lnust respect the nonbankruptcy legal entitlelnents of rightsholders in the
absence of an adequate justification for a bankruptcy-only rule, standard, or
consideration that is based on the core principles of bankruptcy.

E. A Public Choice Account ofProcedure Theory
Substantive bankruptcy-only legal rules that override nonbankruptcy law
without bankruptcy justifications, however ilnplelnented and whether or not
conceived as "reforms" of nonbankruptcy law, raise additional normative
concerns. The enormous power and influence over bankruptcy law that
bankruptcy lawyers and other bankruptcy professionals exercise is well
34o
known.
Bankruptcy lawyers and other professionals are paid first out of the
bankruptcy estate's unencumbered assets. 341 These are not "neutral" law
reformers. The public-choice account of procedure theory assesses this
environment, in which bankruptcy-only adjustlnents of nonbankruptcy
entitlements emerge from the proposals and influence of bankruptcy law
specialists, the interpretation and application of law by bankruptcy courts, and
bankruptcy legislation filtered and massaged by the Senate and House Judiciary
Comlnittees. Whether in the legislative arena or in the bankruptcy courts, the
legislators, judges, individuals, and groups that influence bankruptcy law are

340. See generally infra notes 344-69 and accompanying text.
341. Administrative expenses such as the attorneys fees for counsel to a debtor receive first
pnonty. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2000) (providing for the allowance of administrative
expenses); 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(I) (2000) (providing that administrative expenses have priority).
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not the appropriate actors to make and shape law that has no rational
bankruptcy-only justification.
In his compelling history of United States bankruptcy law, Debt's
Dominion, David Skeel has documented and explained the power and influence
of bankruptcy lawyers on the direction of bankruptcy law, particularly in the
twentieth century following enactment ofour first "permanent" bankruptcy law,
342
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
Skeel blends the perspectives of the interest
group branch of public-choice theory with a thoughtful historical study.343 He
identifies the bankruptcy bar as the single most influential group in shaping
bankruptcy law during the past century.344 Bankruptcy lawyers are scattered
345
On the other
around the country, affording widespread national influence.
hand, within a given local cOlnmunity the bankruptcy bar historically has been
346
concentrated.
Skeel explains that "[t]he cOlnbination of local concentration
and a nationwide presence made it much easier for bankruptcy lawyers than for
many other groups to coordinate. ,,347 Moreover, many other interest groups
348
have a narrower scope of interest in bankruptcy than the bankruptcy bar.
For
example, although the bankers' lobby has been influential, banks generally are
pacified if their collateral is protected and the costs of losses can be passed off
349
to their customers.
Skeel points to other explanations for the influence of bankruptcy lawyers.
The apparent complexity and technical character of the subject adds to the
350
influence of the bar.
This is especially so as to Inatters difficult for the public
and lawmakers alike to understand, even though they tnay be matters of great
351
importance.
Lawyers typically are the only witnesses in Congressional
hearings on technical matters; their expertise offers"an ongoing opportunity to

See generally DEBT'S DOMINION, supra note 264, at 14-16, 80-98.
Id. For an extensive overview of public choice literature, see generally David A.
Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Future of Public Choice-Influenced Legal Scholarship, 50
342.
343.

L. REV. 647 (1997).
344. DEBT'S DOMINION, supra note 264, at 15 (stating that bankruptcy lawyers and judges
had the most influential impact on bankruptcy law).
345. See id. at 86 (discussing the location and influence of bankruptcy lawyers).
346. See id. ("Bankruptcy practice was quite concentrated. ").
347. Id. The bankruptcy bar also coordinated its influence through the Commercial Law
League and the American Bar Association. Id.
348. See id. at 87 (discussing the narrower interests of banks).
349. Id. at 86.
350. See id. at 87 ("Another crucial factor in the influence of bankruptcy professionals is
the perceived complexity of bankruptcy law. ").
351. See id. (" [I]nterest groups often prove most successful in complex areas ofthe law.
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influence the legislative process. ,,352 This opportunity extends well beyond
testimony at hearings; they also participate in drafting and proposing statutory
language and work directly with Congressional staff melnbers. 353
In the legislative process, bankruptcy lawyers frequently adopt a familiar
feature of their bankruptcy practices-they advocate on behalf of a variety of
354
interests.
Accordingly, they do not speak with a unified voice, as some
advocate for interests of debtors, creditors, or both. 355 By representing a range
of interests, the bankruptcy bar provides sOlne obvious benefits to the political
process; it ensures representation for interests that otherwise "Inight be
underrepresented. ,,356 But Skeel also identifies a darker side of the
representative role of bankruptcy lawyers in the legislative process. First, they
"are likely to look out for their own interests" on some issues. 357 Second,
bankruptcy lawyers' representative or agency functions leave one important
group of players behind without representation. Skeel calls this unrepresented
group the "repayers," or debtors "not likely to ever invoke bankruptcy laws. ,,358
As the bankruptcy lawyers focus on the bankruptcy process, they lose sight of
those outside the process. 359 I would add a third concern that derives from the
interplay between the bankruptcy lawyers' representative function and their
self-interest. Their representative role tends to mask or at least divert attention
away from inherent self-interest, raising a sOlnewhat insidious aspect of
bankruptcy lawyers' dominant role in the process.
Skeel identifies two overarching lnarks of the bankruptcy bar's influence
in the legislative process. First, the bar has successfully fought off efforts to
impose a governmental administrator or overseer for bankruptcy cases. 360
352.
353.

Id.
See id. at 88 ("In addition to their testimony at hearings, bankruptcy professionals

leave their fingerprints on altnost every other step of the process .... Given their participation
in every phase of the legislative process, bankruptcy professionals have an enormous influence
on the shape of any proposed legislation. ").
354. See id. ("Lawyers serve as the agents of a wide range of interests. ").

355.
356.
357.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 89. Skeel points out:

Limiting the fees that can be paid to lawyers might reduce the costs of bankruptcy
for debtors, but one does not often see lawyers taking the lead on this kind of
proposal. Nor does one often see creditors' lawyers lobbying for measures that
would curtail debtors' right to file for bankruptcy, even if such a change would
benefit creditors by reducing their losses in bankruptcy.

Id.
358.
359.
360.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 89-93 (discussing the bankruptcy bar's ability to defeat reform).
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Second, the bankruptcy bar "spearheaded the relentless expansion of
bankruptcy law over the course of the [twentieth] century.,,361
The bankruptcy bar's influence over bankruptcy law extends' beyond the
legislative process, of course. Only a select few bankruptcy lawyers actually
testify before Congressional committees and engage in drafting proposed
legislation, although considerably lTIOre are active in organizations that
participate in these legislative activities. But most bankruptcy lawyers and
bankruptcy judges use, apply, argue, and shape bankruptcy law primarily as
actors "on the ground." It is in the bankruptcy courts, and within negotiations in
the courts' shadows, where bankruptcy law is made and shaped by a particular
362
legal culture.
Bankruptcy law in a given bankruptcy court also is a function
ofthe attitudes of bankruptcy judges, who have substantial control over the fate
of a case, especially in Chapter 11. 363
The influences of bankruptcy law on the ground are perhaps more subtle
than the bankruptcy bar's visible participation in lawlTIaking in the legislative
sphere. But they are every bit as real. In both arenas the bankruptcy bar has a
vested interest in much of the status quo. As Skeel has pointed out, one does
364
not see the bar acting against its interests.
This statement does not at all
suggest that individuals and organizations do not have a public-minded interest
in improving the law. But it does suggest that it is unlikely that they would
advocate for fundamental changes that would render their professional
positions vulnerable or substantially less necessary. Equally unlikely is the
advocacy of reforms that would lTIaterially reduce the financial rewards that the
current systelTI provides to the bankruptcy bar.
Another important feature of the bankruptcy bar's influence is the
emphasis and focus on results of the bankruptcy law on actual bankruptcy
cases. This focus comes at the expense of taking into account the instrumental
impact of bankruptcy law on the behavior of actors outside bankruptcy.365 The
361. See id. at 89, 93-98 (discussing the bankruptcy bar's ability to resist expansion).
362. See, e.g., Teresa A. Sullivan et at., The Persistence ofLocal Legal Culture: Twenty
Years ofEvidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 801,859
(1994) (using the bankruptcy system to highlight the influence of "local legal cultures").
363. Decisions made early on in a Chapter 11 case, for example, such as whether to lift the
automatic stay at a secured creditor's request or to deny the creditor requested "adequate
protection," can have an enormous impact on a case or on creditor's ultimate recovery. See
infra Part IV.J (discussing adequate protection and lifting of the automatic stay). I do not mean
to suggest that all bankruptcy judges have similar views, however.
364. See supra note 357 (discussing the role of bankruptcy lawyers).
365. Baird identified the tendency to disregard this instrumental and ex ante impact as a
characteristic of the traditionalist approach to bankruptcy law. See Axioms, supra note 50, at
589-90 (stating the traditional belief that" [b]ankruptcy law can largely ignore ex ante efforts
and that it can push parts in beneficial directions").
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status quo bias and the narrow focus on the effects of bankruptcy law only in
bankruptcy cases plausibly account for the redistributive characteristics and
effects ofthe effective bias towards rehabilitation in Chapter II-in the statute
as well as on the ground. 366 Keeping the debtor afloat gives rehabilitation a
chance. When a debtor floats on the backs of rightsholders that could benefit
more from prompt liquidation, the bankruptcy bar collects. This redistributive
rehabilitation bias directly offends procedure theory.367
It may be that the grip of the bankruptcy bar on bankruptcy law and the
process for "reform" has waned sOlnewhatin recent years. Certainly the bills
currently pending in Congress have been influenced substantially by the lobby
ofthe consumer credit industry368 and have met considerable criticism from the
369
On the other hand, the bankruptcy bar lnore or less
bankruptcy bar.
dominated the work of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission. And
none of the major reform bills introduced in recent years have passed.
The public choice perspective on procedure theory goes considerably
beyond the influence of the bankruptcy bar and other interest groups and its
critique of Chapter 11 's redistributive bias. This perspective cOlnplements the
jurisprudential/incoherence and civil procedure/federal courts accounts of
procedure theory. Simply put, the Judiciary COlnlnittees of Congress and the
bankruptcy courts are inappropriate actors and fora for the development,
promulgation, and implementation of bankruptcy-only legal rules and decisions
on matters that have no legitimate bankruptcy-only justification..
This aspect ofthe public choice perspective addresses both the legislative
and judicial processes affecting bankruptcy law. As already discussed, Chapter
11 's redistributive bias that has resulted froln these processes cannot be squared
with procedure theory.37o But at least the lnatter of rehabilitating distressed
debtors clearly is one within the proper dOlnain of bankruptcy law. Using the

366. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (a) (2000) (providing a 120 day exclusivity period for
debtor to file plan of reorganization); Frost, supra note 4, at 93 (noting redistributive effect of
Chapter 11 process).
367. See generally supra Part IIl.A.
368. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death ofConsun1er Bankruptcy in the United States?,
18 BANKR. DEY. J. 1, 9 (2001) [hereinafter Death] ("The consumer credit industry has been
waging an almost ceaseless, relentless battle to reshape consumer bankruptcy since the mid1960s.").
369. See, e.g., Hearing Regarding S. 1301, the "Consunter Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1997, " Before the Senate Con1n1. on the Judiciary, 105th Congo (1998) (statement of Randal C.
Picker on behalf of National Bankruptcy Conference) (stating objections to various proposed
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code relating to consumer bankruptcies), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edulNBC /CurrentPostings/l 05thCongress.
370. See supra note 118 (discussing the redistributive bias of Chapter 11).
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bankruptcy lawmaking process to address policies and doctrines of general
applicability, on the other hand, enorlTIously exacerbates and widens the
problem. On the legislative side, the Senate and House Judiciary Committees
have jurisdiction over bankruptcy legislation. Certainly, this jurisdiction is
appropriate. Bankruptcy law, including the Bankruptcy Code, is an important
371
branch of the law of procedure and federal courtS.
But these committees and
the legislative process, including interaction with the bankruptcy bar and other
interest groups, generally are ill-equipped to address issues of general
application that are not bankruptcy-specific.
Consider once again plant closings (including employee terminations) and
priority rules dealing with conflicting claims that could arise as easily outside
bankruptcy as in bankruptcy.372 A law regulating the closing of a plant and the
termination of employees now falls under the jurisdiction of the Senate
373
ComlTIittee on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions
and the House
374
Committee on Education and the Workforce.
In considering the WARN
376
Act,375 for example, the predecessors of these COlTIlTIittees took into account
issues affecting firms generally.377 If the Judiciary Committees took up this
topic, however, it is almost certain that the focus would be exclusively on these
matters as they relate to firms that actually end up in bankruptcy. And the
deliberations would be exposed to the usual redistributive biases in the process.
A similar critique applies to priority rules that sort out cOlTIpeting claims to
property.378

371. See generally supra Part IIl.D.
372. See generally supra Part III.A-B.
373. See U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions, About the Comm.,
at http://health.senate.gov/about_the_committee.html (last visited June 16, 2004) (describing
the matters referred to this committee).
374. See Comm. on Education and the Welfare, Full Comm. Members and Jurisdiction, at
http://edworkforce.house.gov/members/l08th/mem-fc.htm#juris-fc (last visited June 16,2004)
(describing the matters referred to this committee).
375. See supra notes 127, 145, 146 (discussing the applicability of WARN Act).
376. The predecessors were the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources and the
House Committee on Education and Labor. Bartell, supra note 127, at 247.
377. See id. at 244-48 (discussing legislative history of WARN Act). Indeed, Professor
Bartell notes that the Act was "not drafted with the bankrupt employer in mind." ld. at 291.
378. Fashioning a bankruptcy-only priority rule is likely to involve attention primarily to
the rule's distributive effects in bankruptcy proceedings. That approach creates a high risk that
insufficient consideration will be given to the rule's instrumental effects, intended or
unintended, outside bankruptcy. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text (discussing the
social costs of bankruptcy).
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Professor Edward Rubin's critique of the legislative methodology
employed in the development of the federal Truth in Lending Act 379 further
illuminates the problem of bankruptcy-only rules in areas of general
380
application.
Applying "policy analysis," Rubin develops a legislative
methodology that at the outset would identify a probleln and the goals of
legislation addressing the probleln. 381 Only after establishing these goals would
the process proceed to consider how the goals would be implemented, the
substantive elelnents of a solution, and the data neces'sary to assess various
policy options. 382
Consider an example. Assulne that a Inelnber of Congress wishes to
follow Professor Rubin's methodology. The legislator initially identifies as a
problem the instances in which firIns and their Inanagers violate their fiduciary
duties relating to pension plans for the firms' employees and retirees. To
address the problem, the legislator then identifies two goals of new legislation.
First, the legislation prevents, or Inakes it very unlikely, that firms and
managers will violate these fiduciary duties. Second, when they are violated,
the legislation ensures, or makes it substantially more likely, that the
employees' and retirees' claims will be satisfied in full. In order to ilnpleluent
the second goal, the legislator proposes a statutory lien on all of a firm's assets.
The new lien would secure claims of elnployees, retirees, and their pension
plans arising out of these breaches of fiduciary duties. The new lien would be
senior to any other liens, including preexisting liens.
The legislator next must consider relevant data. One area of inquiry, out
of many, relates to the instrulnental effects that would flow froln putting the
new statutory lien on the books. Would it adversely affect the ability affirms
379. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321,82 Stat. 146 (1968).
380. See generally Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the
Truth-in-Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233 (1991).
381. Id. at 281-89 (discussing the "Elements of Legislative Methodology"). Rubin's
critique explains how the Truth-in-Lending Act embedded its principal instrumentality,
disclosure, within its goals, thereby inhibiting any direct evaluation of disclosure as the
instrumentality chosen to reach specific goals. Id. at 289.
382. Id. at 281-306 (discussing the "Elements of Legislative Methodology"). Professor
Rubin states:
This approach ... involves a series of discrete steps: identifying the problem,
defining and ranking one's goals for solving that problem, specifying all relevant
options for meeting those goals, collecting the data relevant to each option,
predicting the consequences of those options on the basis of the data, and then
choosing the option that best achieves the goal.
Id. at 282 (citing CARL PATTON & DAVID SAWICKI, THE POLICY ANALYSIS PROCESS: BASIC
METHODS OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND PLANNING 26-38 (1986); EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD
ZECKHAUSER, THINKING ABOUT POLICY CHOICES: A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 5-6 (1978)).
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to obtain unsecured and secured credit? Another matter to investigate would be
the likely frequency and magnitude that the protected claims would arise. If
these claims actually are rare, and the problem is not that serious,'perhaps the
new legislation is not worth the effort. On the other hand, if the claims
frequently arise and present a huge problem, then the new statutory lien's
potential for mischief in the financial and credit markets could be all the more
problematic.
Now take another Inelnber of Congress who also worries about breaches
of pension-related fiduciary duties. This second legislator, however, begins the
process not with an identification of goals but with a complete bill, announced
with fanfare at a press conference. 383 The bill would amend the Bankruptcy
Code to provide that employee and retiree claims for pension-related fiduciary
breaches would have a super priority and could be satisfied even out of
property subject to a valid, nonavoidable lien. This legislator's focus is on the
treatment of employees and retirees in bankruptcy cases, not on the impact of
the legislation on the finance and credit markets. Moreover, the second
legislator's bill ignores cOlnpletely the plight of employees and retirees outside
the bankruptcy process, although their interests are no less worthy. The second
legislator's bill has run afoul of Rubin 's Inethodology by elnbedding the goal of
protecting employees and retirees with the ilnplelnentation strategy of a
bankruptcy priority. Moreover, the second legislator is a member of a Judiciary
Committee charged with overseeing bankruptcy legislation, making the
legislator's strategy of implelnentation through bankruptcy essentially
384
inevitable.
The public-choice perspective on procedure theory applies not only to the
legislative process but to the judicial process as well. The narrow focus on a

383. Rubin identified the flaw in this approach. See;d. at 285 ("Beginning with a bill that
has been fully drafted ... virtually precludes an explicit inquiry into the bedrock goals of the
legislative effort. ").
384. The statement in the text presumes, as is typical, that the legislator wishes to introduce
a bill that will be considered by a committee on which the legislator sits and exercises influence.
Rubin also identified this concern in his critique of the Truth-in-Lending Act. Id. at 243. He
explained that the Act's principal proponent, Senator Paul Douglas, was compelled to choose
the Federal Reserve Board as the Act's regulatory authority because the consequence of
choosing another would have been that the subcommittee that Douglas chaired (the Senate
Banking Committee's Subcommittee on Production and Stabilization) would have lost
jurisdiction over the Act. Id. at 290. For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the
Truth-in-Lending Act, see id. at 242-63. Truth sometimes being stranger than fiction, the
second legislator's story and the substance of the bill closely approximates and is derived from
the actual circumstances of the Employee Abuse Prevention Act of2002, S. 2798, 107th Congo
(2002); Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002, H. R. 5221, 107th Congo (2002). See supra
note 177 (discussing the proposed legislation).
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particular debtor in bankruptcy, that debtor's creditors and shareholders, and
the relevant affected employees and communities are likely to skew the
application, interpretation, and development of generally applicable,
385
Even if one were to reject Frost's conclusion
nonbankruptcy-specific law.
that the judicial process is ill-equipped to take on social engineering, such as
spreading the costs of business failure,386 the courts-especially bankruptcy
courts-in bankruptcy cases populated by the bankruptcy bar are inappropriate
fora for resolving these problems of general application. 387
The critique of bankruptcy jurisprudence-both legislative and judicialthat emerges froln the public-choice account of procedure theory is consistent
with a number of conventional approaches to law. Certainly the critique's
emphasis on the instrumental aspect of bankruptcy law, that is too often
suppressed or hidden in the process, is consistent with the ex ante econolnic
388
efficiency approach favored by the law and economics school.
The critique

385. Imagining a bankruptcy judge attempting to protect a local community from the
detrimental effects of a local finn's failure through judicial discretion raises a particularly
insidious specter. In the absence of a neutral principle, such as maximizing the returns for
rightsholders, judges would be exposed to enormous pressure from community-based interest
groups. In an analogous context, Professor Edward Zelinsky has strongly criticized the
appropriateness of "economically targeted investments" (ETIs) by pension plans. Edward A.
Zelinsky, ETI, Phone the Department 0/ Labor: Economically Targeted Investments, IB 94-1
and the Reincarnation 0/Industrial Policy, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 333, 349-55 (1995)
("Particularly troubling are the possibilities of a mandatory ETI regime. "). For example,
Zelinsky criticized "the investment of the Connecticut state pension fund in Colt's
Manufacturing Company, a large gun manufacturer and a major employer in the Hartford area."
Id. at 350. As Zelinsky observed:
Connecticut treasurer Francisco L. Borges spearheaded a twenty-five million dollar
investment by the state pension fund in Colt's. Four years later, Colt's was again in
bankruptcy with most of the fund's money lost.
Connecticut's experience demonstrates ... in a nutshell the dangers of economically
targeted investing. While Borges claimed that the Colt's venture was financially
sound and that job preservation was a secondary concern, it is hard to take that
argument seriously. The more compelling characterization is that Connecticut state
pension monies were used for an election year bail out of a failing firm and that basic
economic criteria were discounted, if not ignored.
Id. at 351.
386. See supra notes 333-39 and accompanying text (discussing Frost's analysis of the
bankruptcy process).
387. See supra note 385 (discussing the potential problelTI ofbankruptcy judges responding
to community interests).
388. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Econon1ics, Politics and the Reading a/Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263,290-91 (1982) (explaining that the same influences that
affect legislators should guide courts).
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also can be squared with major elements of Inodern legal process
scholarship.389
On one level, the public-choice account suggests that both statutory and
judge-made bankruptcy-only rules and applications for areas of generally
applicable law are less likely to achieve optimal results (however measured).
To that extent, the critique has a utilitarian element that addresses how best to
achieve "good" law. On the other hand, any critique of a process is likely to
fault as well at least some of the results that the process produces. My claim
here addresses primarily the judicial and legislative process.
The public-choice account of procedure theory might benefit from a closer
examination of advocacy for favoring extraneous interests in bankruptcy at the
expense of or risk to a debtor's rightsholders. This advocacy, whether in the
Judiciary Committees of Congress, in bankruptcy or other courts, or in the
pages of legal journals and books, is particularly troubling when one considers
the source-bankruptcy law specialists. Returning to the plant closing
example, I would enjoy as much as the next person a good argulnent about the
pros and cons of legal doctrine that would permit unfettered plant closings and
employee discharges. My views one way or another likely would be politically
inspired, and Iny principal action on theln would occur in the voting booth.
Certainly, I would not hold out Iny views as legal scholarship without first
undertaking a thorough study ofthe literature dealing with eInployment law and
the relevant data in order to develop a modiculn of expertise over a period of
years. Now, as someone who has studied bankruptcy law, could I enhance my
credibility and expertise on employlnent law by proposing that the argument
focus solely on plant closings and the treatInent of eInployees of firms in
bankruptcy? Hardly. Yet advocates of an expansive view of bankruptcy that
embraces the extraneous "employlnent" goal seeln much less reluctant.
Interestingly, these advocates do not argue, at least not in their scholarship,
for generally applicable laws that would restrict or regulate plant closings, for
example. Their agenda (in this context) is limited to advocating for taking into
account the employment goal in bankruptcy.39o Moreover, they make no
pretense of evaluating the general social benefits of protecting employment in a
market economy.
Instead, as bankruptcy specialists, these advocates
concentrate on an audience consisting of bankruptcy specialists. To be sure, if
389. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (2d ed. 1995).
390. Gross certainly acknowledges this point. See Karen Gross, On the Merits: A
Response to Professors Girth and White, 73 AM. BANKR. L..J. 485, 498 (1999) ("l do not aspire
to change the world; I am only interested in changing a tiny corner of it, and my ambitions for
change are not all that lofty. ").
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they believe that regulating plant closings is good public policy, and the field of
bankruptcy law is the only forum in which they have a voice, then their
advocacy for the elnployment goal in the context of bankruptcy offers at least
an opportunity to improve public policy by moving it in the "right direction. ,,391
But that advocacy has nothing to do with bankruptcy policy or theory and
certainly is not legal scholarship in the field of employlnent law. It represents
only a second-best strategy for itnposing a political judgment concerning
employment law in a liInited context (bankruptcy law, presulnably the context
in which the advocates may have influence). 392
It also is worth noting that much of the impact of legitimizing the role of
extraneous interests in bankruptcy would occur outside of actual litigation.
Given the bargaining and negotiation context of Chapter 11, those interests
would be at work in shaping the negotiations in the shadow of a potential
judicial determination. 393
Finally, one way to capture the public-choice account of procedure theory
is to understand the linchpin of the account as distrust, along the lines of the
following story.394 Insolvency is a potentially intractable problem for a Inarket
economy. An overriding federal law and federal judiciary constitute a
bankruptcy system that seeks to ameliorate certain effects of insolvency, in part
by following SOlne of the injunctions of procedure theory but also in part by
empowering the insolvent, whether an individual or a firm in business. Those
with special influence on and power over the bankruptcy regime-legislators,
judges, lawyers, and others-benefit from the bankruptcy system and the

391. I make no claim that these advocates are evil minded or wish to cause any harm.
Professor Melissa Jacoby, who was senior staff attorney for the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission, has observed:
[I]nstitutional and political forces, rather than some preference for different
bankruptcy rules, are sometimes what put the [Judiciary] comlnittee in a bind.
They have jurisdictional problems with making fixes to other laws. Staffers often
are told by others that they are fixing the wrong lavv' when they try to make a
bankruptcy-exclusive change, and they often say in response that they know, but for
political and jurisdictional reasons cannot even consider changing the right law to
effectuate the policy.
Memorandum from Melissa Jacoby to Charles Mooney (July 2, 2003) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
392. See infra notes 621-31 and accompanying text (making a similar argument
concerning proposals for a bankruptcy-only priority rule relating to tort claiInants).
393. See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, A Humanistic Vision a/Bankruptcy Law, 6 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REv. 471, 492 (1998) ("Most bankruptcy disputes are resolved through negotiation and
settlement, rather than after a trial on the merits. ").
394. Much of the sentiment expressed in this paragraph draws on David Carlson's
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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empowerment of insolvents that it delivers. They lnay justify the regime with
utilitarian, libertarian, empirical, or other arguments. But the public-choice
account warns us not to trust this reginle to tinker with nonbankruptcy (mostly
state) law, all in the nalne of their vision of the public good.

IV Bankruptcy Law Under Procedure Theory: Consistencies and
(Apparent or Real) Inconsistencies
Procedure theory holds that the nonnative basis of bankruptcy law is to
maximize the recoveries of and benefits for a debtor's rightsholders in
accordance with nonbankruptcy law. By providing a specialized procedural
body of law, bankruptcy law can enhance the recoveries and benefits of
395
rightsholders.
But in some cases the Bankruptcy Code lnodifies, even
overrides, the interests and rights of rightsho lders. Indeed, some restrictions on
nonbankruptcy rights, such as the automatic stay,396 lie at the core of a
successful procedural bankruptcy law. 397 Inaslnuch as procedure theory
generally calls for honoring nonbankruptcy entitlements, it follows that
procedure theory lnust take a position on these substantive lnodifications of
nonbankruptcy rights and interests.
There are at least four strategies available for rationalizing these
divergences as consistent with the goals of procedure theory. As will become
apparent, these approaches are nonexclusive and overlap to some extent. First,
some apparent modifications lnay actually be procedural, not substantive,
thereby serving to provide rightsholders with the substantive benefits
contemplated by nonbankruptcy law (the procedural test). Second, other
apparent modifications lnay be generally consistent with nonbankruptcy law, or
at least with policies of nonbankruptcy law (the consistency test). Third, some
modifications of nonbankruptcy law, though substantive, nonetheless Inay serve
to maxilnize the collective benefits for rightsholders of a debtor in financial
distress in the context of a collective proceeding (the collective maximization
test).398 Fourth, other modifications may supplement nonbankruptcy law when
it does not provide a resolution for questions that generally arise only in a

395.
396.
397.

See supra Part II.D (asking "Why Bankruptcy?").
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000) (providing for the automatic stay).
See infra Part IV.D (discussing the automatic stay and procedure theory).

398.

The collective maximization test contemplates that varying nonbankruptcy law could

either increase the aggregate value available for the benefit of rightsholders or distribute value
in a manner that provides greater benefits for more rightsholders. See infra note 481 (discussing
pro rata distribution).
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collective proceeding concerning a debtor in financial distress (the
supplemental test).
Sotne features of current bankruptcy law cannot
successfully be rationalized with procedure theory.399 Procedure theory calls
for elimination or modification ofthose offending aspects ofcurrent bankruptcy
law in order to conform bankruptcy law to procedure theory.
The remainder ofthis Part seeks to reconcile procedure theory with several
significant features of current bankruptcy law, sotne of which apparently or
actually modify nonbankruptcy entitletnents of rightsholders. These features
are (i) property of the estate, (ii) claims and interests, (iii) pro rata sharing
among similarly situated rightsholders, (iv) the automatic stay, (v) the
bankruptcy trustee's power to avoid certain prebankruptcy transfers, (vi) the
trustee's power to reject or assume executory contracts and leases, (vii) the
individual debtor's discharge and the fresh start principle, (viii) the provision
for a debtor's discharge in Chapter 11, (ix) priority claitns, and (x) adequate
protection for undersecured creditors. These features figure prominently in the
structure and operation of current bankruptcy law. Moreover, although
disagreement exists as to the rationale of these features, there appears to be a
general consensus as to the wisdotn of tnost of these attributes ofcurrent law (if
not as to all details). The two principal classes of rightsholders who share in or
400
401
benefit from a debtor's assets are the holders of claims
and interests
(shareholders). For convenience, Inuch ofthe following discussion focuses on
the holders of unsecured claims.
One might criticize this reconciliation of procedure theory with some of
the important aspects of bankruptcy law because a strict proceduralist would
reject every aspect of bankruptcy law that varies any aspect of the
nonbankruptcy entitletnents of any rightsholder. One Inight also object on the
basis that the rationalization undennines procedure theory to such an extent that
it could accommodate even a traditionalist, redistributive approach to
bankruptcy. But procedure theory accepts only variations that generally
validate and benefit rightsholders. Moreover, these critiques would render
bankruptcy law under procedure theory essentially identical to nonbankruptcy
procedural law. Finally, as the following discussion illustrates, procedure
theory finds current bankruptcy law wanting in several respects.

399. Recall that it is not necessary that a successful nonnative theory of bankruptcy law
mirror, explain, or defend every aspect of the currently effective positive law. See supra note 11
(discussing normative theory).
400. See supra note 4 (quoting definition of "claim").
401. See supra note 244 (explaining concept of "interest" held by an "equity security
holder").
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A. Property of'the Estate
The filing of a bankruptcy petition "creates an estate. ,,402 What constitutes
"property" of the "estate" is a core concept in bankruptcy. It identifies the
assets potentially available for the benefit of rightsholders in the bankruptcy
case. Property of the estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencelnent of the case. ,,403 Federal law
governs what is "property" for this purpose, and the "label" that state law
provides does not contro1. 404 But it is nonbankruptcy (usually state) law that
determines the attributes of a debtor's rights or interest. 405 Moreover, as
interpreted by the Suprelne Court in Butner v. United States,406 it is state law
that creates and defines "property. ,,407
It is not difficult to rationalize the Bankruptcy Code's conception of
property of the estate with procedure theory. Inasmuch as the property of the
estate generally includes in the assets available for the satisfaction ofclaims the
same assets that would have been available for that purpose under
nonbankruptcy law, the concept is fully consistent with procedure theory and
easily satisfies the consistency test. To the extent that property of the estate
includes more or fewer assets, however, it could offend procedure theory. For
example, if the concept were extended so as to cut off the property rights of
rightsholders or third parties, as by invalidating state law liens, procedure
theory could be offended. 408 The saIne could be true if the concept were
narrowed so as to deprive rightsholders of the benefits ofcertain ofthe debtor's

402. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a) (2000).
403. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(I) (2000).
404. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924). The Court held that a seat on
the Chicago Board of Trade was "property" even though applicable state law was to the
contrary. Id. at 12-13. There were restrictions on the sale of the seat that were valid under state
law. Id. at 7. Sale was permitted only if the proceeds were first applied to the holder's
obligations to other melnbers of the Board, which would have left nothing for the trustee in
bankruptcy. Id. at 8. The Court upheld the restrictions, recognizing that the rights ofthe trustee
(and the general creditors of the debtor) were derivative of the debtor's rights. Id. at 13; see
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 94-95 (3d ed. 2001); TABS, supra note 136,
§ 5.5, at 288-89 (discussing Chicago Board of Trade).
405. See Chicago Bd. of Trade, 264 U.S. at 14-15 (applying state law regarding
membership in the Board of Trade).
406. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48,55 (1979) ("Property interests are created
and enforced by state law. ").
407. See generally TABB, supra note 136, § 5.5, at 287-91. For the most part the statement
in the text is accurate, but a more precise statement would acknowledge that it is nonbankruptcy
law that defines the property rights. That law might be state law or federal law.
408. The trustee's avoiding powers are considered in Part IV. E.
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assets that would be available under nonbankruptcy law. Dicta in Butner
instructs courts not to deviate from the state law property construct "unless
some federal interest requires a different result. ,,409 Procedure theory offers a
normative fence that would liluit courts frOln an expansive application of the
. 410
B utner exceptIon.
The Butner Court reasoned that if concepts of property applied by courts
in bankruptcy varied from those outside bankruptcy it would encourage "forum
shopping" and could provide a "windfall merely by reason ofthe happenstance
of bankruptcy. ,,411 These concerns exemplify the generally procedural nature of
bankruptcy law. 412 It follows that the concept of property of the estate also
reflects procedure theory under the procedural test. 413
B. Claims and Nonclain1 Entitlements

The attributes of claims against a debtor and the identity of the holders of
ciailns determine the "who" in the "core question of ~who gets what' in the
bankruptcy distribution. ,,414 Persons who have legal entitlements to the

Butner, 440 U.S. at 55.
410. Plank has addressed the constitutional lilnitations on the Butner federal interest
exception and argued that courts are prohibited from facilitating a federal interest beyond the
powers conferred by the Bankruptcy Clause. See Erie Doctrine, supra note 297, at 651-52.
411. Butner, 440 U.S. at 55. This reasoning is consistent with Plank's view that Butner is
an application of the Erie doctrine. See Erie Doctrine, supra note 297 at 649-51.
412. See TABB, supra note 136, § 5.5, at 288 ("This explanation [by the Butner Court] is
grounded in the fact that bankruptcy in large part is a procedural device utilized to distribute the
debtor's property in an equitable manner to multiple creditors with competing claims. "). I
suspect that the Court's "windfall" from the "happenstance of bankruptcy" is much more
significant in the real world than the "forum shopping" concerns.
413. Carlson strongly criticized Jackson's reliance on Butner to support what Carlson calls
Jackson's "bankruptcy neutrality" principle. Philosophy, supra note 49, at 1377-78 n.117.
Carlson noted that Butner's result actually was non-neutral because Butner, a mortgagee, was
denied the right to collect rents for its failure to comply with a bankruptcy procedural rule. Id.
at 1378 n. 117 (" [I]t was the failure to follow a rule of bankruptcy procedure that did Butner
in."). Carlson's critique appears to confound neutrality in result with neutrality in substantive
nonbankruptcy law. Under the procedural test bankruptcy sometimes may, consistent with
procedure theory, alter results. Otherwise the institution ofbankruptcy would not be justified at
all. See supra Part n.D (asking "Why Bankruptcy?"). Perhaps Carlson was concerned that the
bankruptcy procedural rule that the mortgagee failed to follow (the failure to give a notice to the
trustee following conversion of the case to a liquidation) was trivial (bad procedure) and
unnecessarily trampled on the mOligagee's state law rights. If so, I share Carlson's concern.
414. TABB, supra note 136, § 5.1, at 273. The "what," of course, is the property of the
estate. Id.; see supra note 4 (quoting Chapter 11 's definition of "claim").
409.
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payment of money by the debtor hold claims. 415 These entitlements include
even a "right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment.,,416 Nonbankruptcy law governs the legal
entitlements that give rise to claitns. 417 Only the holders of claims are entitled
to share in the distribution in bankruptcy.418 At this level of generality, looking
to nonbankruptcy law for the existence of legal entitlements and making
distributions to the holders ofthose entitlements conforms to procedure theory
under the consistency test.
Classifying a nonbankruptcy legal entitlement as a claim sometimes is a
double-edged sword for either the debtor or the holder of the claim. Although
the holder is entitled to participate in the bankruptcy distribution, the discharge
granted to an individual debtor in a Chapter 7 case or to a debtor under
Chapters 11, 12, or 13 operates to discharge liabilities on claitns. 419
Consequently, a nonbankruptcy legal entitlelnent that is not a claim, such as an
equitable remedy for breach that does not give rise to a right to paylnent, is not
discharged. 420 Moreover, a nonclaitn entitlement also is not subject to some
aspects of the automatic stay.421 In the case of an individual debtor, then, the
holder of the nonclaim legal entitlelnent can enforce its entitlelnent following
bankruptcy; enforcement may not be stayed, and the entitlement will not be
discharged. 422 However, if the debtor is not an individual not only will the
holder of the nonclaim entitlement receive no distribution in Chapter 7, but
415. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2000) (defining "claim").
416. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B) (2000).
417. See TABS, supra note 136, § 7.1, at 471 (stating that the claim must be valid under
nonbankruptcy law).
418. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (2000) (specifying the order in which claims are paid).
The statement in the text assumes that the debtor is insolvent and that any equity security
holders will receive nothing. Even so, in some cases even an insolvent debtor's equity security
holders participate. This section focuses on the lTIOre typical situation in which only holders of
claims participate in the distribution.
419. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (2000) (providing for discharge under Chapter 7); 11 U.S.C.
§ 1141 (d)( 1)(A) (2000) (providing that plan confirmation discharges pre-confinuation debt); 11
U.S.C. § 1228(a) (2000) (providing for discharge under Chapter 12); 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)
(2000) (providing for discharge under Chapter 13); see also supra Part IV. G-H (discussing the
individual debtor's discharge and the Chapter 11 discharge).
420. See TABS, supra note 136, § 7.3, at 477 ("The courts have been reluctant to permit
debtors to use the bankruptcy discharge as a convenient way to dodge the need to comply with
injunctive orders. ").
421. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)( 1) (2000) (staying judicial process to recover prebankruptcy
claim), (a)(6) (staying acts to recover prebankruptcy claim); see infra Part IV.D (discussing the
automatic stay).
422. See TABB, supra note 136, § 7.1, at 468-69 (discussing the effect of a creditor lacking
a bankruptcy claim on an individual debtor).
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following liquidation there will be no surviving, ongoing entity against which
to enforce the nondischarged entitlelnent-unlike the case of an individual,
423
whose existence and whose potential for future incolne and assets continues.
In Chapter 11, on the other hand, the nonclaitn entitlement holder's rights will
424
remain fully intact during and following reorganization.
This treatment of nonclaitn legal entitlelnents in bankruptcy generally
conforms to procedure theory. Because these nondischarged and partially
unstayed entitlements remain fully intact during and after bankruptcy, their
status mimics precisely-indeed, is governed by-nonbankruptcy law. Even
when a debtor other than an individual liquidates in Chapter 7, leaving no
viable entity following liquidation, the situation lnitnics nonbankruptcy law.
The holder of the nonclaim entitlement is treated no differently than it would
have been had the debtor simply shut down outside bankruptcy, leaving
creditors to fight over the assets. Procedure theory also supports denying
nonclaim entitlement holders the right to participate in bankruptcy
distributions. Outside bankruptcy, nonclaim entitlelnent holders generally
would not be entitled to recover a money judglnent, otherwise they would be
425
claims.
Stated otherwise, limiting claitns to entitlelnents giving rise to a right
to payment makes sense under procedure theory. Bankruptcy is, at bottom,
about money. Although claims in many cases are dealt with other than by cash
payments,426 the essential structure of bankruptcy law delnands that claims be
427
quantified.
As Tabb summarized:
[E]quitable remedies that cannot be satisfied under applicable
nonbankruptcy law by the paylnent of money are not claims and are not

423. Id. (discussing the effect of a creditor lacking a bankruptcy claim on an individual
debtor). Although the nonclaim entitlement will not be discharged in the case of a debtor that is
not an individual, the practical effect would be the same.
424. See id., § 7.3, at 476-77.
425. This conclusion must be qualified somewhat. See id. § 7.3, at 481-82 (discussing In
re Udell, 18 F.3d 403 (7th Cir. 1994)). Udell held that an injunctive remedy to enforce a
covenant not to compete was not a claim because the liquidated damages available for
noncompliance would not satisfy the injunctive remedy under nonbankruptcy law. Udell, 18
F.3d at 408.
426. For eXaInple, Chapter 11 plans typically provide for the distribution of "property"
(which could be securities such as debt instruments or stock) to the holders of claims. See, e.g.,
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2000) ("each holder of a claim or interest ... will receive or retain
under the plan on account of such claim or interest property of a value .... ").
427. Quantification is necessary, for eXaInple, to calculate pro rata distributions. See infra
Part IV.C (discussing pro rata sharing). It is necessary as well for purposes such as voting on a
plan of reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2000) (providing that a class of creditors
accepts a plan if accepted by holders of "at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-halfin
number of the allowed claims of such class").
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subject to the discharge. The claimant's right to the payment of money
need not be exclusive, however; as the legislative history explains, it is
enough if the right to payment is alternative. The example given in the
congressional explanation of the Code is a right to specific performance
that can be satisfied by the payment of money in the event performance is
refused.
The critical inquiry, then, is whether the nonbankruptcy law that gives rise
to the equitable remedy gives the holder of that equitable remedy the right
to be paid money in lieu of equitable enforcement. 428

In the real world, distinguishing a claim froln a nonclaim equitable remedy
has been more troublesome for the courts than this straightforward reasoning
429
might suggest.
In particular, determining whether rights arising out of an
equitable remedy constitute a claim turns on the characteristics of those rights
under nonbankruptcy law. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that
procedure theory favors drawing the line that best Ininlics the nonbankruptcy
treatment of equitable remedies. 430 But this guideline must be teInpered by
concern for bankruptcy policies that procedure theory also would
431
In general, procedure theory supports the Bankruptcy Code's
accommodate.
statutory framework for the treatlnent of claitns and nonclaitn entitlements for
purposes of distribution, discharge, and the automatic stay.
As discussed above, only claims qualify for participation in the bankruptcy
distribution scheme. But not all claitns so qualify because only "allowed"
claims may participate. 432 A claim covered by a proof of claim 433 is deemed
434
allowed unless an objection to the claim is Inade and sustained.
Subject to
428. TABB, supra note 136, § 7.3, at 476.
429. For a brief but thoughtful survey of the significant case law and discussion ofthe issue
of what constitutes a claim arising out of an equitable remedy in the contexts of environmental
laws, covenants not to compete, and specific performance, see id. § 7.3. An evaluation of the
case law and commentary on this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
430. See Douglas G. Baird & Tholnas H. Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy,
36 STAN. L. REV. 1199,1209-10 (1984) (urging an expansive view ofa "claim" in bankruptcy
grounded on the principle that the outcomes in bankruptcy should Inimic those under
nonbankruptcy law).
431. See Part IV.C (taking, for example, an overly narrow approach to when an equitable
remedy is a claim impairs the underpinnings of pro rata sharing).
432. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (2000) (providing for distribution of the bankruptcy
estate).
433. See 11 U.S.C. § 501 (2000) (providing for filing of proofs of claiIns or interests).
434. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2000) (providing that claims are deelned allowed unless
objection is made); llU.S.C. § 502(b) (2000) (providing that ifobjection is made the court will
determine the amount of the claim and allow the claim unless one of the grounds for
disallowance is established).
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exceptions, only claims that exist on the date the bankruptcy petition is filed are
allowed and then only in the amount of the claim on that date. 435
One ground for disallowance is fundalnental and fully consistent with
procedure theory. A claim will be disallowed if it is unenforceable under
436
nonbankruptcy law.
For example, a promise lnight be unenforceable because
it violates public policy or because the applicable statute of limitations has run
under nonbankruptcy law. This ground meets the consistency test as well as the
437
procedural test.
Another purely procedural ground provides for disallowance
of a claim if "proof of such claitn is not titnely filed. ,,438
Claims for "unmatured interest"-interest that has not accrued as of the
petition date-are not allowed. 439 Arguably, this practice is consistent with the
allowance only of claims existing on the petition date. In effect, the existence
and amount of unsecured claims, including any accrued interest, are "frozen" as
of the petition date. Of course, if all unsecured claitns bore interest at the same
rate, whether under a contractual arrangement or at the legal rate under
applicable law, the disallowance of a claim for "unlnatured interest" would
have no effect on the calculation of each claitnant's pro rata distribution in the
typical case of an insolvent debtor. But in a world where parties are free to
negotiate the applicable interest rates or appeal to legislatures to enact
appropriate legal rates, claimants entitled to interest outside bankruptcy should
be entitled to include interest at the applicable rates as a part of their claims in
bankruptcy. Procedure theory, therefore, would reject the disallowance of
postpetition interest absent a showing that the burden of calculation would
adverse ly affect rightsholders in the aggregate. 440
435. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2000).
436. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)( 1) (2000) (providing for disallowance of a claim that "is
unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement or applicable
law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or unmatured"). As to contingent
and unmatured claims, see infra notes 450-55 and accompanying text.
437. See TABB, supra note 136, § 7.5, at 488 ("At its core, bankruptcy remains a
procedural mechanism for sorting out claims that are established under nonbankruptcy law. If
an entity does not have an enforceable claim against a debtor outside of bankruptcy, nothing
about the debtor filing bankruptcy will change that result. ").
438. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) (2000).
439. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (2000).
440. Some adjustments might be necessary as a matter of procedural efficiency. For
example, interest could be calculated to the day of distribution of funds in a liquidation under
Chapter 7 or to the date of confirmation or the effective date of a confirmed plan in the case of a
reorganization under Chapter 11. I recognize that the calculations of interest up to a specified
date would impose a not insignificant expense that, as a purely practical matter, might not be
worth the effort. Note also that allowing postpetition interest would not undercut pro rata
sharing. It would merely calculate the accrued interest at and as of a point in time later than the
petition date.
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Two additional grounds for disallowance place caps on the amount of
damages that may be included in an allowed claitn. One disallows a lessor's
damages based on termination of a lease of real property to the extent that the
damages exceed the specified cap.441 The other caps damages for termination
of an employment contract. 442 Because these provisions disallow damage
claims that otherwise would be fully enforceable outside bankruptcy, they
appear to clearly contradict procedure theory. They transfer wealth from
claimants whose claitns are capped to other claimants. There may, however, be
a coherent bankruptcy justification for these caps.443 In the case of both real
property leases and employment contracts, aggrieved lessors and employees
seeking damages may be under a duty to lnitigate their damages. 444 Allowing
these claimants full, uncapped recoveries subject to their lnitigation duties
arguably could impose unacceptable delay in a bankruptcy case. Therefore, the
argument goes, the caps would be justified on the basis of administrative
convenience in the bankruptcy process. 445
Because in general only claitns existing on the bankruptcy petition date
may be allowed, it is necessary to detennine when a claim arises for bankruptcy
purposes and to detennine the amount of the claim. A claim may be
"contingent" or "unliquidated. ,,446 An exalnple of the former would be the
obligation of an applicant on a letter of credit to reimburse the issuer of a letter
of credit ifthe beneficiary draws on the credit. 447 The applicant lnust reimburse
441. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) (2000).
442. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(7) (2000).
443. Tabb acknowledges this wealth transfer. See TABB~ supra note 136, § 7.5, at 489 ("In
effect, then, § 502(b)(6) redistributes some of the uncertain entitlement of the real estate lessor
to other creditors. "). He candidly explains its rationale: The cap on a lessor's damages is "to
prevent that claim from consuming a disproportionately large share of the estate, to the
detriment of other creditors." Id. In a just and coherent system, the lessor would receive a
"disproportionate" share only if under nonbankruptcy law and the lease agreement the lessor
were entitled to that "disproportionate" share based on a disproportionately large claim.
444. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.82, at 408 (2d ed.
1993) (noting that many states provide tenants with a defense to payment of rent unless landlord
makes a reasonable attempt to re-lease for the tenant's account in order to mitigate damages);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350( 1) (1979) ("[D]amages are not recoverable for
loss that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or hunliliation. ").
445. This rationale does not fully explain why contract claims generally are not capped,
inasmuch as a duty of mitigation is a generally applicable principle of contract law. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(1) (1979) ("[D]amages are not recoverable for
loss that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation. "). One
response is that real property leases, especially~ and employment contracts, perhaps, often are of
a very long duration.
446. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (5) (2000) (defining "claim").
447. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 5-1 08(i)(1) (2000) (providing the obligation of an applicant to
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the issuer if the credit is drawn on and honored, but if the applicant files a
bankruptcy petition before that titne its obligation is contingent-it is possible
that the credit will never be drawn on and honored. An example of the latter is
a tort claim that has not yet been reduced to judgment against the debtor (and
thereby liquidated). The tort claim also may be "disputed" by the debtor but
would be a "claim" nonetheless. 448 The court must estnnate claims for allowance
purposes in two situations: If the clailn is contingent or unliquidated, otherwise
the administration of the case would be "unduly delay[ed]," and if the claim is
based on "an equitable remedy for breach of performance. ,,449
The allowance of contingent claitns and the estimation of contingent and
unliquidated claims and those arising out of equitable remedies are deviations
from nonbankruptcy law. Outside bankruptcy, an unmatured and contingent
claim generally would not be ripe for the COlnmencelnent of a civil action. 450 In
addition, a court outside bankruptcy would adjudicate claims as opposed to
estilnating them, estitnation being a somewhat rougher form ofjustice. 451 But
in the case of both unmatured and contingent claims, prebankruptcy events
have given rise to a set of legal relationships, even thought they are not yet ripe
for obtaining a judicial remedy under nonbankruptcy procedural law. Thus
allowing unmatured and contingent clailns in bankruptcy generally are
deviations from nonbankruptcy procedural law (with a decidedly substantive
impact, of course). As such, these deviations are consistent with procedure
theory under the procedural test. A narrower conception of allowable claims
resolution, more closely reselnbling nonbankruptcy civil procedure, would not
serve as well the need for a collective bankruptcy proceeding to deal with
reimburse the issuer of a letter of credit).
448. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2000) (defining "claim"). Of course, ifit turns out that the
debtor has no liability, then the clailTI will be disallowed. The bankruptcy court has jurisdiction
to determine the validity of a claim other than one for "personal injury tort or wrongful death."
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(I), (2)(B) (2000).
449. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (2000)~ see supra notes 425-31 and accompanying text
(discussing rights to payment arising from equitable remedies).
450. Consider the example ofa contingent reimbursement claim against the applicant held
by the letter of credit issuer. Until that claim matures, and assulTIing no dispute between the
issuer and the applicant, there would be no case or controversy on which a civil action-even
one for declaratory relief-could be brought. See, e.g., JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 14,
§ 1.10, at 26-30 (discussing "case or controversy" requirement for declaratory relief).
451. This estimation is especially rough when a claim with a positive value is valued at
zero because the probability of success, in the case of a disputed unliquidated claim, is less than
fifty percent. See, e.g., Bittner v. Borne Chern. Co., 691 F.2d 134, 136-37 (3d Cir. 1982)
(rejecting the "probability of success" method in favor of the "ultimate merits" method of
estimation and valuing claims at zero when the probability of success was less than 50%).
Jackson criticized Bittner because its reasoning "skew[s] nonbankruptcy values." JACKSON,
supra note 70, at 46-47. Procedure theory sides with Jackson.
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financial distress. Whether in contexts such as an individual debtor's
discharge 452 or the restoration of a corporation to viability under Chapter 11,453
it is crucial that the bankruptcy proceeding address as broad a range of the
debtor's financial affairs as feasible, in the absence of a good reason to the
contrary.454 The broad scope of allowable claims and the estimation process
invoke in bankruptcy the aphorism "it's now or never. ,,455
This saIne reasoning supports an expansive view of the time that a claim
comes into existence for bankruptcy purposes. While nonbankruptcy law
determines the question whether a legal entitlement exists, in a collective
proceeding, federal bankruptcy law must determine the time that a claim
arises for bankruptcy purposes. The narrowest approach would limit claims
to those that actually have accrued and on which actions could be brought
under applicable nonbankruptcy law (the so-called "accrued state law claim
test,,).456 The accrued state law clailn test would disqualify from participation
in the bankruptcy process a large range of potential claitnants whose fullblown causes of action might accrue in the future based on the debtor's
prebankruptcy conduct and the potential claimant's prebankruptcy
relationships with the debtor. As already noted, that would unduly weaken
bankruptcy as a collective procedural Inechanisln. 457 The Inost expansive
plausible approach would include as claims any existing or subsequent
obligation or liability arising out of the debtor's prebankruptcy conduct (the
so-called "conduct test,,).458 Applied strictly, however; the conduct test could

452. See infra Part IV.G (discussing the individual debtor's discharge).
453. See supra Part II.D (discussing rationale for bankruptcy law).
454. See TABB, supra note 136, § 7.4, at 486 ("In keeping with the basic policy decision to
resolve all of the debtor's legal obligation in the bankruptcy case, even unliquidated and
contingent claims must be estimated and then dealt with in the bankruptcy proceeding. "). A
reason to deviate from this policy can be found in the exclusion from the definition of "claim"
equitable remedies that cannot be reduced to a quantified right to payment under nonbankruptcy
law. See supra notes 425-31 and accompanying text (discussing discharge).
455. This is not to say that the allowance process as it exists under the Bankruptcy Code
and applicable case law is perfect and could not be refined usefully by a close examination
employing procedure theory's tenets. But my claim here is that procedure theory can
accommodate a procedural structure in bankruptcy generally along the lines of current law.
456. See Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Piper Aircraft Corp., 58
F.3d 1573, 1576 (11 th Cir. 1995) (describing the "accrued state law claim test"). As the court in
Piper explained, the principal case supporting the accrued state law claim test is In re Frenville
Co., 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984). Piper declined to follow Frenville. Piper, 58 F.3d at 1576
n.2.
457. See supra notes 452-55 and accompanying text (discussing discharge).
458. See Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 20 1 (4th Cir. 1988) (declining to follow
Frenville).
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discharge "claims" in which no damages have arisen or have been discovered
until long after the bankruptcy case had been closed. 459 A strict conduct test
could make it impossible to know about, much less administer,'a collective
proceeding inasmuch as holders of many claims could not participate even
though their claims would be discharged. The proper test for when claims
exists must, then, balance the need for a broadly applicable collective
bankruptcy system with the administrative burdens and procedural unfairness
that an overly expansive test would entail.
The court in Epstein v. Official Comn1. of Unsecured Creditors ofPiper
Aircraft Corp. sought to strike such a balance. 46o The Piper court described
the appropriate test-in a products liability context-as follows:
[A]n individual has a § 101 (5) claim against a debtor manufacturer if (i)
events occurring before confirmation create a relationship, such as
contact, exposure, impact, or privity, between the claimant and the
debtor's product; and (ii) the basis for liability is the debtor's prepetition
conduct in designing, manufacturing and selling the allegedly defective
or dangerous product. The debtor's prepetition conduct gives rise to a
claim to be administered in a case only if there is a relationship
established before confirmation between an identifiable claimant or
group of claimants and that prepetition conduct. 461

Procedure theory accepts this sort of balance under the procedural, collective
maximization, and supplemental tests. But procedure theory could accept
any of the three tests or variations on any of theln. 462
C. Equal Treatment for Similarly-Situated Rightsholders:
Pro Rata Sharing

Pro rata sharing in bankruptcy also fits well within the consistency,
collective maxitnization, and supplemental tests for rationalizing current
459. See Lelnelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp.~ 18 F.3d 1268. 1278 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding
that "claim" did not in'clude rights of persons injured two years after Chapter 11 plan was
confirmed and who "were completely unknown and unidentified at the time Winston filed its
petition and whose rights depended entirely on the fortuity of future occurrences"). In Robins,
by contrast, the first symptoms of the injuries giving rise to the claim at issue were observed
after the bankruptcy petition was filed but on the same day. Robins, 839 F.2d at 199.
460. See Piper, 58 F.3d at 1577 (outlining the new Piper test to determine the "scope ofthe
term claim").
461.

Id.

462. A complete analysis of the appropriate test for when a claim comes into existence is
beyond the scope of this paper. For present purposes, the point is that procedure theory could
accommodate a broader concept of a claim than the accrued state law claim test.

A NORMATIVE THEORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW

1023

bankruptcy law with procedure theory. To some extent, it also can be
rationalized under the procedural test. As is well known and commonly
accepted, unsecured creditors share pro rata in distributions' under the
463
Bankruptcy Code.
At first blush, pro rata sharing appears to contradict
nonbankruptcy law and policy. Under nonbankruptcy law, unsecured creditors
have no property interest in their debtor's assets until such tilue as they receive
a judicial lien, normally following judgment and, as to personal property, the
exercise ofjudicial remedies against the debtor's assets. 464 Priorities generally
465
date from the time that the judicial liens are created.
This "first-in-time"
principle has become known as the "race of diligence" or "grab rule. ,,466 As
discussed above in connection with the procedural benefits of a collective
proceeding, through the mechanism of pro rata sharing, bankruptcy stops this
race short and puts on an equal footing all unsecured creditors who have not
467
obtained judicial liens.
On this analysis, then, pro rata sharing trumps
nonbankruptcy law's race of diligence and thereby conflicts with
nonbankruptcy law and its principles. But that analysis and its conclusion are
flawed.
In circumstances where pro rata sharing is feasible, nonbankruptcy law
historically and consistently has eluployed (or, at least, taken into account) pro
. ·1 ar1
·
d persons. 468
· to a 11ocate scarce resources among snUl
rata sh arlng
y-sltuate
Examples are state law assignments for the benefit of creditors,469 creditors'

463. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2) (2000) (providing for payment of unsecured, timely filed
claims); TABB, supra note 136, § 7.7, at 494 (discussing the "equality of distribution" among
general unsecured creditors). The principal exceptions are priority claims under 11 U.S.C.
§ 507(a) (2000). See infra Part IV.! (discussing priority claims and procedure theory). Priority
claimants of a particular class, however, share pro rata when there are insufficient assets to
satisfy all of the priority claims of that class. 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2000).
464. See generally STEFAN A. RIESENFELD, CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS'
PROTECTION 4-239 (4th ed. 1987).
465. See id. at 151-63 (discussing the "Commencement and Priority of Lien").
466. See JACKSON, supra note 70, at 8-9 ("Creditor remedies outside of bankruptcy (as
well as outside other formal, nonbankruptcy collective systems) can be accurately described as a
species of 'grab law,' represented by the key characteristic of first-come, first-served. ").
467. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (discussing the pooling of assets for the
benefit of all creditors).
468. David Carlson has taken note of this circumstance. See Philosophy, supra note 49, at
1355 n.43 ("My interpretation [of equality of creditors] does not go to the phenomenon of
federal bankruptcy, but rather to the idea of creditor equality in any kind of collective
proceeding. ").
469. Although state statutes and interpretations of common-law assignments vary, equality
of treatment of creditors plays an itnportant role in many jurisdictions. See generally
RIESENFELD, supra note 464, at 439-41.
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bills,470 and receiverships, including equity receiverships, under both state and
471
federallaw.
The law of decedents' estates also applies a pro rata sharing
approach to heirs of a particular residual class under state law rules of descent
and distribution,472 as well as to claitns of creditors in the case of insolvent
473
There are other examples of systems for sharing that, while not pro
estates.
rata, are likewise intended to achieve equity, if not strict equality.474
Nonbankruptcy law embraces pro rata sharing, both as a doctrine and as a
normatively superior approach. And for good reason. Equal treatment under
the law has a significant moral claim and acceptance. We expect there to be a
good reason, instrumental or otherwise, for the law to favor one claiInant over
475
another.
Why, then, does nonbankruptcy law opt for a baseline first-in-time
rule embodied in the race of diligence? The answer is not that nonbankruptcy
law favors a first-in-time rule, and it is left to bankruptcy law to straighten

470. See JOHN W. SMITH, THE EQUITABLE REMEDIES OF CREDITORS § 239,247-48 (1899)
(discussing the rule establishing priority for the plaintiff in creditor's bills, specifically its
inapplicability when a junior judgment creditor files a bill on its behalf and on behalf of all
creditors who prove claims); Hutchinson, supra note 93, at 464 (stating that in a creditors' bill
filed against an insolvent debtor, "[e]quity found the alternative to class treatment unacceptable:
giving a court-sanctioned preference to the creditor that won the race to the courthouse").
471. See generally RIESENFELD, supra note 464, at 452-53.
472. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-106 (atnended 1990),8 U.L.A. 282 (1998) (describing
the shares allocated to descendants of the same class).
473. 31 AM. JUR. 2D Executors and Administrators § 833 (2002) ("Claims of creditors of
the same class against a decedent are, in case of insolvency of his estate, to be paid pro rata. ").
474. See, e.g., Jackson & Scott, supra note 74, at 171-74 (discussing the "general average
contribution" doctrine for "common disaster" in admiralty law); Robert J. Aumann & Michael
Maschler, Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problenlfrom the Talmud, 36 J. ECON.
THEORY 195, 195-96 (1985) (describing the Talmudic distributional system under which, if
creditors are owed 100, 200, and 300, and there is (i) 100 to distribute, each creditor receives
33.33, (ii) 200 to distribute, the first creditor receives 50 and the second and third receive 75,
and (iii) 300 to distribute, the first creditor receives 50, the second receives 100, and the third
receives 150).
475. The fact that almost everyone agrees on the baseline principle ofpro rata sharing, even
if their reasons may diverge, provides strong support for the statelnent in the text. Karen Gross
argues for a gloss on the principle, calling for "equal outcomes" generally based on pro rata
treatment but not necessarily "equal treatment." GROSS, supra note 9. at 165-76. Under her
scheme, a creditor who, for example, would lose its hOlne if required to accept a bankruptcy
distribution over an extended period might be paid in full early on. fd. at 165. A "deep pocket"
creditor, on the other hand, could be required to wait for extended payments. fd. at 166. Even
this proposal for a modification of the approach of equal treatlnent evoked strong rebukes. For
thoughtful and persuasive reviews of this aspect of Gross's book, see Alces, supra note 131, at
391-95 (discussing the inappropriateness of laying burdens upon large creditors) and White,
supra note 131, at 442-47 (criticizing the proposal to transfer wealth from wealthy creditors to
poor creditors).
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things out (equity is equality and all that).476 To the contrary, nonbankruptcy
law should not be understood to hold that the first-in-time judicial lienholder is
more deserving than a later-in-time party. It should not be understood to value
more highly the satisfaction of the earlier party's claim. The strong and clear
message of the overarching pro rata sharing rule under nonbankruptcy law
makes this clear.
The answer to the question posed Inust be that the first-in-time principle is
the only feasible approach under nonbankruptcy law in a garden-variety
noncollective proceeding for the judicial enforcelnent of a substantive legal
entitlement. To impose a requirelnent that every judicial enforcement of a
claim necessitates a collective proceeding in order to apply a pro rata sharing
rule would cripple the process. 477 In a legal system that recognizes private
claims and private judicial enforcement, ajudgment creditor Inust have a means
to reach a debtor's assets. And, as explained above, without effective
procedural law-including effective relnedies-substantive legal entitlements
are diminished, if not destroyed. 478 The first-in-time rule for judicial lien
creditors is the only feasible general approach to the procedural enforcement of
legal rights. Moreover, unless a judgment debtor is insolvent, there is a de
facto pro rata sharing because every clailnant ultilnately can be satisfied. When
nonbankruptcy law addresses circumstances in which there are insufficient
assets to satisfy similarly-situated claimants, such as insolvency, it opts for pro
rata sharing. The foregoing demonstrates that one can reconcile bankruptcy
law's pro rata sharing rule with procedure theory under the consistency
479
approach.
Reconciliation also is possible under the collective maxinlization
approach. It is true enough that SOlne individual creditors might recover less
under bankruptcy law's pro rata sharing approach than under the race of
diligence. For example, a creditor might argue that it was in a commanding
position to recover through judicial enforcelnent Inuch earlier than any other
476. See JACKSON, supra note 70~ at 9-19 (discussing the interaction between
nonbankruptcy and bankruptcy law).
477. Short of imposing a collective regime for every judicial enforcement, one might
imagine a scheme involvingjudicial discretion. But that would likely result in a discriminatory
and time-consuming process. I thank Stephen Burbank for making this observation.
478. See supra Part II.B.I (discussing "Bankruptcy as Civil Procedure").
479. Of course, as explained in Part lI.D, one virtue of a collective proceeding is that the
aggregate value produced and preserved Inay be increased. But that factor is simply part of the
case for a collective proceeding and does not necessarily bear on the question of pro rata
sharing. See Philosophy, supra note 49, at 1351 ("Jackson has erroneously connected the
existence of bankruptcy efficiencies with the institution of creditor equality. The two have no
logical connection whatsoever. ").

1026

61 WASH. & LEE L. REV 931 (2004)
48o

creditor.
On the other hand, for a collective group in a collective proceeding,
pro rata sharing can produce the result that a larger number of a debtor's
creditors would receive a larger amount, although pro rata sharing does not
affect the aggregate value available for distribution. 481
Inasmuch as
nonbankruptcy law does not value one clailTI higher than another, viewed in this
light pro rata sharing provides a greater collective benefit.
Pro rata sharing also may be reconciled with procedure theory under the
supplelnental approach. As an important feature ofa collective proceeding, pro
rata sharing supplements nonbankruptcy law's first-in-time system in which
sharing would not be feasible. Stated otherwise, because nonbankruptcy law
reflects no generalized priority rule alnong unsecured creditors, pro rata sharing
supplements nonbankruptcy law by declaring a "tie."
Finally, pro rata sharing possesses further supplelnental and procedural
components. Bankruptcy law must adopt son1e method for applying the value
of the debtor's assets to the interests of rightsholders in order to achieve its
ends. While this explanation does not necessarily point to pro rata sharing, as
opposed to some other allocative Inethod, it does identify a justification for
departing froln (or, more accurately under the supplemental test,
supplementing) nonbankruptcy law.
Under another procedural
conceptualization, the trustee in bankruptcy figuratively obtains a de facto
482
judicial lien for the benefit of all the unsecured creditors.
That
understanding would cOInport with the race of diligence under nonbankruptcy

480. This position might be hard to prove in many cases. See BAIRD, supra note 404, at 81
(liThe rule of pro rata distribution provides a way to approximate the rights of each of the
general creditors. . .. [W]e have the pro rata sharing rule because trying to answer arguments
like these [about likely outcomes of creditor recoveries outside bankruptcy] is more trouble than
it is worth. "). I ignore, for now, the possibility that the judicial lien could be avoided as a
preference. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2000) (providing the trustee's preference avoidance
powers); see also infra Part IV.E.2 (discussing bankruptcy preferences).
481. Consider an example. A debtor has $100 in assets and four creditors, owed
respectively $100, $35, $25, and $10. Assume that outside bankruptcy the $100 creditor could
have reached the assets and satisfied itself in fulL That would result in an average per creditor
percentage of the claims paid of 250/0 ($100 + 0 +0 +0 = $100/4 creditors = 25°A». Applying a
pro rata sharing approach, each claimant would receive a distribution of 59% ($1001$170 =
59%). I do not claim that the distributional features of bankruptcy law alone serve to increase
aggregate value. James Bowers has asserted a very different view. See Murphy's Law, supra
note 77, at 2143-44 (arguing that the distributional scheme affects creditors' losses and that
non-pro rata distributions can reduce losses).
482. See Organizing Principle, supra note 79, at 622-23 (discussing the trustee's "strongarm power" under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1), under which the trustee receives the status of a
hypothetical judicial lien creditor, is an "organizing principle" of bankruptcy law). The "strongarm power" and other avoiding powers of the trustee are addressed in Part IV.E.
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law inasmuch as the judicial lien for the benefit of each creditor would arise
simultaneously upon the bankruptcy filing.

D. Automatic Stay
Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, Section 362 of the Bankruptcy
Code imposes an automatic stay-a statutory injunction, in effect. 483 The
automatic stay plays a "core role" in bankruptcy484 and is "[a]n integral
structural component of a bankruptcy case. ,,485 It stays a host of acts that would
disrupt an orderly bankruptcy process, such as the commencement or
continuation of judicial or other actions or proceedings,486 enforcement of
judgments against the debtor or the debtor's property,487 acts to "obtain
possession of property of the estate, ,,488 and the creation, perfection, or
489
Broad as it is, the automatic
enforcement of liens on property of the estate.
stay is not absolute. Several acts that otherwise would be covered by the stay
490
are excepted.
The automatic stay protects both the debtor and creditors by preserving the
status quo. It supplements and complelnents the rationale for a special wealth
preservation (or enhancing) bankruptcy proceeding. It links property of the
estate, claims against the debtor, and the baseline rule of pro rata sharing. 491 In
general, the automatic stay permits an orderly and properly structured
bankruptcy process to work for the benefit of the debtor and rightsholders and
meets the procedural, collective maxilnization, and supplemental tests.
In proper circumstances, a party in interest Inay obtain relief from the
automatic stay. Consistent with procedure theory, the grounds for relief are
designed to protect the interests of persons other than the debtor, and

483. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000).
484. See BAIRD, supra note 404, at ]69 (stating that the "core rule" is the automatic stay's
ability to "stop individual creditors from taking actions that would thwart the reorganization and
to allow the ,debtor to continue doing business with the rest of the world on ordinary terms").
485. TABB, supra note 136, § 3.1, at ]46.
486. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)( 1) (2000).
487. ] 1 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2) (2000).
488. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2000).
489. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (2000).
490. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (2000) (providing exceptions).
491. See BAIRD, supra note 404, at 169 ("[The automatic stay] stop[s] individual creditors
from taking actions that would thwart the reorganization and to allow the debtor to continue
doing business with the rest of the world on ordinary tenns . . .. Allowing creditors to take
action during the bankruptcy proceeding would undennine bankruptcy's pro rata sharing rule. II).
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appropriately applied, they inhibit the autolnatic stay from a redistributive
492
If improperly applied, however, the stay can conflict with procedure
effect.
theory by impairing a rightsholder' s nonbankruptcy entitlements for the benefit
of other rightsholders or third parties. 493

E. Trustee in Bankruptcy's Avoiding Powers
Several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code confer on the trustee in
bankruptcy the power to "avoid"-set aside-transfers ofproperty made by the
debtor before a bankruptcy filing. An avoidance has the effect of making the
transferred property available as a source of value for distribution to the
debtor's rightsholders. 494 In addition to the avoiding powers of the trustee,
Section 365 ofthe Bankruptcy Code pennits the trustee to "reject"-elect not to
be bound by-executory contracts and leases. 495 That section also permits the
trustee to "assume"-elect to become bound by and preserve-these contracts
and leases, in SOine cases under circumstances in which the debtor could not
preserve the contract or lease under nonbankruptcy law. 496 As with pro rata
sharing, these provisions appear to contravene nonbankruptcy law and to upset
the nonbankruptcy entitlelnents of rightsholders. To a great extent, however,
the avoiding powers actually derive froln and are closely connected to
nonbankruptcy law. This section and the following section explain how
procedure theory can accommodate in principle, ifnot in every detail, both the
avoiding powers and the regitne for rejection and assumption of executory
contracts and leases.

1. Strong-Arm
Under the "strong-arm" avoiding power, the trustee in bankruptcy has the
rights and powers of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor as well as the rights of

492. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(I) (2000) (providing relief to be granted "for cause, including
the lack of adequate protection"); 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (2000) (providing relief to be granted
as to acts against property when "the debtor does not have an equity in the property" and the
"property is not necessary for an effective reorganization").
493. See infra Part IV.J (discussing adequate protection for secured creditors).
494. Property of the estate includes property recovered by the trustee's exercise of its
avoiding powers. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(3) (2000).
495. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000).
496. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)-(b) (2000).
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a bona fide purchaser of real property.497 By exercising the strong-arm power,
the trustee can avoid prebankruptcy transfers, including security interests and
other liens, that would be subject to the rights of ajudiciallien creditor under
applicable nonbankruptcy (normally, state) law. In the most practically
significant context, the trustee may use its strong-ann power to avoid the
creation of a prebankruptcy security interest in personal property or fixtures if
the security interest is unperfected at the time of the bankruptcy filing. 498 The
metaphor ofthe trustee as ajudiciallien creditor for the benefit of the creditors
generally embraces the strong-arm power. 499 It preserves the benefits of
applicable nonbankruptcy law that, absent bankruptcy, would have been
available for unsecured creditors that could have obtained judicial liens against,
for example, collateral subject to an unperfected security interest. In effect, the
strong-arm power interrupts the nonbankruptcy race of diligence, thereby
declaring a "tie" as alnong the unsecured creditors and freezing the status of an
unperfected security interest as such. 500 By this operation, it subordinates the
unperfected security interest to the trustee's rights for the benefit of the
creditors generally, thereby cOlnplelnenting the pro rata sharing rule. 501
By mimicking nonbankruptcy law in the context of a collective
proceeding, the strong-arlTI power is fully consistent with procedure theory.
Because it complements the pro rata sharing rule and gives effect in bankruptcy
to the nonbankruptcy rights of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor, the Strongarm power may be reconciled with procedure theory on essentially the same
. Ie app I'lcabl e to pro rata sh arlng.
. 502
ratlona
497. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)( 1) (2000) (granting the trustee the powers of a hypothetical
judicial lien creditor); 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (2000) (granting the trustee the powers of a "bona
fide purchaser of real property").
498. See U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2) (1999) (providing that an unperfected security interest in
personal property or fixtures is subordinate to a lien creditor unless one of the conditions
specified in U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3) is satisfied, such as a debtor authenticating a security
agreement, and a financing statement has been filed)~ U.C.C. § 9-1 02(a)(52) ( 1999) (defining
"lien creditor").
499. See supra note 485 and accompanying text (discussing this metaphor in the context of
a procedural justification for pro rata sharing).
500. See TABB, supra note 136, § 6.5, at 338-39 (1997) (discussing the effect of the strongarm power on unsecured creditors).
501. Indeed, Carlson identifies the trustee's strong-arm power as the organizing principle
of bankruptcy. Organizing Principle, supra note 79, at 622-23. Carlson also points out that
notwithstanding the avoidance paradigln, in actuality unperfected security interests are merely
subordinated to the extent necessary to satisfy unsecured creditors, although it is avoided once
the collateral is disposed of by the trustee. See id. at 559-62 ("[S]ubordination is avoidance,
and avoidance is subordination. ").
502. See supra Part IV.C (discussing pro rata sharing); see also Policy, supra note 40, at
n.48 (discussing the strong-arm power and pro rata sharing). The Policy text states:
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2. Preferences

The power ofthe trustee in bankruptcy to avoid preferences is,quite unlike
the trustee's strong-ann power. In particular, it does not derive generally from
503
nonbankruptcy law.
The trustee-as-judicial-lienholder metaphor does not
hold. Indeed, as Professor Carlson has put it, voidable preference law "strikes at
transactions that are perfectly legal and even admirable at state law. Voidable
preference law undoes payment and security of debt. ,,504 Following is a
description ofthe generally proffered justifications for voidable preference law,
followed in turn by an explanation of how preference law generally comports
with procedure theory.
Voidable preference law is codified in Bankruptcy Code Section 547. 505 It
provides for the avoidance of certain prebankruptcy transfers of the debtor's
property "to or for the benefit of a creditor" or "on account of an antecedent
debt. ,,506 A transfer is voidable only if it is lnade while the debtor is insolvent
and within ninety days before the date that the debtor's bankruptcy petition is
507
filed.
In addition, to be voidable a transfer lnust allow the creditor to obtain
more than it would have obtained in a Chapter 7 liquidation of the debtor had
An involuntary bankruptcy is conceptually very much like a collective judicial lien,
in that the bankruptcy court takes jurisdiction over the debtor's property for the
purpose of using it to satisfy claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (addressing filing of
involuntary cases). Giving the trustee this same status in a voluntary case
eliminates any costly manipulation and perverse incentives concerning the filing of
a voluntary as opposed to an involuntary case. This metaphor fits less comfortably
with the trustee's "strong-arm" power for transfers of real propel1y, as to which the
trustee has the rights of a hypothetical bona fide purchaser, not merely the rights of
ajudiciallien creditor. Id. at § 544(a)(3). The real-property "strong-arm" power is
best viewed as an anti-secret lien policy that is more exacting than state law. See
THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 76 & n.13
(1986) (explaining that drafters of Bankruptcy Code "appear to have concluded that
the trustee's strong-arm power principally addressed the evil of property interests
with ostensible ownership problems that remained despite available curative
measures under nonbankruptcy law").

Id.
503.

Some states also have preference laws, however. See, e.g., 39 PA. CONS. STAT ANN.

§ 151 (West 1954) (addressing "preferences inuring to the benefit of all creditors").

504. Crucible, supra note 268, at 213.
505. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2000) (establishing the trustee's preference avoidance powers).
For a classic discussion, see generally Vern Countryman, The Concept ofa Voidable Preference
in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713 (1985).
506. 11 U. S. C. § 547(b)( 1)-(2) (2000).
507. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3)-(4)(A) (2000). If the creditor was an insider, avoidable
transfers include those made "between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of
the petition." 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (2000).
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the transfer not been made and had the creditor received its distribution in the
Chapter 7 proceeding. 508
Payment of a preexisting debt is a classic example of an avoidable
preference. Assume that a creditor is owed $100 by an insolvent debtor and
that in a Chapter 7 liquidation of the debtor the creditor would receive a
distribution equal to 100/0 of its unsecured claim or ten dollars. If the debtor
were to make a paylnent to the creditor, whether partial or in full, the creditor
would receive payment on a dollar-for-dollar basis to the extent ofthe payment
made, leaving the remaining balance (if any) on the debt as an unsecured claim
in a Chapter 7 liquidation. Paylnent of any portion of the debt on a dollar-fordollar basis necessarily gives the creditor more than it would obtain
(hypothetically, 100/0) in the debtor's Chapter 7 liquidation. In fact, in any case
in which the creditor would not receive 1000/0 of its claim in the Chapter 7, any
prepetition payment necessarily allows the creditor to iJnprove its position over
that which the creditor would obtain in the debtor's Chapter 7. Inasmuch as
providing the creditor with collateral for an antecedent debt before the petition
is filed also would allow the creditor to obtain the collateral value on a dollarfor-dollar basis in the Chapter 7, a prepetition grant of collateral for antecedent
debts also can be avoided under Section 547.
The flip side of voidable preference law is the effect of a prepetition
transfer on the debtor's other, nonpreferred creditors. To the extent that the
debtor's assets are depleted before the bankruptcy petition is filed to satisfy a
creditor's debt, they are unavailable in the Chapter 7 liquidation to satisfy a
portion of the other creditors' clailns. Hence, the creditor that benefits from the
prepetition transfer is said to have been preferred to the detriment of the other
creditors. Voidable preference law, then, reverses the preference and brings the
assets back into the debtor's estate for the benefit of all creditors, who will
share pro rata in the recovered assets.
There are two principal accounts for the purpose of voidable preference
law. The first is deterrence. Because a creditor tnay not be able to retain a
payment made or collateral granted if the debtor files a bankruptcy petition
within ninety days, the creditor tnay be deterred [rotn grabbing the debtor's
assets on the eve of bankruptcy. 509 While this vision may be plausible in some
contexts, most agree that deterrence is, at best, an incolnplete explanation and
justification. For example, many creditors no doubt strongly encourage a

508.
509.

11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (2000).
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 177 (1977) (stating that voidable preference law

might discourage creditors "fronl racing to the courthouse to dismember the debtor during his
slide into bankruptcy").
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payment sooner rather than later in the hopes that the ninety-day period will
elapse before a bankruptcy petition is filed. 5lO
The other justification is that voidable preference law promotes a policy of
equality among creditors. "Second, and more important [than deterrence], the
preference provisions facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of
distribution among creditors of the debtor. ,,511 By forcing the transferee to
regurgitate the payment (or collateral) to the end that the debt becomes once
again unpaid (or unsecured), voidable preference law steps in to set things as
they were when it has failed as a deterrent. To the extent that equality is the
principal, or a principal, goal of voidable preference law, of course, the
deterrence function (when effective) directly serves the equality policy by
causing the assets to relnain in place.
In adopting the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, Congress appeared to favor the
policy of equality over that of deterrence, as suggested by the language quoted
above from the House Report. An additional indication was the rejection by
Congress ofthe element ofthe transferee's knowledge or notice of insolvency,
which featured in the avoidability of preferences under the Bankruptcy ACt. 512
The transferee's state of Inind would be significant only if the goal is
deterrence-one wholly ignorant of the debtor's financial distress would not be
motivated to "grab" assets on the "eve of bankruptcy. ,,5 13 Professor Tabb has
argued, however, that one of the exceptions to voidability delnonstrates that
preference law is not primarily worried about equality. Because Section
547(c)(2) excepts from avoidance ordinary course payments of debts incurred
in the ordinary course, leaving only "unusual" payments to be avoided, he
believes that this exception "eviscerates equality. ,,514 In effect, the ordinary
course exception "resurrected the saIne core principal of culpability" that was
found in the Bankruptcy Act's "reasonable cause to believe" test. 515 Professor
Tabb may overstate the case inasInuch as Inany paylnents Inade shortly before a
bankruptcy filing will not find cover under the ordinary course exception.
Moreover, transfers such as security interests and other liens will remain

510.

For a brief critique of the deterrence rationale for voidable preference law, see

Crucible, supra note 268, at 215-16 (critiquing the deterrence rationale).
511. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 177-78 (1977).
512. Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 696, § 60(b), 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978)
(voidability required proof that the transferee had "reasonable cause to believe the debtor was
insolvent at the time of such transfer").
513. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 178 (1977) ("[A] creditor's state of mind has nothing
whatsoever to do with the policy of equality of distribution .... I').
514. TABB, supra note 136, § 6.18, at 383.
515. Jd.
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516

vulnerable.
But he surely is correct that the equality goal has not entirely
squeezed out the culpability principle and the deterrence goal. 51 ?
Focusing on the exceptions in Section 547(c) also is useful in"considering
voidable preference law in the context of procedure theory. Recall that
voidable preference law addresses transfers that are valid under nonbankruptcy
law as between the transferor and transferee and, in general, as against third
parties. These transfers are not necessarily tainted under nonbankruptcy law by
wrongful intent or insufficient value as are transfers avoidable under fraudulent
transfer law. Voidable preference law, however, can be reconciled with
procedure theory under the same analysis applicable to pro rata sharing in a
518
collective proceeding.
To the extent that it promotes equality it furthers the
goal of pro rata sharing, and, as noted above, to the extent that it effectively
promotes deterrence, that also promotes equality and pro rata sharing. The
Section 547(c) exceptions, however, recognize that preference law will not
disrupt all transfers that are valid under nonbankruptcy law and that otherwise
meet the elements of voidability under Section 547(b). Drawing on Professor
Tabb's views of the impact of Section 547(c)(2), procedure theory can be
rationalized best with the exceptions to avoidance by viewing them as
establishing a set of nonculpability tests. When the excepted transfers are
viewed as examples and proxies for circulnstances in which any gun-jumping
lnanipulation of the bankruptcy process would be unlikely, excepting these
transfers froln avoidance and respecting the transfers, valid under
nonbankruptcy law, recognizes the appropriate domain for a bankruptcy-only
voidability rule in the context of voidable preference law. 519 Under this
516. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(A) (2000) (defining preferences to include transfers made "in
payment of a debt") (emphasis added).
517. As Carlson has pointed out, "[t]he complete theory of voidable preferences has yet to
be articulated, and even the most sophisticated accounts of it cannot help but fall into
contradiction." Crucible, supra note 268, at 213. Carlson also argues that manipulating the
timing of a transfer of a security interest for purposes of voidable preference law joins the
strong-arm power in punishing secret liens. Id. at 218. He further notes that this function also
served the interests of the "nation-bUilding" and nationalislTI interests by ensuring that secret,
local liens would not prevail over national creditors who could not discover the liens. Id. at
217-18.
518. See supra Part IV.C (discussing pro rata sharing).
519. One might rationalize the exceptions as accolTImodations to circumstances in which
the detrimental effects of avoidance, instrumental and otherWise, would outweigh the benefits of
equality and pro rata sharing. For example, one could argue that the "ordinary course"
exception in § 547(c)(2) encourages repose and finality in commercial transactions. While that
is a perfectly plausible analysis, procedure theory would view it as just another example of
offensive social engineering in the Bankruptcy Code. Focusing on deterring and rectifying
prebankruptcy manipulations that impede equality, however, focuses on a goal of bankruptcy
law.
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nonculpability standard, then, equality would give way to legitimate
prebankruptcy transfers that do not jeopardize the bankruptcy process. It
follows that procedure theory would be served best by a broad and general
exception for routine, ordinary transfers that would not be limited (as is Section
547(c)(2)) to payments alone. 52o

3. Fraudulent Transfers
Another important avoiding power is the trustee's power to avoid
fraudulent transfers. But fraudulent transfers are avoidable outside bankruptcy
as well. An avoidable fraudulent transfer Inay involve a debtor's actual intent
to defraud its creditors by attempting to put assets out of the creditors' reach. 521
Alternatively, while "innocent," a transfer nonetheless may amount to
constructive fraud because the debtor receives nothing in exchange for a
transfer of assets or receives less than the value of the assets. 522 In each case,
were the transfers to stand, the transferred assets would be unavailable for the
satisfaction of creditor claitns and no assets--or assets ofa lower value-would
remain.
Under Bankruptcy Code Section 548, the trustee can avoid certain
transfers made within one year before the date on which a bankruptcy petition
is filed. 523 Although Section 548 is a federal rule applicable only in bankruptcy,
it embodies longstanding principles of non bankruptcy fraudulent transfer
law. 524 For this reason, Section 548 generally may be squared with procedure
theory under the consistency test. Like the strong-arm power, Section 548 also
complements pro rata sharing. In effect, it puts the value of assets back in the
520. Once again, as a normative theory procedure theory can offer guidance such as that in
the text but cannot provide specific instructions on detailed questions, such as whether the
preference reachback periods (ninety days, in most cases, and up to one year, in the case of
insider transferees) are optimal. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (2000) (providing the prebankruptcy
time periods for transfers made that trustee may avoid).
521. See, e.g., U.F.T.A. § 4(a)(1), 7AlJ.L.A.301 (1999) (concemingthedebtor's "intent to
hinder, delay or defraud" any creditors).
522. See, e.g., U.F.T.A. §§ 4(a)(2), 5(a), 7A U.L.A. 301-05 (1999) (providing that a
transfer may be fraudulent "if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation ... without
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange").
523. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2000).
524. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2000) (concerning actual fraud) and 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(2) (2000) (concerning constructive fraud), with UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
ACT §§ 7, 7A U.L.A. 113 (1999) (concerning actual fraud), and 4-6, 7A U.L.A. 67,105,110
(1999) (concerning constructive fraud), and U.F.T.A. §§ 4(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 301 (1999)
(concerning actual fraud), and 4(a)(2), 5(a), 7A U.L.A. 301, 330 (1999) (concerning
constructive fraud).
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debtor's estate that were transferred wrongfully or to the extent that insufficient
value was received by the debtor in exchange for the transfer. It mimics the
rights of creditors to avoid fraudulent transfers under nonbankruptcy law and
preserves the benefits for the debtor's creditors generally, following the
collective judicial lien paradigm. 525
In general, these observations concerning Section 548 apply as well to the
avoidance of fraudulent transfers under Bankruptcy Code Section 544(b)(1),
which empowers the trustee to avoid a transfer of property by the debtor which
"is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim. ,,526
Unlike Section 544(a)(1), under which the trustee receives the powers of a
hypothetical judgment lien creditor, Section 544(b)( 1) permits the trustee to
assert the avoidance rights only of an actual creditor of the debtor. 527 Like
Section 544(a)(1), however, under Section 544(b)(1) the trustee lnust find the
substance of its avoidance power under "applicable law"-nonbankruptcy
528
law.
From the foregoing it appears that one can reconcile avoidance of
fraudulent transfers with procedure theory. Not only are the application of
Bankruptcy Code Sections 544(b) and 548 generally consistent with
nonbankruptcy law, but they fit the model of trustee as judicial lienholder for
the benefit of all creditors. They thereby cOlnplelnent the goal of pro rata
sharing and, as with the strong-arm power, can be reconciled with procedure
theory on the same basis. Nonetheless, in SOlne respects the application of
these sections does not comport with procedure theory. Accordingly, procedure
theory calls for modifications.

525. See U.F.T.A. § 4, 7A U.L.A. 301-36 (1999) (concerning transfers avoidable by
creditors whose claims arose before or after the transfer)~ U.F.T.A. § 5, 7A U.L.A. 301-36
(1999) (concerning transfers avoidable by creditors whose claims arose before the transfer).
Carlson conceptualizes fraudulent transfer avoidance as a part of the strong-arm organizing
principle's model of the trustee holding a judicial lien for the benefit of all creditors. See
Organizing Principle, supra note 79, at 563-73 (discussing fraudulent conveyances).
526. II U.S.C. § 544(b)(I) (2000). Although Section 544(b)(I) applies to any transfer that
is voidable under applicable (usually, state) law, its principal applicability is in the context of
fraudulent transfer law. Another nonbankruptcy law permitting avoidance by an unsecured
creditor relates to a "sale or return" of goods. See U.C.C. § 2-326(2) (1999) (defining "sale on
approval" and "sale on return"); see also TABB, supra note 136, § 6.5, at 344 (discussing other
state laws available to the trustee in bankruptcy).
527. TABB, supra note 136, § 6.5, at 343.
528. Assuming the trustee can identify an actual creditor that could set aside a transaction
under applicable nonbankruptcy law, it tnay allow the trustee to avoid transfers that could not be
avoided under Section 548. State fraudulent transfer statutes of limitation generally are longer
than the one-year reachback of Section 548. See id. § 6.5, at 345-46 (discussing the reachback
time period of fraudulent transfer laws).
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As noted above, both the Section 544(a)(1) strong-arm power and the
derivative (from nonbankruptcy law) power of the trustee under Section
544(b)(1) to avoid transfers that an actual creditor could avoid each depends on
substantive nonbankruptcy priority rules. These sections adapt those rules to
bankruptcy's collective proceeding. Section 548, however, is quite different in
concept. Although its substantive provisions are quite similar to widely
accepted nonbankruptcy systems of fraudulent transfer law, Section 548 is,
nonetheless, a freestanding, bankruptcy-only rule. Its provisions can apply to
529
override some transfers that would be unassailable under nonbankruptcy law.
That is to say, in some cases nonbankruptcy law commands that a
prebankruptcy transfer must stand, and Section 548 cOlnmands that it must
fall. 530 To that extent, Section 548 offends procedure theory.531
Granted, it is entirely possible that Section 548 provides a superior
framework for fraudulent transfer law. One also can iInagine collateral benefits
from a modern, well-drafted, nationally applicable, uniform standard. By virtue
of Section 544(b) and varying fraudulent transfer regin1es under nonbankruptcy
law, Section 548, however, does not impose unifonnity; it creates a separate
stand-alone regime that deviates from nonbankruptcy law. Moreover, were
Congress actually to seek a unifonn and well-designed fraudulent transfer
regime, it could enact a single federal fraudulent transfer statute that would
apply generally, not solely in bankruptcy.532
For similar reasons, the operation of Section 544(b) also offends
procedure theory. To the extent that a transfer is avoidable only in part under
529. For example, the applicable state law fraudulent transfer statute might be narrower in
scope than Section 548.
530. Section 548 is agnostic as to whether a transfer is avoidable under applicable law by a
creditor whose claim arose after the transfer (a "future creditor") or would be avoidable only by
a creditor whose claim existed at the time the transfer was made (an "existing creditor").
Consequently, the operation of Section 548 can serve to transfer wealth capturable by existing
creditors to future creditors. As explained below,Section 544(b), as applied by the courts, can
achieve the same result.
531. Perhaps the best defense of Section 548 against procedure theory is that it
complements pro rata sharing and the bankruptcy process. When a debtor hides assets or gives
them away, they no longer would be available for the satisfaction of creditors' claims absent a
means to recover them for the benefit of all creditors. When this occurs temporally sufficiently
close to the time of a bankruptcy filing, it disrupts bankruptcy's goal of an orderly and fair
process to vindicate the rights of rightsholders. This argument was developed in the discussion
of voidable preferences. See supra Part IV.E.2 (discussing preferences).
532. This theory assumes that Congress has the power to enact generally applicable
fraudulent transfer legislation notwithstanding recent Suprelne Court decisions narrowing the
scope of its power under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
567-68 (1995) (holding that Congress does not have the authority under the Commerce Clause
to ban weapons from school zones).
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nonbankruptcy law, one would think that the derivative power of the trustee
under Section 544(b) would be avoidance only to the extent avoidable under
nonbankruptcy law-limited to the aggregate amount of the claimS held by the
actual creditors in whose shoes the trustee stands. Similarly, one would expect
that if the transfer were avoidable under nonbankruptcy law only by certain
creditors and not by others, that the value captured by the trustee under Section
544(b) would be distributed only to the actual creditors who possessed the
nonbankruptcy avoidance rights. But the famous case of Moore v. Bay533
teaches otherwise.
As Moore is generally understood and applied, the trustee in bankruptcy
can avoid an entire transfer; the avoidance is not litnited to the extent to which
the actual creditor or creditors in whose shoes the trustee stands could have
534
avoided the transfer.
For exalnple, if property worth $100 is transferred and
the creditors eligible to avoid the transfer under nonbankruptcy are owed only
$50 in the aggregate, outside bankruptcy the transfer could be avoided only to
the extent of $50. 535 But under Section 544(b)(1), interpreted according to
Moore, the trustee could avoid the entire $100 transfer-a result that punishes
the transferee and transfers the additional $50 of value from the transferee to
the debtor's creditors. 536 Similarly, outside of bankruptcy only the creditors in
the class entitled to avoid the transfer could share in the value ofthe transferred
asset. Under the Moore analysis of Section 544(b)(I), however, all of the
unsecured creditors will share the $100 in reclaimed value, thereby transferring
wealth from the entitled-to-avoid class to the other unsecured creditors. 537
Clearly, the application of Section 544(b)(1) under Moore contravenes
procedure theory.

533.

Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4, 5 (1931).

See TABB, supra note 136, § 6.6, at 347 (discussing Moore).
See, e.g., U.F.T.A. § 7(a), 7A U.L.A. 339 (1999) (stating that "creditor ... may
obtain ... avoidance of the transfer ... to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim")
534.
535.

(emphasis added).
536. Moore addressed the predecessor to § 544(b)(1), Bankruptcy Act § 67(d). As
Professor Tabb has declared: "[T]he trustee is given a license by § 544(b)[( 1)] to rob Peter (X)
[the transferee in his example] to pay Paul (general creditors)." TABB, supra note 136, § 6.6, at
348.
537. See TABB, supra note 136, § 6.6, at 347-48 (providing an example of the application
of the result in Moore). Arguably, one might rationalize this aspect of the Moore doctrine with
procedure theory as an example of nonbankruptcy entitlements that must give way to the
collective norm in bankruptcy and as an analogy to pro rata sharing. I would be unconvinced.
At best, this feature of the doctrine lTIay be only slightly less offensive than permitting recovery
of the entire transfer from the transferee.
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F. Assumption and Rejection ofExecutory Contracts and Leases

Whether considered against the backdrop of procedure theory, as a
doctrinal matter alone, or froln any other perspective, the treatment ofexecutory
contracts and leases under the intricate provisions of Bankruptcy Code Section
365 is one of the most bewildering artifacts of bankruptcy law. Conflicting
case law and a legacy of wrongheaded, poorly reasoned judicial decisions have
compounded the confusion. An article of broad scope such as this one can only
hope to address the most basic features of this body of law. The following
discussion considers the extent to which these basic features of Section 365
conform to the procedure theory of bankruptcy law.
For present purposes, it is sufficient to adopt the standard conception ofan
"executory contract" developed by Professor Countrylnan; a contract as to
which both the debtor's and the other party's obligations are "so far
unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute
a material breach excusing the performance of the other.,,538 A typical example
is a contract for the sale of goods-say, apples-under which the seller has not
yet delivered the goods, and the buyer has not yet paid. The debtor in a
bankruptcy case could, of course, be either the seller or the buyer. For now,
assume that the debtor is the buyer. If the contract is a burdensome one, say,
because the contract price of the apples is $10 per bushel but the market price
is $8, the debtor would prefer to be relieved of the contract. Then it could buy
the apples in the market at a lower price. It is true that if the debtor is in breach
of the contract it must answer in dalnages, which outside bankruptcy likely
would consume the benefits of the opportunity to buy at a lower market price
following the buyer's breach. 539 But, assuming the debtor is insolvent, in
bankruptcy the debtor would only be required to satisfy the seller's pro rata
share of the dalnage claim. In this example, the debtor's trustee likely would
seek to "reject" the contract. Now assume that the contract and market prices
are reversed-the contract price is $8, and the market price is $10. Under these
circumstances, the trustee likely will wish to "assulne" the contract. By doing
so, it can buy at the below-Inarket contract price of $8, thus preserving for the
estate the value of the favorable contract.

538. Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part f, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439,
460 (1973).
539. See U.C.C. § 2-708(1) (1999) ("[M]easure of datnages for non-acceptance or
repudiation by the buyer is the difference between the market price at the time and place for
tender and the unpaid contract price .... ").
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Under Section 365(a), subject to court approval, the trustee "may assume
or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease ofthe debtor. ,,540 Following
assumption, the trustee also could seek to assign the contract to a third party.541
Or, at least for some period of time, the trustee might do nothing. 542

1. Rejection
If the trustee rejects the contract, as in the first variation of the example,
the rejection "constitutes a breach" that is given effect as if it occurred
"immediately before the date of the filing of the petition. ,,543 This deemed
prebankruptcy breach, then, entitles the other party to an "allowed" claim,
thereby entitling it to a pro rata distribution along with the other unsecured
544
creditors.
This structure fits well with procedure theory. As under
nonbankruptcy law, a party to a contract may repudiate it, and the resulting
breach will trigger the other party's reluedies-·damages, in the example. Ifthe
other party in our example, the seller, was entitled toforce the trustee to comply
with the contract following bankruptcy, by taking and paying for the apples at
the $10 above-market contract price, then the seller would be fully satisfied
because it would receive the entire benefit of its bargain to the detriment of the
other creditors. The statutory structure for rejection, then, ensures that a party
to an executory contract will not receive a windfallluerely because the debtor
was not in default when the bankruptcy petition was filed.
But what treatment does Section 365 afford equitable remedies? These
might include a right to an injunction to enforce a debtor's covenant not to
compete in connection with a rejected franchise agreelnent or a right of a buyer
to specific performance of a contract to buy unique goods from the debtor
under a rejected contract for sale. In short, nothing of general applicability in
Section 365 appears to provide differing treahnent based on whether the other
party to an executory contract is entitled to equitable relief or solely money
damages. Instead, the proper question is whether the rejection gives rise to a

540. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000). For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that for the
most part leases are special types of executory contracts.
541. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(f) (2000) (providing the trustee may assign an executory contract
or lease notwithstanding a provision to the contrary)~ see also infra notes 566-72 and
accompanying text (discussing assignnlent).
542. See infra notes 573-74 and accompanying text (discussing time limitations of court
orders).
543. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1) (2000).
544. 11 U.S.C. § 502(g) (2000).
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"claim. ,,545 If the equitable remedy gives rise to a right to payment, then it is a
"claim.,,546 As among the holders of unsecured claims, bankruptcy law's
equality policy dictates that the holder of a clailn arising out of an equitable
remedy, as with the holder of any other unsecured claim, should receive a pro
547
rata distribution and should not have the equitable relnedy actually imposed.
Moreover, because the equitable remedy gives rise to a claim, it can be
548
discharged.
This treatment of claims arising out of equitable remedies does
not offend procedure theory.549 It lnerely applies the policy of equality as
550
The chief point for
among money claimants as reflected by pro rata sharing.
present purposes is that detennining whether a breach arising out ofa rejection
of an executory contract creates a "claitn" depends on an analysis of
551
nonbankruptcy law.
Rejection of an executory contract or lease gives rise to a "breach," but
procedure theory dictates that rejection should not deprive the nondebtor other
party of a property interest that it may have received pursuant to the contract or
lease. Procedure theory views setting aside prebankruptcy transfers ofproperty
as the domain of the trustee's avoiding powers. 552 For example, a lessee of
553
personal property acquires a property interest in the leased goods.
Rejection
ofthe lease by the debtor-lessor would constitute a breach but, under procedure
theory, should not deprive the lessee of its property rights, including possession
554
and use of the goods, so long as it complies with the terms of the lease.
Nonetheless, SOlne courts have held, contrary to procedure theory's approach,

545. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B) (2000) (defining a "clain1" that arises out of an equitable
remedy).
546. TABB, supra note 136, § 8.8, at 595.
547. Id. (discussing circumstances when an equitable remedy is a claim).
548. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (2000) (providing for discharge of prebankruptcy debts
and claims)~ see also infra Part IV.G (discussing discharge and procedure theory).
549. See supra notes 420-31 and accompanying text (discussing equitable remedies as
claims and as nonclaim legal entitlements).
550. See supra Part IV.E (discussing the trustee's avoiding powers).
551. See § 11 U.S.C. 502(g) (2000) ("A clain1 arising from the rejection ... shall be
allowed .... ") (emphasis added). In some cases, however, the Bankruptcy Code's treatment of
claims does not comport with procedure theory. See supra notes 439-45 and accompanying
text (discussing disallowance of claitns for unmatured interest and caps on certain damage
claims).
552. See supra Part IV.E (discussing the trustee's avoiding powers).
553. See D.C.C. § 2A-l 03( 1)(m) (1999) (defining "leasehold interest" as lessee's or
lessor's interest under a leasing contract); U.C.C. § 1-201 (b)(29) (1999) (including "taking
by ... lease" as a type of "purchase" that "creat[es] an interest in property").
554. See TASS, supra note 136, § 8.8, at 592-95 (discussing the example of a lease).
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that rejection effects a termination or rescission and that the other party to a
555
contract or lease is entitled only to damages arising out of a breach.

2. Assumption

A debtor's assumption of an executory contract or lease binds the estate to
perform the contract in full and entitles the estate to the benefits of the
contract. 556 An assumption under Section 365 generally respects the
nonbankruptcy entitlements of the nondebtor party. Consequently, it is the
quintessential embodiment of procedure theory's goals. And inasmuch as the
benefits will inure to the debtor's rightsholders generally, it also is consistent
with the equality policy of pro rata sharing. Nonetheless, the assumption
scheme of Section 365 overrides some aspects of a nondebtor party's
nonbankruptcy legal entitlements. The following discussion tests these features
against procedure theory.
If no default exists under an executory contract, then the nondebtor party
has no basis to cOluplain that an aSSll111ption interferes with its nonbankruptcy
entitlements. But if a default exists, the nondebtor party may have reason to
object. Section 365(b)( 1) requires the trustee, as a condition precedent to an
assumption, to cure all defaults and compensate the nondebtor party for actual
pecuniary losses arising out of the default. 557 Alternatively, the trustee may
"provide adequate assurance" of a prompt cure and compensation for losses. In
addition, the trustee must provide "adequate assurance of future
performance. ,,558 On one view, these protections benefit the nondebtor party,
who might not wish to be held to the contract except with a reasonable
555. Id. For this reason Professor Tabb harshly criticizes Lubrizol Enter., Inc. v. Richmond
Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986), and
its ilk. T ABB, supra note 136, § 8.8, at 592-95 (discussing the effects of termination or
recession). He also points out that special provisions in Section 365 which protect the property
rights of nondebtor parties to certain types of contracts and leases could erroneously be read to
create a negative inference that where such protections are not explicit in the statute, a party to a
contract or lease would lose its property rights upon rejection. Id. § 8.9, at 596.
See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (2000) (regarding real property leases and timeshare contracts
when debtor is lessor or seller)~ 11 U.S.C. § 365(j) (2000) (regarding real property and
timeshare sale contracts when debtor is vendor); 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2000) (regarding license of
intellectual property when debtor is licensor). In support of the view that rejection does
eliminate any property interest acquired by the nondebtor other party to a contract or lease, see
generally Laura B. Bartell, Revisiting Rejection: Secured Party Interests in Leases and
Executory Contracts, 103 DICK. L. REV. 497, 504, 514, 526-43 (1999).
556. See T ABB, supra note 136, § 8.13, at 609-11 (discussing the effects of assumption).
557. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(I)(A)-(B) (2000).
558. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(C) (2000).
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expectation that the future will not hold additional defaults or nonperformance.
On the other hand, what is implicit in this structure is the nondebtor party's
inability to exercise any otherwise applicable right to terlninate ot cancel the
contract pursuant to its terms, applicable law, or both. 559 The goal of
assumption nonetheless is to make the nondebtor party whole and to put it in as
good a position as if no default ever occurred. The Inandatory cure rights for
the trustee represent a rational and reasonable procedure for ensuring respect of
the nondebtor party's nonbankruptcy entitlements, the essential goal of
procedure theory, while perlnitting the trustee to preserve a valuable asset. 560
Of course, had the nondebtor party exercised a right to terminate or cancel
before the filing ofthe bankruptcy petition, there would be no contract left to be
assumed. 561
Ironically, procedure theory does find fault with the scheme for
assumption in Section 365 when the contract of lease is not in default. In that
situation, the trustee is entitled to assume without providing adequate assurance
of future performance even if those assurances would be required under
nonbankruptcy law. 562
There is another important exception to the requirement that the trustee
cure defaults (or provide reasonable assurance of a prolnpt cure) as a condition
of assumption. The trustee need not cure defaults arising from a breach relating
to the debtor's insolvency or financial condition, the COlnmencement of a
bankruptcy case, or the prepetition appointlnent of or taking possession by a
trustee or custodian. These so called "ipso facto" or "bankruptcy" defaults
generally permit the nondebtor party to tenninate the contract or lease or
provide for automatic tennination. 563 Before this exception was built into
559. The Bankruptcy Code does not speak explicitly to such a postpetition termination, but
most courts have held it unavailable. See generally Douglas W. Bordewiek, The Postpetition,
Pre-Rejection, Pre-Assumption Status ofan Executory Contract, 59 AM. BANKR. LJ. 197,20213 (1985). Plank argues that prohibiting a termination on a basis other than an ipso facto
provision is unconstitutional. Federalism, supra note 136, at 1122.
560. The inherent delay involved in the rejection-assumption process is addressed below.
See infra notes 573-74 and accompanying text (arguing that a reasonable delay and the "limbo"
period before rejection or assumption are in general necessary procedural aspects of the
bankruptcy system, analogous to the automatic stay).
561. See TABB, supra note 136, § 8.14, at 611 (stating that a contract must exist at the time
of bankruptcy).
562. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)( 1)(C) (2000) (providing requirement of adequate assurance of
future performance required only if there has been a default). Plank argues that this defect
raises a constitutional issue. Federalism, supra note 136, at 1122-23.
563. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2) (2000). The trustee also is not required to cure a default based
on a "penalty rate or provision relating to a default arising from any failure by the debtor to
perform nonmonetary obligations." 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2)(D) (2000).
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Section 365, when the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, courts generally
enforced these defaults under the Bankruptcy Act, resulting in the
unavailability for assulnption of many otherwise valuable contracts and leases.
By reading these ipso facto provisions out of the parties' bargain, this
exception to the cure-of-default requirement clearly tramples on the
nonbankruptcy entitlements of the nondebtor party. Can it be reconciled with
procedure theory? Perhaps it can, based on reasoning similar to that applied to
the cure-of-default requirement. Because bankruptcy is a procedural system
designed to maxiInize the recoveries and benefits for rightsholders, preserving
valuable assets such as executory contracts ~nd leases furthers that goal.
Inasmuch as ipso facto defaults and terminations, if effective in bankruptcy,
would be common, if not ubiquitous, overriding these clauses provides
substantial assistance in preserving this value. While ordinarily putting one
person's (the nondebtor party's, here) entitlements at risk to benefit others
(unsecured creditors and other rightsholders, here) offends procedure theory, in
the assumption context it may not. In that context, the protective provisions"adequate assurance"-are such that the nondebtor party can expect to receive
all of the benefits that it would have received outside bankruptcy and absent
564
any default. This rationalization is roughly analogous to procedure theory's
consistency with "adequate protection" in the context of a debtor's use of
property.565 In the end, this conclusion is sOlnewhat tentative. Ifnot offended,
procedure theory is at least annoyed that Section 365 overrides ipso facto
provisions to which parties have agreed.

564. The stated conclusion relies heavily on the "adequate assurance" of cure,
compensation, and future performance required by Section 365(b)(I). 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(I)
(2000). As already noted, if no default has occurred, the absence of a duty to provide adequate
assurance of future performance otherwise required under nonbankruptcy law does offend
procedure theory. If, in any case, cure, compensation, or future performance does not in fact
occur then the assurance provided necessarily was not adequate. One would hope that any
judges who habitually determine to be adequate what turns out to be inadequate would be
sanctioned or removed.
565. See infra Part IV.J (discussing relieffrom the automatic stay and adequate protection).
Plank believes that giving effect to ipso facto defaults for the benefit of the other party would
violate the Non-Interference Principle and that preventing the other party from relying on a
bankruptcy filing or the like under an ipso facto clause does not violate the Non-Expropriation
Principle. Federalism, supra note 136, at 1123 n.215, 1126-32. Accordingly, he believes that
Section 365 is constitutionally acceptable in this respect. ld. Admirably, out of concern for the
interests of nondebtor parties, § 365 does not pennit the assumption of certain contracts and
leases. These include personal service contracts, such as an opera singer or artist, and other
contracts that are nondelegable under nonbankruptcy law, absent consent from the nondebtor
party, and contracts to make a loan or otherwise to extend financing. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)-(2)
(2000).
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3. Assignment

Section 365 appropriately recognizes that an executory contract or lease
may ·have a greater value if assigned to a third party than would be the case if it
was retained by the debtor. For example, a trustee, including a Chapter 11
debtor in possession, may lack sufficient financing and other resources
necessary to perform the contract or lease itself, even though it would be
profitable or otherwise valuable to another party. Accordingly, Section 365
facilitates the assignment of a contract or lease by the trustee in order to
preserve its value. But Section 365 also recognizes the interests of the
nondebtor party. It requires, as a condition of assignment, that the trustee
assume the contract or lease, thus invoking the protective provisions such as
curing defaults and compensation for the nondebtor party's losses,566 as well as
providing adequate assurance of the assignee's future performance.567
Notwithstanding its significant appreciation ofthe risks that might be imposed
on a nondebtor party by an assignment, Section 365 nonetheless interferes with
a nondebtor party's nonbankruptcy entitlements in two material respects.
These infringelnents must confront procedure theory's baseline insistence that
substantive nonbankruptcy entitlements be respected.
First, Section 365 overrides and nullifies contractual restrictions on
assignment, such as provisions that prohibit assignment or that would terminate
or modify the contract or lease upon assignment, even though those restrictions
may be effective under nonbankruptcy law. 568 Second, it imposes a novation
on the nondebtor party following an assignlnent-the trustee and the estate are
relieved from liability, and the obligations of the assignee are substituted for
that liability.569 Consequently, the nondebtor party's future interests depend on
the adequate assurance ofthe assignee's future performance, mentioned above.
For the same reasons and on the saIne analysis presented above,57o these
adequate assurance and other nondebtor party protections arguably could
reconcile procedure theory with a novation that substitutes the assignee's
performance for that ofthe trustee following assignInent. But procedure theory
probably should condelnn the nullification of contractual restrictions on
assignment which force a nondebtor party into an ongoing relationship with a
566. See supra notes 557-61 and accompanying text (discussing assumptions of executory
contracts).
567. 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(2) (2000).
568. 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1 )-(3) (2000).
569. 11 U.S.C. § 365(k) (2000).
570. See supra notes 563--65 and accompanying text (discussing assumption
notwithstanding an ipso facto bankruptcy default provision).
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stranger. There may be important reasons why the nondebtor party may wish to
pick and choose its business relationships notwithstanding assurances of
571
performance.
Indeed, Plank argues that overriding the otherwise effective
restriction on assignment is unconstitutional. 572

4. Timing and Delay
In addition to opting for rejection, assulTIption, or assignment and
assumption of an executory contract or lease, the trustee has a fourth optiontake no action. The timing of the trustee's decision often is of extreme
importance and concern to a nondebtor party. Several specific rules in Section
365(d) address the timing issue. The baseline rule in a Chapter 11 case permits
assumption or rejection "at any tilue before confinuation of a plan," but it
authorizes the court to order the trustee to decide "within a specified period" if
requested by a nondebtor party to a contract or lease. 573
One could hardly imagine a luore procedural aspect of bankruptcy law
than the timing issue. Obviously, the trustee lTIUSt have an opportunity to
investigate, analyze, and assess the potential value or burden of the debtor's
contracts and leases, and procedure theory should be accommodating.
However, a general reconciliation of procedure theory with the central features
ofthe statutory scheme for rejection, assumption, and assignment of executory
contracts and leases depends primarily on its protection of the nonbankruptcy
entitlements of the nondebtor party. Accordingly, what procedure theory can
accept in concept, a reasonable delay, could be rendered unacceptable by the
exercise ofjudicial discretion that fails to afford reasonable protection for these

571. I use the word "probably" advisedly in the preceding sentence. It is possible that a
study of the sort of legal restrictions-as opposed to contractual restrictions-on assignment
which, under Section 365(c), are not overridden would reveal an adequate source of protection
for the interests of nondebtor parties. When the obligation owed to a person such as the
nondebtor party amounts only to an obligation to pay money, the trend in nonbankruptcy law is
to render restrictions on assignment (both contractual and legal) ineffective. See U.C.C. 9406(d) (1999) (providing that contractual restrictions on celiain assignments of accounts, chattel
paper, and payment intangibles are ineffective); U.C.C. 9-406(f) (1999) (providing that legal
restrictions on assignments of accounts, chattel paper, and payment intangibles are ineffective).
Although Section 365(f) might be reconciled with procedure theory through nuanced statutory
modifications that distinguish various types of contracts and leases, procedure theory is served
best by deference to nonbankruptcy law.
572. See Federalisn1, supra note 136, at 1122 (discussing the exercise of state law rights).
573. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (2000). This provision also applies in Chapters 9,12, and 13.
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entitlements. It follows that procedure theory would favor more precise, clearly
drawn time limitations with less judicial discretion to grant extensions. 574

G. The Individual Debtor's Discharge and the "Fresh-Start" Principle

Procedure theory calls on bankruptcy law to provide a system that enforces
nonbankruptcy legal entitlelnents and enhances the recoveries of a debtor's
rightsholders. Yet a central feature-if not the central feature-of an
individual's Chapter 7 bankruptcy case is the debtor's entitlement to a
discharge of prebankruptcy claims. 575 Following discharge, creditors are
enjoined from seeking to recover on their discharged claims. 576 At first blush
an individual's right to a discharge seems to conflict directly with procedure
theory. Unsatisfied claims essentially are abolished. 577 This section addresses
the relationship between procedure theory and the individual's bankruptcy
discharge.
The bankruptcy discharge of claiIns against an insolvent debtor is a
venerable concept. 578 The first bankruptcy law providing for a discharge under
English law was contained in the Statute of 4 Anne. 579 Bankrupts who were
574. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(I) (2000) (providing a contract or lease is deemed
rejected in a Chapter 7 case if the trustee fails to assume or reject it within sixty days after the
date of the bankruptcy filing, unless extended by the court "for cause"). An alternative view is
that the timing question is purely procedural and therefore strictly consistent with procedure
theory's acceptance of bankruptcy law as a procedural system for vindicating nonbankruptcy
entitlements. Under this view, unreasonable delays do not contravene procedure theory; they
simply amount to ineffective and inefficient procedure.
575. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (2000) (providing for a debtor's discharge from all
prebankruptcy debts and certain other claims); see also 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2000) (setting out
exceptions under which no discharge will be given); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2000) (specifying
exceptions to the discharge of specific debts).
576. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2000) (voiding judgments on discharged debts, enjoining
enforcement of discharged debts, and enjoining enforcement against certain property of the
debtor).
577. The statement in the text accurately describes the result in most cases. As a
conceptual matter, however, discharged claims are not extinguished. While the discharge voids
prebankruptcy judgments, it operates only as an injunction against enforcement of discharged
claims. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2000). Discharged claims may be reaffirmed by a debtor, subject
to protective restrictions, and a debtor may voluntarily pay a discharged claim. 11 U.S.C.
§ 524(c)-(d), (f) (2000) (governing reaffirmations and voluntary repayment).
578. For an excellent historical overview of the development of the bankruptcy discharge
under English and United States law, see generally Discharge, supra note 254.
579. 4 Ann. c. 17 (1705). John McCoid points to earlier beginnings of the discharge in
English law. See John C. McCoid, II, Discharge: The Most In1portant Development in
Bankruptcy History, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 163, 177-78 ( 1996) (discussing the role of the
Chancery in the early seventeenth century and an ordinance issued in 1654 (citing C. S. FIRTH &
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honest and cooperative were entitled to a discharge of prebankruptcy debts,
however, only if a majority ofthe bankrupt's "comlTIissioners" certified that the
bankrupt had acted in conformity to the act. 580 While there is some
disagreement as to the underlying lTIotivations for Parliament's enactment of
the Statute of 4 Anne, the most compelling view is that its overarching goal was
to enhance the recoveries of creditors (perhaps supplemented by some human
compassion for distressed debtors).581 As Charles Tabb explained:
The discharge was the "carrot" offered to induce debtors to cooperate in
disclosing and turning over their estates; the death penalty was the "stick."

Certainly, the primary purpose of the act was to facilitate creditors'
recoveries; the title of and preamble to the statute make that abundantly
clear. One scholar states that the bill was introduced in direct response to
the notorious frauds of 'Thomas Pitkyn in 1704. The prerequisite to the
debtor receiving a discharge-"confonning" to the act-shows the
fundamentally creditor-oriented basis of the law, since the required
confonning activities were designed to enlarge and ease the creditors'
recoveries. Furthermore, the very rapid retreat taken by Parliament, which
soon required creditor consent to the discharge, indicates that the interests
ofthe creditor were paramount. Finally, the predominance ofthe creditors'
interests is shown by the limitation to traders, and the reservation to
creditors of the right to institute bankruptcy proceedings. 582

Offering a discharge as a tool for inducing debtor cooperation also was a
583
justification advanced for the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 in the United States.
And this concept continues to playa role in the availability of a discharge under
current law. 584
R.S. RAIT, II ACTS AND ORDINANCES OF THE INTERREGNUM, .1642-60, at240 (4 Sept. 1649»)).
580. Discharge, supra note 254, at 333-34.
581. See id. at 337 ("The primary purpose of the act was to facilitate creditors'
recoveries. ").
582. Id. at 336-37 (footnotes omitted).
583. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral
Conversions and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 90-94 (1990)
[hereinafter Fresh Start] (discussing this "debtor cooperation theory" of dischargeability);
Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consun1er Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 1047,
1049-50 (1987) (identifying one "major function" of bankruptcy in the United States as a
collection mechanism).
584. In noting that "[t]he debtor cooperation theory continues to thrive under current ...
bankruptcy law," Tabb points out that most of the grounds for a complete denial ofa discharge
under current law are based on a debtor's noncooperation. Fresh Start, supra note 583, at 92 &
n.267. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2000) (providing exceptions to discharge under Chapter 7). But
Tabb also explains that provision for exceptions to the discharge do not fit well with the debtor
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The debtor cooperation paradiglu lueshes well with procedure theory. It
illustrates that a debtor's right to a discharge in bankruptcy, while on one level
serving to disadvantage the debtor's creditors, also could provide a net gain for
the creditors. Perhaps, as an empirical matter, the discharge of individuals in
bankruptcy has the effect of increasing recoveries of creditors, although that is
585
far from clear.
While it may continue to be recognized as a material
justification for discharge, the debtor cooperation model does not provide a
complete explanation of discharge (and exceptions to discharge) or a complete
normative theory of discharge under past or current law.
In the years before and after enactluent of the Statute of 4 Anne,
586
considerable concerns were expressed for the plight of the insolvent debtor.
The same can be said of the period that preceded the enactlnent of the

cooperation theory; these exceptions provide disincentives to debtor cooperation. Fresh Start,
supra note 583, at 92-94.

585. An empirical showing to this effect would bring procedure theory into harmony with
the discharge. But support by the consumer credit industry for bankruptcy reform suggests that
some in the industry hold contrary beliefs. These reforms would screen out from eligibility for a
Chapter 7 discharge conSUlner debtors who are thought to be able to pay a portion oftheir debts
out of future income (so-called "means-testing"). See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 975, 108th Congo (2003) (Engrossed as Passed by
House) (providing a needs-based bankruptcy scheme). For critiques ofthese proposed reforms,
see Jean Braucher, Means Testing Consun1er Bankruptcy: The Problen1 ofMeans, 7 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 407,454-55 (2002) ("Ifbetter means testing is wanted, attention needs to be
paid to the means of achieving it, so that the worst off and most in need of a fresh start are not
priced out of the consumer bankruptcy systeln. ");Death, supra note 368, at 12-45 (critiquing
the "means testing" approach); Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Taking the New
Consumer Bankruptcy Modelfor a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 27, 61 (1998) ("[M]eans-testing as enshrined in H.R. 3150 will not go the
distance. ").
586. See Discharge, supra note 254, at 338-39 (discussing the English statutes' concern
for the debtor) (footnotes omitted). The text states:
It would be a mistake, however, to ascribe to Parliament no concern for the debtor's
interests. The century preceding the passage of the Statute of 4 Anne had seen
considerable agitation regarding the plight of honest insolvents, and indeed
Parliament had on several occasions acted to improve the situation of such debtors,
albeit without notable impact. As the "Age of Reason" moved into full bloom,
thoughtful persons began to recognize a moral distinction between fraudulent
debtors and honest but unfortunate traders, a distinction nicely crystallized in the
provisions of the Statute of 4 Anne. The importance of commercial credit to the
growth of commerce, the possibility of honest losses suffered solely because ofthe
uncertainties of trade, and the corresponding need for lnerchants to be able to limit
their liability, were all recognized ....
Id. Blackstone and others, writing approximately half a century after the passage of the 1705
Act, unmistakenly identified concern for the honest debtor as one of the bases upon which the
bankruptcy acts rested. Id.
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Bankruptcy Act of 1800 in the United States. 58 ? Today, as well, the debtor's
interests are at the heart of some argulnents that have been advanced to explain
and justify the bankruptcy discharge. Discharge can be explained as a humane
policy that relieves an honest but insolvent individual from burdensome debt,
thereby restoring the debtor's self-worth and promoting Inorality.588 Somewhat
related to a humanitarian justification for the discharge, but conceptually
distinct, is a policy of rehabilitation or social utility. Under this approach, the
discharge is seen as furthering the policy of returning the debtor to productive
participation in the economy while relnoving the disincentive to work caused
589
by excessive debt.
That is, of course, good news for the debtor. But
rehabilitation theory focuses mainly on the benefits that the discharge brings to
society more generally. 590 Another instrulnental justification for the bankruptcy
discharge points to the discharge as a proxy for limited liability that encourages
entrepreneurs to take risks and encourages consumers to obtain credit. 591 Yet
587. See MANN, supra, note 264, at 186 ("[I]t is evident that the purpose behind
empowering Congress [pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause] to establish uniform laws on
bankruptcy was to protect debtors-albeit not all debtors-as well as creditors, a dual purpose
recognized by at least some participants in the ratification debates. ").
588. See GROSS, supra, note 9, at 102-03 (discussing discharge based on "humanitarian
grounds" and as a part of "a humanely functioning society"); rj"esh Start, supra note 583, at 9599 (discussing the "humanitarian theory" of discharge).
589. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (stating that discharge is "of
public as well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor ... a new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort"); Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and
Bankruptcy: The Meaning of 'Fresh Start', 45 HASTINGS L.J. 175, 206-09 (1994) (providing an
economic account of discharge focusing on removing disincentives for debtor to work); Fresh
Start, supra note 583, at 94-95 (discussing the "social utility theory" of discharge); Howard,
supra note 583, at 1062, 1069 (discussing the "economic rehabilitation" function of discharge
that restores "participation in the open credit econolny").
590. Id. at 1062, 1069-70 ("Only the rehabilitative purpose of restored participation in the
open credit economy remains as a meaningful goal of discharge. "). Tabb describes a related
aspect of the rehabilitation or social utility theory as repairing the "fabric of society" that is tom
during times of "widespread financial ruin and calamity." f'resh Start, supra note 583, at 9495. Tabb also notes that "[t]he nonwaivable aspect of the discharge can be explained by this
theory, in that waiver might generate externalities, which debtors might systematically ignore."
Id. at 94.
As in the case of the debtor cooperation model, an empirical case could be made that the
rehabilitation paradigm is consistent with procedure theory because the discharge provides net
gains for creditors. For example, in the area of conSUlner bankruptcy it is plausible that most
creditors are repeat players as extenders of conSUlner credit (banks that issue credit cards,
automobile finance companies, and landlords among others). Restoring discharged debtors to
the credit markets has the effect of increasing the universe of creditworthy customers for those
creditors holding discharged claims but who wish to engage in future business with the
discharged debtors.
591. See Fresh Start, supra note 583, at 100-03 (discussing the "limited liability" and
"economic efficiency" theory); John M. Czarnetzky, The Individual and Failure: A Theory of
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another rationale focuses on the impulsive tendencies of individuals to obtain
excessive credit and their systelnatic underestiInation of the risks inherent in
credit. 592 Unsurprisingly, reactions among COlnlnentators to this' perplexing
593
Moreover, some of the
array ofjustifications for the discharge have varied.
justifications for discharge either do not adequately explain or support, or
actually conflict with, the various exceptions to the discharge under current
594
law.
Clearly no consensus exists as to the justification for the bankruptcy
discharge and the debtor's corresponding fresh start. Theories abound-some
are competing, SOlne are complementary. Interestingly, there does seem to be
agreement approaching consensus among Inany (but not all) acadelnics that the
discharge generally is justified, that current law has it about right, and that no
595
major overhaul is needed.
Any attempt here to pose a resolution of the
current debates would push this project far beyond its feasible scope.
What, then, can procedure theory offer concerning the bankruptcy
discharge? First, it supports the retention, even expansion, of the debtor
596
cooperation paradigm in bankruptcy law.
Second, procedure theory urges
that whatever purpose or purposes Inay be served by the bankruptcy discharge,
the discharge should be circumscribed as Inuch as possible without
undermining those ends. For example, Jean Braucher and I recently proposed,
as a substitute for Ineans testing proposals pending in Congress,597 a
598
modification to the discharge provisions featuring a novel approach.
Our
the Bankruptcy Discharge, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 393, 412-15 (2000) (arguing that discharge is
justified by the "entrepreneurial hypothesis" that the discharge is a part of the institutional
market system that encourages entrepreneurship).
592. See Fresh Start, supra note 583, at 99-100 (discussing Jackson's "systematic
overborrowing theory"). See generally JACKSON, supra note 70, at 232-43. For a scathing
critique of Jackson's theory of discharge, see Philosophy, supra note 49, at 1356-76.
593. Compare Fresh Start, supra note 583, at 103 (providing that "discharge and its
exceptions seem driven, in differing degrees, by a variety of normative policies, some of which
conflict .... [A] coherent discharge policy requires a thoughtful and balanced consideration of
these different policies. "), with Howard, supra, note 583, at 1069 (stating that "discharge ... of
non-tort claims should have only one goal-to restore the debtor to economic productivity and
viable participation in the open credit economy").
594. See, e.g., supra notes 583-85 and accompanying text (discussing debtor-cooperation
theory).
595. See supra note 585 (providing commentary critical of means-testing proposals). But
see Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time/or Means-Testing, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REv. 177,
248 (1999) (arguing in support of means-testing).
596. See supra notes 583-85 and accompanying text (discussing the justifications for
discharge).
597. See supra note 585 (discussing the effect of discharge).
598. See generally Jean Braucher & Charles W. Mooney, .If., Means Measurement Rather
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system would capture postdischarge earned incolne, assessed along the lines of
a progressive income tax, for a period of three to five years following an
individual's discharge in Chapter 7. 599 In effect, the system would assess a
progressive bankruptcy surcharge based on a debtor's postbankruptcy taxable
6oo
It would balance a debtor's interest in a discharge and a fresh start
income.
against the normative principle that a debtor that can pay some or all of her
prepetition discharged debt should be required to pay.601
Limiting the assessment period following bankruptcy to a few years is a
concession to political realities,602 but procedure theory would support an
indefinite surcharge so long as the discharged claims had not been satisfied in
full. Thus, procedure theory can inform the dischargeability debates at the
margin. But even under an unliInited assessment period, were the debtor never
to earn sufficient incolne for the asseSSlnents to be applicable the discharge
would be effective to prevent any postbankruptcy collections (the same result as
under current law). It follows that there relnains a residual tension between
603
As the foregoing summary
procedure theory and the bankruptcy discharge.
Than Means Testing: Using the Tax System to Collect/rom Can-Pay Consumer Debtors After
Bankruptcy, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 6 (Feb. 2003) (proposing modifications to the discharge
provisions).
599. Id. at 6, 56.

600.

Id.

60 I. Id. at 6. Even harsh critics of the means-testing proposals agree with this principle.
See, e.g., Death, supra note 368, at 13 ("[I]t is hard to argue it is fair to permit people who can
repay to skip out on their debts. ").
602. And also, perhaps, it is concession to Braucher's views in our jointly authored piece,
as she might not support a lengthier period.
603. Another argument for reco,nciling procedure theory with the discharge focuses on the
fresh start cousin of the discharge, exempt property. State laws (and some nonbankruptcy
federal laws) provide that a portion of an individual debtor's property is exempt from the reach
of creditors, though there is a wide disparity among the state laws. See BAIRD, supra note 404,
at 32, 46-47 (discussing the historical progression of exempt property and the irregularity of
state rules). Moreover, most states have opted out of the federal exemptions provided in
§ 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, thereby making state law exemptions of those states
applicable in a bankruptcy case of a resident of one of those states. See TABB, supra note 136,
§ 9.2 at 643-45 (discussing II U. S. C. § 522(b)( 1), which permits states to opt out of the II
U.S.C. § 522(d) federal exemptions for their residents). Looking to state law-and
nonbankruptcy federal law, when applicable-for a debtor's exemptions is fully consistent with
procedure theory. Moreover, the argument goes, there are both practical and constitutional
reasons why leaving the bankruptcy discharge to state law is not feasible. See supra notes 26566 and accompanying text (discussing state law bankruptcy and insolvency statutes in effect in
the absence of a federal bankruptcy law). And, that some states enacted statutes providing for a
bankruptcy discharge is some evidence that if the states could provide an effective bankruptcy
discharge perhaps they would do so. See MANN, supra note 264, at 203 (discussing the 1790s
Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Maryland statutes pennitting discharge on special petition to the
legislature). This is especially so today inasmuch as the bankruptcy discharge is generally well
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of the theoretical debates suggests, the bankruptcy discharge under current law,
including the exceptions to discharge (general and specific), represent compromises
alnong a number ofcompeting values. As Charles Tabb has observed,""[t]he rub, of
course, is how to reconcile the conflicting demands ofjustice and mercy. Justice
says that a debtor should be compelled to pay his debts whenever possible ....
Mercy says that the debtor should be relieved of his debts. ,,604
The bankruptcy discharge is based in part-perhaps in large part-on
normative grounds that are independent of procedure theory's concern for the
vindication of legal entitlements. As it relates to an individual Chapter 7 debtor,
bankruptcy law generally is bifurcated between lnatters relating to the application of
prepetition assets toward the satisfaction ofprepetition claims and those concerning
the individual debtor's postpetition life, including the discharge and the related
injunction. Procedure theory lnay infonn the latter segment, as discussed above, but
it addresses and instructs pritnarily the former. That procedure theory cannot fully
explain or justify the bankruptcy discharge, however, in no way undercuts
procedure theory's clear normative and explanatory purchase with respect to these
6os
other aspects of bankruptcy law, which is its prilnary focus.

H Chapter 11 Discharge
ConfIrmation ofa plan in Chapter 11 "discharges the debtor from any debt that
606
Although the discharge
arose before the date" of the order confirming the plan.
accepted in principle. This argument-that the bankruptcy discharge would be a feature ofstate
law but for the essential need for a single federal system-is sinlilar to the argument supporting
the consistency of procedure theory and pro rata sharing. See supra Part IV. C (discussing pro
rata sharing). But, unlike pro rata sharing, as to which there are strong reasons to believe that
creditors in general benefit from the doctrine, it is not clear that the discharge generally benefits
creditors. See supra note 585 and accompanying text (discussing empirical questions
concerning debtor-cooperation theory).
604. Fresh Start, supra note 583, at 113. This tension of justice and mercy also can be
analyzed in economic terms. A recent economic analysis tnodels the discharge and identifies
the tension between the discharge as insurance against low income and the corresponding
reduction of a debtor's incentive to avoid becoming insolvent. See generally Barry Adler et al.,
Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (2000).
605. Note also that the various theories put forth to justify the discharge provide virtually
no guidance whatsoever on the bulk of bankruptcy law, which is unrelated to the discharge.
They offer nothing useful in resolving normative and policy questions, such as those raised by
the plant closing example and the proposed priority rule discussed in Part III.A-B, or for the
understanding of issues such as property of the estate, avoidance powers, or executory contracts
and leases. They generally address only one artifact of bankruptcy law (albeit an important
artifact for the individual debtor in bankruptcy), the discharge.
606. 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (d)( 1)(A) (2000). It also "tenninates all rights and interests of equity
security holders and general partners provided for by the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 114I(d)(I)(B)
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appears to override the legal entitlements of a debtor's rightsholders, properly
viewed it is fully consistent with procedure theory. Absent consent, under the "best
interests" test, confmnation generally requires that each holder ofa claim or interest
receive property of a value not less than the holder would receive in a Chapter 7
liquidation ofthe debtor. 607 This policy is consistent with the goal ofreorganization
and of procedure theory, to enhance and preserve value for the benefit of the
rightsholders. In exchange for the discharge, then, holders of claims or interests
receive the modified package of property and rights provided under the plan. 608
In Chapter 11, as with the nonbankruptcy judicial enforcement of any claim,
recoveries are applied to and discharge the claim. But there is a difference with a
Chapter 11 discharge because debts are not discharged pro tanto based on the value
received as in judicial enforcement outside bankruptcy; they are discharged entirely.
While the discharge prevents a rightsholder from maintaining its prebankruptcy
legal entitlements indefinitely, as a practical matter that ability would not exist in
any event under nonbankruptcy law even in the absence the Chapter 11 discharge.
Without the power to lTIodify its financial structure, the debtor would have little
incentive to tile under Chapter 11. And assunling in lTIOSt cases that the alternative
to reorganization would be liquidation, in Chapter 7 or otherwise, the absence of a
discharge in liquidation would represent a distinction without a difference. 609
Following liquidation, no one could expect that additional investments or operations
would provide renewed value for the vestigial "shell" tirnl.
1. Priority Claims Under Bankruptcy Code Section 507

As a general matter, procedure theory regards the priority scheme for
unsecured creditors in Bankruptcy Code Section 507(a) to be the lTIOSt noxious
feature of bankruptcy law. 610 This view is not because that section blatantly
(2000).
607. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2000) (establishing the "best interests" test).
608. In Chapters 12 and 13 the discharge normally is not given until the debtor has
completed all payments under a confirmed plan,subject to certain exceptions. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1228(a)-(b) (2000) (providing the general rule and the exceptions). These discharge
provisions are even more faithful to procedure theory than the Chapter 11 discharge, which is
given upon confirmation. See supra note 606 (discussing the confirmation of a plan in Chapter
11 ).
609. The discussion contemplates that the debtor is not an individual. Entities such as
corporations do not receive a discharge in Chapter 7. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(I) (2000) (liThe
court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless-( 1) the debtor is not an individual. ").
610. The priority provisions are not, however, as high on the culpability scale from the
perspective of procedure theory as would be the allocation of rightsholders' wealth to benefit
the interests of persons or groups when those interests do not consist of legal entitlements-for
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benefits congressional favorites (which it does)611 or because the beneficiaries
necessarily are undeserving (they lnay be),612 but because it is wrong. 613 It is
wrong for Congress to allocate assets first to those who have no legal
entitlements to be paid first under nonbankruptcy law.
There is rOOln for some exceptions to procedure theory's general
hostility to bankruptcy-only priority rules. A priority could be justified to the
extent that the priority afforded in bankruptcy would .have the result of
improving, or at least not detracting from, the recoveries and benefits of the
rightsholders who are subordinated to the priority claimants. For example,
the collective benefits of bankruptcy would be substantially hindered,
whether in liquidation or reorganization, were professionals and others who
transact postpetition business with the debtor not entitled to an administrative
priority under Section 507(a)(1 ).614 SiInilarly, one might argue that the
priority rule for prepetition wage claims provides an incentive for employees
to remain on the job and that it thereby furthers the goal of a successful
615
reorganization.
For the most part nonbankruptcy law could, if the relevant lawgivers so
wished, accommodate the apparent policies underlying the Section 507(a)
priorities. For example, state law or general, nonbankruptcy federal statutes
providing for nonconsensual general liens on a debtor's assets could provide
substantial protection for elnployee claims, employee benefit contribution
claims, and the claims of grain farlners and fishers. Moreover, liens for taxes
under both state and federal law already are comlnon. 616 0 f course,

example, future employment and comn1unity interest. See supra Part III.A-B (discussing the
interests of rightsholders). At least the favored priority claimants hold real claims under
nonbankrutpcy law.
611. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(5) (2000) (granting fifth priority for certain claims of grain
farmers and United States fishers).
612. For example, the third priority rank provided for certain wage claims may recognize
that most employees have only one job, making them poor risk spreaders.
613. Cf GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 96 (Penguin Group 1996) (1946) ("All animals
are equal but some animals are more equal than others. ").
614. See TABB, supra note 136, § 7.7, at 494 (discussing priority of administrative claims).
This policy does not mean that administrative expense priorities as applied necessarily further
the goal of enhancing the benefits for rightsholders. For example, it is entirely possible that the
effect of the priority across the entire run of Chapter 11 cases is to deplete wealth to the
detriment of rightsho lders and to the benefit of professionals.
615. I do not make that argument but mention it only as the genre of explanations that
procedure theory could accept. Presumably those who lnight make this argument are not the
ones who argue that keeping their jobs is the paramount concern for employees.
616. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (2000) (providing a lien on all of taxpayer's property in
favor of United States if taxpayer fails to pay federal taxes).
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exceptions and priority rules might be necessary to accommodate the interests
of buyers and secured creditors and the resulting structure might not replicate
exactly the Section 507(a) priorities.
Procedure theory would push the argulnent even further. Given the
substantial deference that the Bankruptcy Code gives to nonbankruptcy law
with respect to property" transfers,617 there is no principled reason, given the
essentially procedural functions of bankruptcy law, why nonbankruptcy law
should not effectively establish priorities that would be binding in
bankruptcy.618 This approach would contravene not only doctrine but a
longstanding cultural aspect of bankruptcy policy.619 But on consideration of
the general respect that the Bankruptcy Code lnaintains for nonbankruptcy
liens, this move would not be as radical as it Inight appear at first blush.
Moreover, the same argulnent would apply equally to the creation of
nonbankruptcy law statutory liens triggered by insolvency. Of course,
respecting those liens would require a modification of Bankruptcy Code
620
Section 545.
The foregoing discussion bears directly on arglunents made by a handful
of academics that in bankruptcy contract claitns (and, perhaps, even secured
contract claims) should be fully or partially subordinated to tort claims-the
"tort-first" argument. 621 Elsewhere I have expressed skepticism about the
merits of the tort-first proposals. 622 But procedure theory, by its nature, would
assess the tort-first argument while conceding that tort-first could provide a
normatively superior regime, whether evaluated on efficiency grounds or on
another basis. Yet procedure theory lnaintains that tort-first proposals are the
domain of nonbankruptcy law.
617. See supra Part IV .A (discussing the "Property of the Estate").
618. Presumably, these priorities would apply in the case of insolvency, whether inside or
outside bankruptcy.
619. See TABB, supra note 136, § 7.7, at 496 ("The states are not permitted to establish
priorities that will be effective in bankruptcy cases. The federal priority scheme set out in
§ 507(a) preempts state priorities under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution."). Even if
state-created priorities were generally honored in bankruptcy, federal bankruptcy law should not
honor priorities designed to favor one state's residents over another. Otherwise, an important
goal of a uniform federal bankruptcy law could be undercut. See supra notes 265-66 and
accompanying text (discussing federalism concerns of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction).
620. See 11 U.S.C. § 545( 1) (2000) (providing avoidance of statutory liens that are
triggered by a bankruptcy filing, insolvency, or similar events or conditions).
621. For a review of subordination proposals, see generally Social Costs, supra note 168,
at 1349-55.
622. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Judgn'lent Proofing, Bankruptcy Policy, and the Dark Side of
Tort Liability, 52 STAN. L. REV. 73,75-76 (1999) [hereinafter Judgn1ent Proofing] (questioning
the basis and effectiveness of tort law).
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One apparent advantage of itnporting a tort-first priority regime into
bankruptcy law, even an advantage quasi-procedural in its effect, is the relative
convenience of administration in a collective proceeding. This argument
follows the same line of reasoning applied to justify and reconcile with
procedure theory pro rata sharing in bankruptcy.623 It would be easier to
administer a priority regime in a collective proceeding than in individual
lawsuits (such as a suit grounded in tort) in which the subordinated class of
parties (such as general contract creditors) are not involved. 624 Moreover, it is
the scarcity of resources presulned to exist in a bankruptcy case involving an
insolvent debtor that would drive the need for a tort-first priority rule.
Procedure theory can marshal several responses to this argulnent. First, it
would be much easier to impose tort-first as a matter ofnonbankruptcy law than
it would be to impose pro rata sharing. Statutory liens, incorporating a lis
pendens feature or other notice systems, are common under nonbankruptcy
law. 625 But pro rata sharing necessarily involves a collective proceeding
inasmuch as it affects all unsecured creditors.
Second, unlike pro rata sharing, which is ubiquitous in nonbankruptcy
collective insolvency contexts, in the United States there is no nonbankruptcy
tradition or historical normative support for tort-first. Instead, nonbankruptcy
law must be understood as cOlnlnanding equality alnong unsecured creditors,
irrespective of the doctrinal nature of those claims, while accepting the race of
diligence as an essential cOlnponent of enforceability in the absence of
insolvency.626 Pro rata sharing gives effect to the essential equality of
unsecured creditors outside bankruptcy. Tort-first, on the other hand, would
promote some otherwise equal creditors to the detriment of other, demoted
creditors. Moreover, if anything, SOlne nonbankruptcy and bankruptcy doctrine
627
would support a tort-second approach.
623. See supra Part IV.C (discussing pro rata sharing).
624. See Philosophy, supra note 49, at 1380-81 n.123 (discussing the difficulty of
"marshaling" assets in a nonbankruptcy case in order to effect a tort-first regime).
625. Procedure theory could accolnmodate a bankruptcy-only tort-first regime only if it
would be virtually impossible or unfeasible to implement the regime under nonbankruptcy law.
Some advocates for the partial subordination of security interests have argued that a
nonbankruptcy regime is indeed feasible and, perhaps, superior to a bankruptcy-only
subordination regime. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, Should the Secured Credit Carve Out
Apply Only in Bankruptcy? A Systems/Strategic Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REv 1483 (1997);
William J. Woodward, Jf., The Carve-Out Proposal and Its Critics: A Response, 30 U.C.C. LJ.
32 (1997).
626. See supra note 477 and accompanying text (discussing pro rata sharing).
627. See Judgn1ent Proofing, supra note 622, at 74-75 (explaining that in many cases
when tort claims arise the debtor (tortfeasor) does not receive reasonably equivalent value in
connection with incurring the obligation, thereby raising the question whether these tort claims
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Third, similar to but distinct froln the second response, tort-first would not
affect, but would detract from, procedure theory's goal of enhancing the
benefits for rightsholders. It would punish some and reward others. Ifsociety
wishes to "tax" some to benefit others, then it should adopt a comprehensive
across-the-board system for providing benefits to victiIns of torts, not a
bankruptcy-specific redistribution of wealth. 628
Procedure theory must recognize that it is not merely in bankruptcy that
tort-first might have its principal effects. Indeed, advocates generally have
pointed to the caution-inducing instrumental effects that they claitn would
result from a tort-first regiIne. 629 Procedure theory alone cannot refute these
instrumental arguments. Instead, it maintains that the process of creating
63o
bankruptcy law is not the proper crucible for addressing these problems.
I
suspect that the likelihood that the process of reforming and administering
bankruptcy law will develop pathbreaking and revolutionary solutions, even
partial solutions, to the probielns of deterring tortious conduct and
compensating victims of torts is about the same as the probability that it will
631
improve the world by radically overhauling eInployInent law-slim to none.
Finally, consider the position that objectors to procedure theory must
embrace. The counter to procedure theory necessarily must hold that the proper
domain for bankruptcy-only priority rules includes any modification of
nonbankruptcy entitielnents whatsoever so long as the move is socially
beneficial and susceptible to better adIninistration (presulnably, no matter how
slight the advantage) in a collective proceeding. That is a plausible political
position for anyone who thinks that they and their ilk Inight manipulate the
bankruptcy reform process to their desired ends. The argument here, however,
is not about the merits of proposals such as tort-first but the proper scope of
bankruptcy law. The unbounded view of bankruptcy holds that once all of the

may be, or should be, avoidable under fraudulent transfer law). See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)
(2000) (concerning constructive fraud)~ supra Part IV.E.3 (discussing fraudulent transfers).
This argument implicates the merits of a tort-first regime but also is compatible with procedure
theory's acceptance of nonbankruptcy entitlelnents.
628. See generally STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW
(1989).
629. See, e.g., David W. Leebron, Linu'ted Liability, Tort Victin1s, and Creditors, 91
COLUM. L. REv. 1565, 1637-50 (1991) (discussing how bankruptcy "structure affects the
externalization of tort risk, and about the proper liability of debtholders"). For a brief skeptical
critique, see Social Costs, supra note 168, at 1364-70 (critiquing the tort-first regime).
630. See supra Part III.E (discussing public choice account of procedure theory).
631. Procedure theory cannot, however, resolve the empirical questions implied by the
statement in the text.
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assets and rightsholders are in court, bankruptcy's job is to do social justice
without regard to whether it tramples on nonbankruptcy legal entitlements.
J Adequate Protection/or Undersecured Creditors

Both the trustee in banl(ruptcy, or debtor in possession, and the holder of a
secured claim have a property interest in the property ofthe estate that is secured by
the secured claim. 632 In effect, a secured claiIn extends only to the value of the
collateral. Ifthat value is less than the claiIn, the claim is bifurcated into a secured
claim (equal to the collateral value) and an unsecured claim for the shortfall or
deficiency.633 The creditor holding such a secured claim is said to be an
"undersecured" creditor. When a debtor in possession possesses and uses a secured
creditor's collateral the creditor is entitled to "adequate protection" of its interest in
the collateral. 634 Fully consistent with procedure theory, this right to adequate
protection preserves the value ofthe secured creditor's nonbankruptcy entitlement
and avoids a redistribution ofthat value for the benefit ofthe unsecured creditors. 635
Outside bankruptcy the secured creditor would be entitled to enforce its lien,
such as by a disposition in a foreclosure proceeding, following the debtor's
default.636 By virtue of the automatic stay,637 however, the secured creditor is
denied this opportunity. Is the secured cred Hor entitled to adequate protection
for the delay caused by the stay in this context-for the time value of
632. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000) (discussing the bifurcation between the secured and
unsecured portions of allowed claims). The statue provides:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has
an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's
interest in the estate's interest in such property
and is an unsecured claim to the
extent that the value of such creditor's interest
is less than the amount of such
allowed claim.
Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (2000) (defining "lien" as a "charge against or interest in
property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation").
633. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000). If the value exceeds the clainl, of course, then the secured
claim is equal to the amount of the claim. Jd.
634. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2000). See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2000) (explaining and providing
examples of "adequate protection"). The "lack of adequate protection" also constitutes "cause"
for relief from the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(I) (2000). See supra Part IV.D
(discussing the automatic stay).
635. This policy views the unsecured creditors as the residual owners of an insolvent firm
who stand to gain from a successful reorganization. Adequately protecting the secured creditors
means that their assets are not dissipated to benefit the unsecureds who otherwise would be
"rolling the dice" with the secured creditors' collateral.
636. This discussion assumes, as is typical, that the debtor is in default.
637. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the automatic stay).
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money? The Supreme Court unanilnously answered "no" to this question in
United Savings Association v. Timbers ofInwood Forest Associates, LTD. 638
Although I believe that the court incorrectly decided the case as' a matter of
statutory interpretation, that is beside the point for present purposes. 639 The
result in Timbers (or in the Bankruptcy Code, assulning a correct interpretation
in Timbers) clearly contravenes procedure theory. Outside bankruptcy, the
creditor would be entitled to the liquidation value of the collateral on day X
and by virtue of the automatic stay, the secured creditor receives the value on
day X plus Yand, under Timbers, the creditor is not compensated-adequately
protected-for the delay.640 The secured creditor's property rights are being
sacrificed for the benefit of the unsecured creditors, plain and silnple.
The effect of Timbers is not merely wrong, it is outrageous. But even if
the Court overrules it or rectifies it with an aInendInent to the Bankruptcy Code,
I suspect that the judiciary often would find the lneans to offend procedure
. practIce.
. 641 P roce d ure t heory prov}·d es a normatIve
. b ottom to argue
t heory In
for a more radical adjustment ofthe treatment of secured claims in bankruptcy,
such as a requirement that the trustee or debtor in possession cure all defaults
within a specified period as a condition to retaining possession or control of
collateral.642

K. Other
This Part has exalnined some of the most itnportant features ofbankruptcy
law. In many respects, it found these features generally compatible with
procedure theory, although it also identified SOlne details of current doctrine
that cannot be reconciled. Those aspects should be confonned to procedure
theory. These aspects of bankruptcy law, while important, nonetheless are
638. United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., LTD., 484 U.S. 365, 382
(1988) (holding that "unsecured creditor is not entitled to interest on its collateral during the
stay").
639. For an article that predated Tin1bers and that argued in favor of protecting secured
creditors for the time value, see generally Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate
Reorganizations and the Treatnlent ofDiverse Ownership Interests: A Con1ment on Adequate
Protection ofSecured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97 (1984).
640. For a brief, clear exposition of the nonnative argument against the Timbers result, see
TABB, supra note 136, § 3.18, at 197.
641. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 4, at 93 (noting redistributive effect of Chapter 11
process).
642. Such a scheme could be patterned on the regime for commercial aircraft and ships in
Chapter 11 cases in which the debtor is an air carrier or water carrier. See 11 U. S. C. § 1110
(2000) (stating the Chapter 11 provisions regarding "Aircraft equipment and vessels").
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illustrative. Much of the legal landscape of bankruptcy remains to be examined
through the normative principles of procedure theory.
Additional aspects of bankruptcy law that could be informed by procedure
theory include corporate governance and securities regulation in Chapter 11,
additional issues relating to what constitutes a claim (including environmental
injunctions and covenants not to cOlnpete), postpetition financing, equitable
subordination, mass torts issues (including Bankruptcy Code Section 524(g),
future claims, and third party injunctions and releases), successor liability,
additional avoidance and related powers-including statutory liens, turnover
orders, postpetition after-acquired property and proceeds, and setoff-federal
and state exemptions, and first-day orders under the "doctrine of necessity."

V Conclusion

This Article develops a normative theory of bankruptcy, procedure theory
that understands bankruptcy law as a subset of civil procedure law. The proper
domain of bankruptcy law is in service to the interests of rightsholders that have
a relationship to a financially troubled debtor. Procedure theory holds that it
generally is wrong to ilnpair the interests of rightsholders for the benefit of
nonrightsholders or to reorder nonbankruptcy priorities in bankruptcy.
Procedure theory allows for exceptions to its baseline injunctions when
necessary and appropriate for bankruptcy law to fulfill its purpose. It identifies
what bankruptcy law should do, in general tenns, but it does not resolve the
optimal means for a bankruptcy law to achieve its appropriate goals of serving
the interests of rightsholders.
Procedure theory does not rely on a simplistic, label-based procedure
versus substance dichotomy for its normative content. It draws its normative
core from three similar but distinct accounts: The philosophical and
jurisprudential account, the civil procedure and federal court jurisdiction
account, and the public choice account. Each account condemns the existence
of one set of laws applicable in bankruptcy and another applicable outside
bankruptcy, unless there is a rational bankruptcy-related basis for a bankruptcyspecific or bankruptcy-only rule.
After establishing the content and normative grounds underlying
procedure theory, this Article examines several itnportant features of United
States bankruptcy law. It rationalizes the existence of several bankruptcy law
deviations from nonbankruptcy law and concludes that there are bankruptcyrelated reasons that justify these deviations. In other cases, however, procedure
theory identifies aspects of current bankruptcy law that cannot be justified and
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it calls for change. This Article demonstrates the utility of procedure theory as
a framework for a principled critique of current bankruptcy law and ofchanges
to bankruptcy law that might be proposed.

